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The

analytical

power should not be confounded with simple ingenuity;

for while the analyst

is necessarily ingenious, the ingenious man
is
often remarkably incapable of analysis. ...Between ingenuity
and the

analytic ability there exists a difference far greater, indeed, than
that
between the fancy and the imagination, but of a character very strictly

analogous.
fanciful,

It will be found, in fact, that the ingenious
are always
and the truly imaginative never otherwise than analytic.

"The Murders

in

Edgar Allan Poe
the Rue Morgue'’
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An

anti-skeptical transcendental

purports to

show

that

Aune

argument can be loosely defined as an argument

some experience

or

knowledge of an

external world

is

that

a

necessary condition of our possession of some knowledge, concept, or cognitive
ability that

we know we

have. In this dissertation

I

examine transcendental arguments

by focusing on one such argument given by Immanuel Kant

Reason along with some attempts
,

to interpret that

in his Critique

of Pure

argument by contemporary

commentators.

I

proceed by dividing anti-skeptical transcendental arguments into three types:

epistemological, verificationist, and psychological.

two types (themselves often described
succeed against the skeptic.
different type:

it

is

I

I

examine arguments of the

as ‘Kantian’) and

show why they cannot

then argue that Kant's Refutation of Idealism

psychological in that

forming beliefs of certain kinds.
his anti-skeptical strategy relies

it

first

is

of a

concerns the necessary conditions of our

Many contemporary Kant

scholars have claimed that

on phenomenalism or verificationism;

vi

I

argue.

however, that Kant
strategy

in the Refutation

employs a clever and

hitherto unappreciated

which involves an empiricist principle concerning the

origin of simple ideas,

and which does not require either phenomenalism or
verificationism.
an analysis and assessment of Kant's argument.

I

conclude with
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INTRODUCTION
SKEPTICISM

An

AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS

anti-skeptical transcendental

that purports to

show

that

argument can be loosely defined as an argument

some experience

or knowledge of an external world

is

a

necessary condition of our possession of some
knowledge, concept, or cognitive ability
that

we know we

have. In this essay

I

examine transcendental arguments by

shall

focusing on one such argument given by Immanuel
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason

along with some attempts to interpret that argument by
some
In

my

his Critique.

them.

I

I

first

chapter

I

modem

,

commentators.

introduce Kant's approach to epistemological skepticism in

explain the two main founts of skepticism and sketch Kant’s
response to

argue in this chapter that Kant has two answers to skepticism.

One such answer

involves a widely criticized sort of idealism, in which he appears to answer
skepticism by

embracing phenomenalism. However, Kant also presents

in the Critique

argument called the ‘Refutation of Idealism' which, while very
appears to be based on a different sort of reasoning.
this

argument as

it

In Chapters

is

difficult to interpret,

conclude Chapter One by sketching

presented and noting the difficulties in interpreting

Two

through Four

I

examine three approaches

argument and the correlative three basic approaches
argument. In Chapter

I

Two examine what
I

I

call the

an anti-skeptical

it.

to interpreting Kant’s

to the anti-skeptical transcendental

“epistemological” approach to

transcendental arguments and to Kant’s argument in particular. This approach focuses on
the necessary conditions of making justified judgments of certain kinds. Paul

Guyer has

argued that Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
external-world objects

is

is

an argument that claims that experience of

a necessary condition of making justified
judgments about the

temporal order of one’s subjective experiences.
in addition to

being unsubstantiated by the

text,

I

argue, however, that this interpretation,

cannot yield a successful anti-skeptical

argument.
In Chapter Three

examine the dominant view of transcendental arguments. On

I

this view, anti-skeptical transcendental

arguments

like

Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

concern the necessary conditions of making meaningful or
‘legitimate’ judgments of
certain kinds.

approach

is

I

call this

approach the “verificationist” or “Wittgenstinian" approach. This

influenced by logical positivism and by Wittgenstein's views on language.

I

begin by discussing logical positivism and examining a hypothetical
anti-skeptical
transcendental argument based on

its

doctrine of verificationism.

argue that

I

verificationism cannot be the basis for a successful argument of that kind because
the

skepticism in question can always be relocated to the level of the meaningfulness of one's
utterances.

I

then

move

to a slightly different class

Burge

in

of the

ability to refer to external-world objects.

which they claim

that experience

of argument given by Putnam and

of an external world

is

a necessary condition

For reasons similar

to

my

rejection of

verficiationism as the basis for a transcendental argument against the skeptic,
again, that this kind of argument cannot succeed.

skeptical argument based

In the last

I

I

claim,

then address a related sort of anti-

on Wittgenstein's views on private languages.

two sections of Chapter Three

I

examine

P.F. Strawson’s

and Jonathan

Bennett's interpretations of Kant’s anti-skeptical strategy. These interpretations explicitly

claim that Kant in the Refutation of Idealism attempts to show that the experience of an

2

external world

is

a necessary condition of making
"meaningful” or “legitimate”

judgments about one's subjective order of experiences.
This has become the received

view about the strategy behind

anti-skeptical transcendental arguments
generally, and

represents the kind of argument that has been
subject to devastating criticism by

commentators such as Barry Stroud and Anthony Brueckner.
sections

why

I

demonstrate

in these

such arguments cannot succeed against the skeptic,
for reasons similar to

those that defeated the other verificationism-based
arguments dealt with previously.
I

Bennett

believe not only that the quasi-Kantian arguments
presented by Strawson and
fail,

that there

is

but also that they do not represent Kant's reasoning.

I

argue in Chapter Four

a hitherto unappreciated alternative interpretation of the
Refutation of

Idealism which furthermore represents the best anti-skeptical
strategy of all those
consider. This

I

call the

"psychological" interpretation of the Refutation. The

psychological interpretation
external world

order of our

is

own

is

that

Kant intended

a necessary condition of our

subjective states.

I

to

claim that the experience of an

making any judgments

argument

is

in

Three.

I

I

go on

Kant’s reasoning.

interesting and

about the

it is

useful to look at Lipson's

resembles the argument of the Refutation of Idealism when that

understood correctly.

hidden premises

more

it

at all

introduce this interpretation by discussing another

transcendental argument presented by Morris Lipson;

argument because

I

more

I

to

defend

my

interpretation

also claim that Kant's real

difficult to defeat than those

and

to explain the

argument

is

rather

considered in Chapters

Two

and

conclude with a discussion of certain issues about temporal experience that may

cause problems for Kant’s argument.

3

CHAPTER

I

EPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM AND KANT’S REPLIES

1.

One of Immanuel
Cartesian and

Humean

states.

Our

its

Humean

Skepticism

Kant's goals in his Critique of Pure Reason

We have, proponents believe, no

constituents;

we

belief in the existence of material objects

is

make about

things exist at

the external world.' In fact,

if

I

cannot

I

being deceived by an evil

demon might be

demon

is in fact

I

1

sense-

cannot be certain of any

a disembodied

spirit

who

is

the real cause of all his sense-impressions. Alternatively, his sense-

rule out these possibilities (and others like them),

I

my

into thinking that there is a material world. This evil

unknown

then

that

sort

cannot be sure that any material

impressions might be caused by some hidden and

know

I

know

some

all.

Descartes considered the possibility that he

claim to

immediate contact with the

the result, therefore, of

impressions accurately represent the world around me, then
I

to refute both

are in direct contact only with our internal mental

of inference on the basis of our sense-impressions. But

judgment

was

skepticism about our knowledge of the external world.
Cartesian

skepticism arises as follows.
material world and

Cartesian and

that material objects (or

faculty in him. If I cannot

cannot, Descartes thought, justifiably

even a material world)

exist. If

I

cannot

know this,

cannot be said to have knowledge about the world outside of my perceptions. The

Rene Descartes, Meditations, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,

4

edited by

sort

of skepticism that denies that

I

can rule out the possibility of an unknown,
sensory

idea-producing faculty in me, or of a deceptive evil
sensory ideas in me,

is

demon with

the sort of skepticism about our

the

knowledge

power

that

I

to create

will henceforth

refer to as 'Cartesian skepticism'.

Hume

agrees with Descartes that

we

derive our alleged knowledge of objects

from inferences based on premises about the impressions of
our senses. In

Hume's view

come up

that all the

knowledge we possess, and

all

fact,

the meaningful ideas

it

is

we can

with, are ultimately derived either from the impressions
of our senses or from

ideas derived from those impressions. 2

material world

Hume's skepticism about our knowledge of the

stronger than that of Descartes.

is

On Hume's

view, even

if

we knew

that

our senses were not being deceived and that our sense-impressions accurately
reflected
the world around us,

we would

still

have no rational ground

to infer

on

their basis the

existence of independent, spatially and temporally extended substances which cause

sense-impressions in us. If this

is

the case, of course, then

we

could surely not be said to

have knowledge of such substances.

Hume

attacks our alleged

knowledge of the material world by attacking the key

concepts of substance and causation. According to him, our idea of enduring substance-

an idea of a substratum which persists through changes

in

an object's qualities

from the "easy transition" between one quality and another,

John Cottingham.
“

David Hume,

A

et al,

Vol.

II

in

—

arises

conjunction with the

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.12-6.
The Oxford University

Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. (Oxford:

Press, 1978), p.4.

5

mind's propensity to be deceived by this transition. 3

He

claims that

we

never actually

non-inferentially perceive a substance underlying the
changes in the sensory qualities

experience

when we look

at

supposed external objects. What we sense,

succession of qualities which

we

infer

may

or

may

by optical

rather, is a

not resemble each other; from this experience

an unchanging cause of the succession.

a kind of confusion of our imagination

we

We

somewhat

are led to

make such an

inference by

similar to the kind of confusion caused

illusions.
4

On Hume's

view,

all

we

really experience,

when we

are said to experience

substances independent of our minds, are similar impressions had

account of why

we

at different times.

His

think any external objects--any spatially and temporally extended

matter existing independently of our minds-exist

is

essentially the

same

as his account of

our belief in the existence of substance. Our ideas of external substances are derived from
ideas of apparent relations between similar but intrinsically unrelated sense-impressions,

and from the "easy transition" of the imagination from the thought of one such
impression to another.

compulsion

Because of these factors we experience a psychological

to infer the existence

of objects independent of our impressions which cause

them. The mere occurrence of these diverse impressions 'underdetermines',
the

judgment

that external,

without such things.

enduring objects

On Hume's

4
5

Hume,
Hume,
Hume,

when we

Treatise p.220.
,

Treatise p.254.
,

Treatise p.4
,

6

say,

same impressions could occur

view, the only meaningful ideas

derived from our impressions." But

J

exist; the

we might

we have

are those

posit the existence of substances or objects

separate from our impressions,

we go beyond what

is

actually given by our impressions

and beyond what could possibly be actually presented by our
senses. Thus,

strictly

speaking, beliefs about external objects, insofar as ideas of
such things are ideas of

something separate from sense-impressions, are meaningless.

Hume

takes a similar view of the idea of causation.

really experience,

one pool

when we experience an

ball allegedly

moving because

it

is

explains that what

we

alleged instance of cause and effect (such as

has been struck by another),

sense-impressions. The conclusion that the
of reason: there

He

first

is

event caused the second

a sequence of

is

not a product

never any contradiction in supposing that an event of a given type

not followed by an event ol another type, or vice-versa. The reason

why we

is

think there

is

a causal connection between perceived events (or between the alleged substances they

represent)

is that, in

the past,

we have

seen that experiences similar to the

followed by experiences of the second type. This leads us to think,
is

a causal connection between the

conclusion that there

is

a causal

two types of events. This

law stating

that events

followed by events of the second type. But there
experience in order to justify any such judgment.

between events of two types
coincidental.

the

first

Thus

it

is

is

of the

no way

To

all past,

to say that

first

have been

says, that there

we come

to the

type are necessarily

to appeal non-circularly to

say that there

to say that their conjunction

involves the claim that

is

Hume

first

is

is

a causal connection

necessary, rather than

present, and future occurrences of

type of event will be followed (given similar conditions) by an occurrence of an

event of the second type. Experience, however, can give us no evidence of what the

world will be

like in the future.

Since reason can give us no such guarantee either, there

7

can be no justification for inferring a causal
connection between two events. Thus, as
the case of judgments concerning substances,
since any such

judgment

underdetermined by reason and by any possible
experiential evidence,
rational or epistemic right to

make such

Consequently, for Hume,

we

active objects independent of our
said to

know

a judgment: any such

exist. If this is so,

that such objects exist; nor could

I

is

we have no

judgment

is

unjustified.

cannot justifiably or meaningfully say that causally

minds

their properties or causal relations.

in

we be

then clearly

said to

we

could not be

have knowledge concerning

shall henceforth refer to this position as

'Humean

skepticism'.

2.

The General Principle of Kant's Analogies of Experience

In the Preface to his Critique

Kant laments

that

still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human
reason in general that the
existence of things outside us. ..must be accepted on faith and if anyone
thinks
it

,

good

to

doubt their existence,

satisfactory proof. (Bxl n.)

The
the

are unable to counter his doubts by any

6

section of Kant's Critique entitled "The Analogies of Experience" plays a role in both

two major answers Kant gives

are involved in

to the

6

we

two

to Cartesian

different anti-skeptical

and

Humean

skepticism.

7

The Analogies

arguments presented by Kant, corresponding

two editions of the Critique. Although the way he uses them against the

skeptic

all references to Kant will be from the Kemp Smith
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929)). All references to this text will be in the form of intext notes, using page numbers from the two original editions (designated by A and B,

Unless otherwise noted,

translation

,

respectively)
7

The exposition of the Analogies

that follows

8

owes much

to Paul

Guyer.

differs in these

Kant attempts

two

to

editions, the Analogies themselves are
essentially the

show, while accepting Descartes' and Hume's
premise

knowledge of particular substances and

same

in each.

that our

their causal relationships is inferential,
that our

possession and application of the concepts of substance
and cause

is

an a priori condition

of the formation of any representation of an objective
world.

The term

representation'

is

a technical term Kant uses frequently. In general,
one

forms a representation when one brings a raw sense-impression,
or a complex of such,
under some concept. One has a representation when one
'represents')

is

some

data of consciousness as something.

what one has when one

is

aware of a

bit

is

On

aware of (when one
the one hand, a representation

of sensory information as a perceptual

experience. Another variety of representation

comes when one

complex of

represents a

sense-data as of an object, such as of a house or a ship. Alternatively,
a representation

may

be the result of bringing some concept or concepts under another concept,
such as

when one

thinks of all

men

as mortal. All our conscious experiences,

representations of one of these kinds.

What concerns Kant

in the

on Kant's view, are

Analogies

is

the

representation of things as objective, or independent of the perceiver.

What Kant
"experience

is

calls the

"General Principle of the Analogies"

is

the statement that

possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of

perceptions," where 'experience'

is

defined as knowledge of objects through the

unification of perceptions under a concept (B218).

inference, like the one

Hume

describes,

from

What Kant has

in

is

the

beliefs about sense-impressions to beliefs

about the existence of enduring, independent objects or substances.

9

mind

One way of looking

at this

inference

is

as a unification of diverse impressions in
the idea of an object which

endures and which bears a variety of properties. Kant's
goal in the Analogies

some necessary conceptual presuppositions of such
Hume’s claim

that the concepts

unification; in so doing, he will attack

of substance and cause (traditionally understood) are a

posteriori concepts derived (and derived illegitimately)

The

ability to distinguish

ordering of one’s experiences

is

to locate

is

between an

arbitrary

the key condition,

of objects and an objective world.

He

from experience.

and a non-arbitrary temporal

on Kant's view, of the representation

notes that "in experience, perceptions

together only in accidental order" (B219).

What he means by

this is that the order in

which perceptions are apprehended by the mind does not necessarily

reflect the

ordering of the objects or objective events they are then taken to represent.

an objective order of perceptions

is

to think

come

of them as being related

To

temporal

represent

in a necessary (i.e.,

non-arbitrary) way, as opposed to the merely accidental order through which the

apprehends them.

On

this,

Kant claims,

is

mind

based the possibility of our distinguishing

between our subjective experiences and an objective world. In the

First

Analogy Kant

explains this notion, with reference to the role of the concept of substance in making the
distinction in question.

3.

In the First

The

Analogy Kant argues

First

Analogy

that the

concept of substance

representation of an objective change. His opening (very opaque)

10

is

essential to the

summary of the

argument contains three curious claims which constitute the
heart of his argument. 8 The
first is that

"time cannot be perceived" (A183/B226; see also
B219, R5637, R631

second (presented as a consequence of the
of perception, that

is,

first) is that

"there

must be found

in the appearances, the substratum [or 'permanent']

represents time in general."

The

third (a

consequence of the second)

is

9

The

).

in the objects

which

that "all

change or

coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum,
and through
relation of the appearances to

it."

Later in the First Analogy Kant sheds

some

light

on these claims:

Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is
Through it alone we can never determine whether

therefore always changing.

manifold, as object of experience,

determination

we

is

this

coexistent or in sequence. For such

require an underlying ground which exists

at all

times, that

is,

something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only
so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists.... [I]n [the
permanent] alone is any determination of time possible. (A182-3/B225-6)
Alteration can therefore be perceived only in substances.

ceasing to be which

is

A

coming to be or
not simply a determination of that which endures cannot be

a possible perception. For this enduring thing

is what makes possible the
representation of the transition from one state to another, and from not-being to
being. These transitions can be empirically known only as changing

determinations of that which endures. If you assume that something simply begins
to be, then you must have a point in time in which it was not. But to what do you

which already exists? For a preceding empty time is
coming to be with things
have previously existed, and which persist in existence up to the moment of
coming to be, this latter must be simply a determination of that which

attach this point, if not to that

not itself an object of perception. But if we connect the
that
this

precedes

it.

Similarly also with ceasing to be;

it

presupposes the empirical

representation of a time in which an appearance no longer exists. (A188/B231)

g

In

all

respects relevant to

same
Numbers preceded by an

my

purposes here, the arguments

in the

A and B

editions of

the Critique are the
9

gesammelte

Schriften,

'R' refer to

Kant's Reflexionen as they appear in Kants
,

herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften

(29 vols.), edited by Walter de Gruyter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902). R5637
vol.XVIII, pp. 271-2, and R631

1

is in

vol.XVIII, p.61

1.

is

in

Kant's argument can be divided into three main
points

observes that there
state

it.

is

we

changes involves only the replacement of one

moment of time

we

is

of affairs by another, rather than an
itself is

is

to say, the content

that our

apprehension

of our representations

is

is

successive and

constantly shifting;

consider our raw, subjective experience of the world as a succession of fleeting

representations, even if

is

state

perceive, but the experience of these

perceive only things in time.

The second premise Kant employs

we may

we

experience some state of affairs in

preceding or following some state of the world. Time by

not an object of perception;

always changing. This

we

experience the world,

experience changes in the states of affairs

'empty'

follow Guyer in this 10 ). Kant

nothing that could count as the direct perception of the
absence of a

of affairs. Whenever

We

(I

what we think of them

an independent and enduring thing or

state

as representing, or represent through them,

of affairs. There

is

no such

thing,

Kant

believes, as the direct perception of the endurance of an object or state of affairs.

The important consequence of this

fact is that, purely in

terms of the content of

one's sense-impressions, any given succession of subjective experiences could be
interpreted in three ways. First,

it

could be taken to represent a change

point of view on an unchanging object or scene. Second,

change

in place

it

in one's focus or

could be taken to represent the

of two otherwise unchanging objects. Finally,

it

could be interpreted as

representing an actual objective change: a change in the objective qualities of a state of
affairs (the succession

10

Paul Guyer, Kant

of one

and

Press, 1987), pp.226-7.

the

state

of affairs upon another).

Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University

What, then, could justify us

in inferring,

objective change has in fact taken place?
the states

But

we

given a change in subjective

The detection of some

an

state, that

incompatibility between

perceive would give us a ground to think an objective change
has occurred.

this alone is not sufficient.

something being,

for

A rule

stating simply a logical incompatibility

between

example, both wooden and ashen will not do: a sequence

the perception of something

wooden

could be caused by one’s seeing

is

wood

in

which

followed by the perception of something ashen
in

one place and ash

in another, or

by the

replacement of something wooden with something ashen (A185/B228). In neither
case

would there be change

in the object.

The experience of something wooden followed by

the experience of something ashen can be counted as evidence of objective

change

in the object rather than in the perceiver's point

of view-only

if

change-

one postulates the

existence of some thing, or substance, which has undergone a transformation from

wood

to ash.

The
one

rests

ability to distinguish

on the

between an objective temporal order and a subjective

ability to distinguish objective

change from the mere subjective

succession of perceptions. The order in which things happen in the world cannot be
directly inferred

from the order of my perceptions, because

of a number of things— including a mere change

change

in the world.

As Kant

that order could represent

in perspective

explains in the First Analogy,

I

on

my

must add

sequence of my perceptions the thought that that sequence pertains

and independent substance undergoing alteration

part, rather

in order to think

than a

to a given

to a single enduring

of that sequence as

representing something objective rather than as just being an accidental subjective

13

any

sequence. The concept of substance, then,

is

necessary even to form the thought of a non-

accidental temporal order of perceptions. If this

judge that an objective change has occurred.

is so,

then

We may call

it

is

clearly also necessary to

such a judgment an 'objective

temporal judgment' [OTJ],
This line of reasoning explains Kant's statement that "there must be found
in the
objects of perception, that
general; and

all

is,

in the

appearances, the substratum which represents time in

change or coexistence must,

in

being apprehended, be perceived

substratum, and through relation of the appearances to

which endures through changes

is

it."

in this

The postulation of a substance

necessary to the distinction between objective change

and coexistence, and between objective and subjective change. Thus the concept of
objective change presupposes the concept of substance, and the possibility of making

OTJs

is

dependent on the possession and application of such a concept. But

ability to distinguish

if the

very

between the mere play of one's subjective representations and actual

objective change rests on supposing that substance exists (and cannot be in two

incompatible states
(by making OTJs)

that the

at the

make

same

time),

and the empiricist concedes

this distinction, then the empiricist

concept of substance

is

(as he does) that

must be wrong

we do

in claiming

derived from the experience of an apparently objective

world.

This does not, however, provide a response to the Cartesian skeptic or to the
skeptical empiricist

substances

may

be

who,

false.

like

At

Hume, holds

best, all

that all

judgments asserting the existence of

Kant has shown

exists is a necessary presupposition of

any judgment

14

is

that the

judgment

that an objective

that a substance

change has taken

place, rather than a merely subjective one.

At best

this

would suggest

that, if

we have

knowledge of objective change, then we must also have knowledge of objects
enduring
through such change. This does not

itself establish that

any judgments we make about

objects or objective change are true, or even justified. There are two
establish the claim that

we do have knowledge of an

correspond to the two editions of the Critique. The
unsatisfactory; the second edition attempt

more

interesting.

I

shall deal

Kant employs

of the

objective world; these two methods

first

edition attempt

is

first

Kant's First Edition Idealism

edition of the Critique entitled the 'Fourth Paralogism',

his doctrine of transcendental idealism in an attempt to respond to

the existence of outer objects— and an outer

concerned

internal or external is

in his

is

which appear

infer

always uncertain,"

Meditations that whether the cause of our perceptions

is

always doubtful.

Kant counters with "transcendental idealism," or "the doctrine
[objects

we must

world— from our "inner perception" (A368).

Since "the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause

is

clearly

obscure and incomplete, but considerably

Cartesian skepticism. There he presents Descartes' view as the view that

Descartes

tries to

with each in turn.

4.

In the section

is

ways Kant

that

appearances

to us] are to be regarded as being representations only, not things

in

themselves" (A369). The transcendental

to

be "mere appearances, and "therefore nothing but a species of my representations"

(A3 70). Since the Cartesian concedes

that

idealist,

we

15

Kant says, considers external bodies

are immediately acquainted with our

subjective representations, transcendental idealism
"removes

all

difficulty in the

accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony
of our mere

way of

self-

consciousness."

Transcendental idealism can be applied to the results of the First
Analogy as
follows.

By

that

argument Kant believes he has established

concept of substance

is

that the application

of the

necessary to the distinction between the mere accidental order in

which one experiences objects and events and the objective order of the
events one
experiences. This

the

is

the case because

same substance, considered

objective change.

at different

think of different qualities as attaching to

times, in order to represent to ourselves

Thus the representation of substances

an objective world with

its

own

representation of an external

must know

we must

is

necessary to the experience of

temporal sequence. Since (by Kant's idealism), the mere

body

is

sufficient evidence to say

of it that

it

is real,

then

we

that substances exist.

One might respond

that this account betrays

hand Kant speaks of the need
and on the other hand

for a distinction

an inconsistency, since on the one

between an objective and subjective order,

identities objects with their subjective representations.

But

according to transcendental idealism, the key distinction between representing a
subjective order of representations and representing an objective order of things

represented

is

the indifference or accidental nature of the subjective order, as contrasted

to the necessity, non-arbitrariness, or

represent a subjective order

reproduced

in

is

rule-govemedness of the objective order. To

to represent an order

of perceptions which could equally be

another order; to represent an objective order

16

is

to represent a

sequence of

perceptions the order of which

is

determined or governed by rules of some kind. The

difference between these orders that the First Analogy
reveals

represent objective change,

we

is

just that,

when we

think of the order of the representations by which

it

is

constituted as caused by the changing states of something that
endures through their

change.

Transcendental idealism thus responds to Cartesian skepticism by reducing
objects to representations and objective change in objects to a
representations. Since the Cartesian concedes that

representations, or 'inner perceptions', there

is

we

way of connecting

are immediately

aware of our own

no problem with asserting

that

we have

knowledge of objects and the objective world.
This response to skepticism
status ol representations.

entities

from

is

unsatisfactory because

Although Kant does give

degrades objects to the

it

criteria to distinguish 'objective'

'subjective' ones, the objective entities

of the Fourth Paralogism are not the

robustly independent objects the knowledge of which Descartes casts doubt upon.

Henry Allison

tries to

rescue Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism from this

charge. Kant describes "empirically ideal" objects as subjective appearances, or Cartesian

mental

entities or impressions,

while he characterizes "empirically real" objects as the

non-subjective objects that appear (B35/A20). The transcendental
puts

it,

"the level of philosophical reflection

transcendental refer to two different

upon experience."

ways of considering

1

is

for Kant, as Allison

The empirical and

the

objects: in relation to the

epistemic conditions of their appearing to us, and independently of any such conditions

1

Henry

Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism
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(New

haven: Yale University Press,

(A27/B43-A28/B44; see Allison,
be merely the forms in which
our

own

we

p.7).

Space and time,

for

example, are held by Kant to

represent, respectively, objects external to ourselves
and

representations. Since objects, if they are to be represented
(and thus known),

must be represented

spatially

and temporally, the representations of space and time are a

prion epistemic conditions of our perception of objects. Thus space
and time are
empirically real (he claims) insofar as the objects which appear to us are
thought of as

appearances, rather than as things in themselves, or things considered independently
of
the conditions under

which they can be known by us (A28/B44). Although

Kant's view, can be ascribed to objects insofar as

can be said of whether objects considered

in

we

spatiality,

on

represent them, on his view nothing

themselves— as they

really are, in abstraction

from any of the epistemic conditions placed on our perceiving them-are
temporal (B44/A28, B52/A35-B53/A36). Thus space and time

are, for

spatial or

Kant,

transcendentally ideal.

It is

true that Kant's language

sometimes suggests the interpretation of his

empirical realism/transcendental idealism distinction as resting on a distinction between

two ways of 'considering'

objects.

But

it

think of objects, or the context in which

remains a mystery

we

how the way

in

which we

think of them, actually determines facts about

them.

Lacking a coherent defense of the doctrine, Kant establishes with transcendental
idealism no more than a demonstration of the existence of mental constructs, which

1983), p.7.
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Descartes never doubts. The challenge presented by Cartesian
skepticism

is

to

show

that

a material world independent of us exists, and this Kant fails
to do with his idealism.

5.

Kant adds
Idealism

this

He

to the

The Second Edition Refutation of Idealism
second edition of the Critique a section called the "Refutation of

(hereafter, 'the Refutation').

Once again he

takes Descartes as his target, but

time he gives an argument that does not take transcendental idealism as a premise.
represents Descartes skepticism as the position that "the existence of objects in space

outside us"

is

"doubtful and indemonstrable" (B274).

prove that objects outside us

am

exist.

The Refutation

is

intended, then, to

Kant's proof runs as follows:

conscious of my

own existence as determined in time. All determination of
time presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot
be an intuition'^ in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which
I

are to be

met with

me

in

are representations; and as representations themselves

require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so
my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined. Thus

me and not
through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the
determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of
perception of this permanent

actual things

my

existence

which
is at

I

the

other things outside

is

possible only through a thing outside

perceive outside me. ...In other words, the consciousness of

same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of

me

(B275-6).

(I

have made changes

in

accordance with

Kant's instructions in the preface to the second edition [Bxxxix])

The second sentence

is

a clear reference to the First Analogy. This tells us that

meaning the placement of

can understand 'determination of time'

in this context as

something

Analogy, the problem was explaining what

in a time-order. In the First

is

presupposed by the interpretation of a given subjective succession as representing a

12

Note: an

'intuition' for

Kant

is

a sensory representation, or an impression of either

19

we

determinate, or particular, objective order; in other words,
the question

was of the

necessary conditions of making OTJs. In the Refutation Kant
looks into the necessary
conditions of placing

myself-my own existence-in

placement of myself qua enduring substance

Hume

direct perception

place in

my

seen,

Kant agrees with

Kant agrees with

Hume

that

I

have no

of myself qua an entity which endures through the changes that take

subjective states.

The only

necessary conditions of my placing
'determining'

Kant does not mean the

this

we have

in time: as

that substances are not directly perceived.

By

time.

them

in time).

alternative

my

is

that

Kant

is

looking into the

subjective states in a particular order (thus

This reading

is

strongly supported by a later Reflexion on the

Refutation:

Since we therefore could not perceive succession in ourselves, and thus could not
order any inner experience..., even inner experience can be thought only by means
of the relation of our senses to objects external to us. 13

Thus

the question in the Refutation, by contrast to the First Analogy,

can perform STJ s -subjective temporal judgments. The
posterior to the Refutation, for the First

the sequence of

my

First

Analogy assumes

Analogy

that

I

is

is

that

of how

we

thus logically

have already determined

subjective representations, and that on the basis this sequence

together with an application of the notion of a substance

I

infer

an objective order of

events.

It is

an important and implicit premise, then, of the Refutation that even the

temporal order of my subjective representations

is

not immediately given, but must be

outer or inner sense.
13

R6313, Kants gesammelte Schriften

,

vol. XVIII, p.614.
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somehow
by Kant

derived from

in the

A

some

other information. This premise

is

most

clearly expressed

version of his Transcendental Deduction:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be
represented as a
manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in
the sequence of one
impression upon another; for each representation, in so
far as it is contained in a
single moment can never be anything but absolute unity.
(A99)
,

In order to interpret

extended event,

of affairs with

I

some

must

my

inner state of mine as the representation of a temporally

link together

some

recollection or recollections of previous states

perception of the current state of affairs. In other words,

together past representation of mine with present ones.
total subjective state at

any “single moment”

representation; as

Guyer puts

before one's mind

at the

be before one's eyes."
representations,

any such

state

I

14

must

it,

In order to

my

is that

my

formal reality just a single

recollection in the

way

in

is

not in fact

which a dozen eggs can

have knowledge of even a subjective succession of

my

can be interpreted

representation (as in

in its

The claim made by A99

"the manifold of successive representations

moment of its

interpret

is

must bring

I

current state as presenting such a succession.

in several different

And

ways: as a single complex

experience of any scene which involves more than one type of

perceptual input); as a collection of temporally diverse representations (as in

my

experience of a temporally extended event, such as a piece of wood turning into ash), or
as

if

one part of an ongoing representation

it

is

my

experience of a continuous tone).

a question of ordering any sequence of representations, then one must also

determine what the correct order

14

(as in

is.

Guyer, Kant p.302.
,
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And

This interpretation cannot be
representation alone. There

is

which indicates

my

its

place in

made on

the basis of the content of the

no mark included

in the content

complex

of my representations

subjective temporal order as a digital time display

included in the lower right-hand comer of every present
impression or recollected
representation might do.

representation off

Hume

I

cannot directly

'read' the

proper temporal position of a

content alone.

its

agrees that the distinction, in reflection, between present sense
impressions

and memories thereof cannot be explained

which they give

1

rise.

in

However, he claims

terms of the content or nature of the ideas

that present perceptions

to

and memories are

distinguished on the basis of their relative "force and vivacity"; 16 present perceptions
exhibit,

on

his view, a greater "pitch of vivacity" than

to distinguish

between the two.

complex representation

as, for

On Hume's

view, then, the interpretation of a current

example, the representation of a current

and the representation of its previous

state

feature,

possible Kantian response to

even

if

it

exists,

state

of an object

can be accomplished simply by considering

the phenomenological difference between the

One

memories, which allows us always

two kinds of representation.

Hume

might be

that this

could not be the original explanation for

phenomenological

my

ability to

make

the

requisite sort of distinction. For to associate certain phenomenological features with

certain kinds of representation in the first place,

distinction

I

must already be able

between these kinds of representation; otherwise,

I

to

make

the

would not be able

to

15

Hume, Treatise p.85.
Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning
of Morals, 3rd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), p.17.
,

16
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the Principles

correlate a particular sort of phenomenological feature
with a particular sort of

representation. Thus, to

these kinds of ways,

I

come

to the understanding that

must have some prior basis

my

current state

for distinguishing

Let us suppose for the time being, then, that Hume's account
other basis could

I

have for distinguishing between internal

states

interpretable in

is

between them.
is

inadequate.

which represent

What
a

temporally simultaneous complex of perceptions and those which
represent a temporally
diverse set of perceptions?

can temporally order
the idea

seems

distinctions;

I

substances or

to

be that

must

my

my

As

in the First

Analogy, Kant

perceptions only relative to

I

some permanent

must apply some extra-logical

relate the parts

placement

of my subjective

in respect to

The Refutation does not on

in the Refutation suggests that

thing.

rules in order to

state either to

Once

I

again,

make such

changes

in the states

of

them.

the face of

it

fall

prey to the major limitation of Kant's

Fourth Paralogism argument: unlike the Fourth Paralogism, the Refutation does not

appear to promote the reduction of objects to representations. In
the claim

on the claim

make STJs, and

thus

that access to

would be

my

representations alone

insufficient to

fact, the

would be

argument makes

insufficient to

form any determinate representation of

myself or of the external world.

The point of difficulty

in the Refutation is the following.

While the

First

Analogy

appears to ground only the claim that the representation or postulation of enduring things

is

necessary to interpret subjective states as representing an objective order, he claims

the Refutation that the

mere representation of enduring things outside me

23

is

in

not sufficient

to order

my

subjective perceptions: this ordering

existence of actual things which

It

would seem

that, to

sequential or simultaneous,

those representations-the

together.

it

I

would be

By conceiving of my

said to be possible only given the

perceive outside me."

judge that

same

is

subject

my

representations are or have been either

sufficient to conceive

who now

representations as

is

all

of an enduring subject of

recollecting

them and bringing them

belonging to an enduring

then think of them as sequential alterations of myself.

Why

B

version of the Critique

I

can

must the notion of an

enduring substance independent of myself be involved? Kant responds
note added to the preface to the

self,

in a last-minute

:

through inner experience

I am conscious of my existence in time
(consequently
determinability in time), and this is more than to be conscious merely of
representation. It is identical with the empirical consciousness of my

also of

my

its

existence,

which

is

determinable only through relation to something which, while

bound up with my existence, is outside me. ..The reality of outer sense is thus
necessarily bound up with inner sense, if experience in general is to be possible
all;

are in

is,

I

I

time (Bxxxix-xli
I

we

self at aH.

I

n.).

think that Kant's answer

STJs,

at

am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me, which
relation to my sense, as am conscious that myself exist as determined in

that

is that,

when we

are speaking of the necessary conditions of

are also speaking of the necessary conditions of having any

Kant often contrasts

this notion

knowledge of my

of self-knowledge, 'empirical

self-

consciousness', with 'intellectual' self-consciousness, which can be summarized by the
analytic proposition that

This

latter notion,

knowledge of the

all

of my experiences must belong

to

me

(see Bxl

n.,

B131-2).

however, being merely analytic, does not imply any empirical
self at

all.

Kant's idea seems to be that so-called empirical knowledge

of the self is just knowledge of the content and ordering of subjective experiences— none

24

of which

is itself

referring

its

them

actually experience of a self.

The

self, in

Henry

Allison's words, "in

representations to itself in judgments of inner sense. ..does
not conceive of

as representations of itself in the

way

representations of outer objects. Instead,

belonging to

itself,

as

its

own

it

outer intuitions are regarded as

conceives of these representations as

'subjective objects'."

17

Thus the perception of a

self cannot

be the condition of the ordering of subjective experience, since
the only 'perception' of a

one has

self

precisely the reflective experience of the order of subjective experience.

is

This answer
direct perception

is in line

with Hume's thinking, since

Hume

agrees that there

of a self qua substance enduring through one's diverse

ot course, also thinks there

is

no

direct perception

18

states.

is

no

Hume,

of external substances. However, Kant

thinks that the case of external substances differs from that of a self-substance. In a
note

appended

to the Refutation

Kant says

that

The consciousness of myself in the representation

T is not an intuition, but a
merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This T
has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as permanent, might
serve as a correlate for the determination of time in inner sense-in the manner in
which, for instance, impenetrability serves in our empirical intuition of matter.
(B278)
There

is

an experiential criterion

object; there

is

distinction that

which
is

I

order

we

can point to to identify an experience of an external

no such sense-experience when

Kant exploits

my

it

comes

to the self.

subjective experiences

is

myself; the idea seems to be

Allison. Kant's Transcendental Idealism p.262.
,

18

Hume,

think

is this

it

in ruling out the possibility that the substance in relation to

a manifold of sense-data, purportedly of external objects,

17

I

Treatise p.252.
,
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that,

which provides

while there

the content of

references to them, there

of a

self,

of which

experiences which

is

we have
we

knowledge of such a

no such data when

to describing the self.

empirical knowledge, and which

ascribe to

self

comes

it

it,

is

The notion

independent of the

is

thus devoid of content. Consequently,

it

cannot be

which explains our subjective temporal judgments.

The obvious shortcoming of Kant's Refutation

as

it

stands

he

is that

fails to

explain why, as in the First Analogy, the mere postulation of an
enduring external object
or objects

would not be enough

to explain the possibility

the leap from the notion that the concept of substance

is

of STJs. Kant appears

to

make

necessary to represent objective

change, or a subjective succession, directly to the claim that an actual, veridical
perception of external substance
stronger claim

of why

this

is

necessary to accomplish

was what he intended

along

all

must be so would apply equally

in the First

there. In the

Note on the System of Principles" (which comes shortly

this. It is

possible that this

Analogy; but then the question

Analogies and
after the

B291)

(e.g.,

A182/B225), or

the notion of alteration. In Chapter Four

might be

so.

the product of an evil

it

substance

demon

innate) while

it

or an

(though this would

is

will

still

while

still

unknown

necessary to

examine some reasons why

claiming that

all

it

would seem

this

that the

such perceptions could be

faculty within us.

mean conceding,

is

to "obtain" or "exhibit" (e.g.,

Regardless of how Kant justifies this claim, however,

Cartesian skeptic could concede

concede

I

"General

Analogies and the

Refutation) Kant states repeatedly that the perception of a "permanent"

perceive or "determine" alteration

in the

The Humean

skeptic could

contra empiricism, that the concept of

maintaining that our inferences that substances actually

exist are unwarranted.
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Kant thus does not say enough
Refutation. Neverthless,

argument and

to

numerous commentators have

make some

tried to

fill

in the

understanding

why Kant might

think that to

knowledge of the temporal order of one's subjective

actual experience of external objects.

refutation of skepticism

is,

gaps

in Kant’s

version of his anti-skeptical claim stick. The central problem

in reading the Refutation is in

beliefs about or

to establish the strong anti-skeptical claim
of the

The challenge

to

have

states requires the

Kantian or neo-Kantian

for a

then, to give a transcendental

come

argument

19

which establishes a

connection between one's ability to make STJs (or to perform some other, related,

fundamental act necessary to cognition as

we know

it)

and the existence of external

objects.

As

it

has turned out, there have been three ways the argument of the Refutation

has been reconstructed or revised;
the next three chapters. In Chapter

I

shall explain

Two

I

shall

and

critically

examine each of them

in

examine an interpretation of the

Refutation which connects the possibility of justified STJs with the existence of external

19

Kant discusses the practice of epistemology at the level of the
is the level concerned with the possibility of certain kinds of
experience or knowledge in general (A56/B80-A57/B81). Kant identifies an inquiry as
In the Critique

"transcendental"; that level

when

concerns the conditions of the possibility of the possession or
employment of intuitions, concepts, or knowledge. This has led to the coining of the term
'transcendental'

it

'transcendental argument' to refer to arguments

so defined.

The argument of the

First

Analogy

which
is

fall

within the transcendental realm

a transcendental argument, in that

it

deals primarily with the necessary conditions of coming to have a certain sort of
representation.

It is

not— by

because the condition

it

itself— primarily an anti-skeptical transcendental argument,

identifies is that

of the possession of a certain

sort

of concept,

rather than the existence of external objects or the possession of veridical beliefs about

external objects.

When

conjoined with Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism the

First Analogy becomes an anti-skeptical transcendental argument; the Refutation, as we
have seen, is an anti-skeptical argument which utilizes the conclusion of the First

Analogy.
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objects. In Chapter Three

I

shall

examine several reconstructions of Kant's argument and

neo-Kantian refutations of skepticism which connect the

ability to

make

legitimate or

meaningful judgments about external objects with the existence
of external objects. In
Chapter Four
argue,

is

I

shall present

my own

reconstruction of the Refutation which.

I

shall

both more faithful to Kant's original intent and has a greater
promise of success

than the revisionary and often misguided accounts
Three.
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I

deal with in Chapters

Two

and

CHAPTER

II

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

1

Guyer's Reading

.

Paul Guyer interprets the Refutation as an argument
that the perception of
enduring, independent objects

is

a necessary condition for making justified udgments
j

concerning the order of our subjective

states.

He

says that he cannot see

what sense a principle which is not a psychological factor in the production
of a
form of belief can serve as a condition of the possibility of a form of
judgment
except by furnishing the basic framework for the justification of beliefs.
in

Guyer s conclusion

is

that the condition

Kant

cites in the

Refutation— the perception of

material objects-is an epistemological condition: a condition for the
verification of

STJs.

2

As Guyer
act

notes, the

argument requires the assumptions

spells out his version of the

states

Suppose we designate these subjective
appeared to

B-ly'.

If,

STJ concerning

argument as follows. Consider two objective

and B, and two possible subjective

1

any STJ requires an

of judgment and that neither the representational contents nor the phenomenological

features of any subjective state are sufficient to justify an

A

that

which might represent these

states as 'being

on the above assumptions, there

Guyer, Kant pp. 304-5.
Guyer's interpretation borrows a

that state.

states

states

3

He

of affairs
of affairs.

appeared to A-ly' and 'being

is

no logical or spatio-temporal

,

2

lot from Melnick's interpretation of Kant's Second
Analogy (Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies of Experience [Chicago: Chicago University

Press, 1973]).
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impossibility involved in supposing either that these states
represent a subject's

being appeared to A-ly and B-ly or that they represent
that subject's

now remembering having been

A-ly and

to

now

now

being appeared

appeared to B-ly, there could be no way for

the subject to justify either supposition.

A and B

Suppose

involve the presence of a desk and a chair, respectively.
There

no logical or spatio-temporal impossibility, Guyer notes,

is

the

room

either at the

same time

in the chair

and desk being

in

or successively. According to Guyer, the only thing that

could justify one interpretation or the other

is

either a justified belief about the successive

presence of a chair and a desk or a justified belief about the simultaneous
presence of a
chair and a desk.

Therefore, given that

we make justified

STJs,

we must

be justified

in

thinking that there exist objects external to us which are causally related to
our subjective
states/

It is

clear

from

this

why

the causal agent or agents in question cannot be our

enduring selves, or causally active hidden faculties within ourselves. Guyer's claim

is

that

our STJs are justified on the basis of beliefs about objective states of affairs and beliefs
about causal laws governing those states of affairs and their effects on

assumption

4

Note

that

that

justification

some of our STJs

Guyer

is

of certain

are justified he concludes that

us.

On

some of our

the

beliefs

only discussing a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition of the
sorts

of belief.

5

Guyer is not clear about what he thinks a beliefs being "justified" entails. I think he
must be assuming an externalist theory of justification, according to which a beliefs
being justified depends in part on its actually being causally related (in the right sort of
way) to the state of affairs it represents. Otherwise, it would not be clear that this
argument would serve as a proof that external objects exist. This interpretation of Guyer
is

also suggested by the fact that he sometimes equates a beliefs being justified with

constituting

knowledge (Guyer,

p.3

1

5).
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its

about objective states ot affairs are also. But

if all

our external-world beliefs are actually

based on sense-impressions created by a hidden faculty
within

us, then

none of our

beliefs about objective states of affairs can be justified. 6

Guyer notes
he claims that

that his

argument could give

we must justify

action of external bodies

powers of objects
might be thought

rise to a

charge of circularity. 7 Although

our STJs by means of causal inferences regarding the

on ourselves, he acknowledges

knowledge of the causal

that our

generated by means of induction from subjective successions. This

is

to result in a circular

his account implies that

account of how

we make

STJs: one might think

STJs are based on beliefs about causal laws which

in turn are

based on induction on the basis of those very same STJs.

Guyer responds

that this

would indeed be

circular, if his version

of Kant’s

Refutation concerned necessary conditions of the psychological process through which

consciousness of subjective succession and objective causal laws

is

generated. But his

account concerns only necessary conditions of confirming or justifying beliefs about
subjective succession or objective causal laws,

implied, because

is

Guyer

is

not claiming that

however those

my

beliefs

STJs depend for

may

arise.

No

circle

their very existence

on

causal judgments which in turn depend for their existence on the very same STJs.

Neither

is

Guyer's account circular in the sense that

of particular STJs

is

same STJs. Other

beliefs about

6

Again,

wouldn't
7

this

make

it

implies that the justification

dependent on causal judgments that are themselves justified by the

my

subjective sequences of experiences can serve to

assumes an externalist analysis of justification; Guyer's
sense without

Guyer, Kant p.3
,

1

it.

5.
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interpretation

confirm beliefs about objective states of affairs and
objective causal laws, and various
beliefs about external objects can confirm
particular STJs. Therefore there
"in the supposition that

rejected

is

no

difficulty

any particular belief about external objects might be
accepted or

on the basis of some belief about a subjective succession
of representations." 8

For the same reason, Guyer's account does not require
an objectionable form of
verificationism. His account connects ihe justification
of STJs with justified beliefs about

the objective world; an objectionable verificationism,
by contrast,

meaningfulness of STJs with such

Although

I

am more

Refutation as he construes

it

beliefs.

concerned

would connect the

9

in this chapter

with Guyer's claim that the

provides a successful refutation of skepticism,

note that Guyer's interpretation of the Refutation

is

a gross misreading.

He

I

should also

interprets

Kant's argument as concerning the necessary conditions of the justification
of particular

knowledge claims about
Kant says
all

the order of one’s mental states. But in a note

on the Refutation

that

we have

here sought to prove

is that inner experience in general is possible
only through outer experience in general. Whether this or that supposed
experience be not purely imaginary must be ascertained from its special
determinations, and through its congruence with the criteria of all real experience

(B278-9)

Kant thus

explicitly contrasts his project in the Refutation with the project of justifying

particular

knowledge claims. Also, there

8

9

is

a complete absence of any language

Guyer, Kant, p.315.
See the following chapter for a discussion of neo-Kantian arguments involving forms

of verificationism.
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suggesting that Kant's concern

with the justification of STJs. Rather, he
talks

is

of the "possibility" of the determinate
consciousness of one’s existence
This being said, however,

Guyer sees

it

it

Anthony Brueckner has

my

that

worth taking a look

at

terms

in time.

whether the argument as

has a chance against skepticism.

2.

Suppose

is

in

Brueckner's Criticism

a criticism of Guyer's

argument which runs as follows.

current representation, Z, in fact represents two other
representations,

X

and Y, as having been experienced successively. For example,
Z could be a memory of Y
succeeding X.
beliel like

Z

is

Z
to

is,

my

in

terminology, an STJ. According to Guyer's account,

be justified,

I

must have a justified belief

W,

Guyer's view

in fact,

that, in

on Guyer's view determines the content of Z:

terms of content alone, any complex subjective

recall that

state

interpreted as a representation of successive or simultaneous perceptions.
ot

W,

I

had a representation W' which represented

coexistent parts of an object, then

would be

a representation of

As Brueckner

W

is

10

X

observes,

Z would

and

it

is

Y

X

Y

The
it

is

may be
Thus

if,

instead

as being simultaneous with

be a different representation; Z,

in that case,

as simultaneous.

crucial to Guyer's

necessary, rather than just sufticient, for any

Z

argument

that a representation like

to be justified.

11

Brueckner suggests,

Anthony Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of

Idealism," Philosophical Topics 19 (1991), pp.34-6.
,

11

and

any

W which represents X and Y

10
as being simultaneous with successive states of an object, or
states of affairs.

presence of

if

Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical...", p.38.
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however,

that

membership

my

in a

belief of Z’s content might well be justified
by virtue of

coherent set of inferentially connected beliefs concerning
only

representations and their temporal relations." 12 Suppose,
for example,
beliefs

B

its

I

my

have a number of

about X-like representations and Y-like representations.
These

beliefs,

according to Brueckner, could inductively justify, by demonstrating
a constant
conjunction of X-like representations with Y-like representations,
the judgment that X-

hke representations always precede Y-like representations. The

my

claims, could directly justify

set

of beliefs B, he

belief in the content of Z, without any need for a belief

W.
Guyer's unsuccessful answer to this criticism

Brueckner

s

is

instructive.

He responds

to

suggestion that STJs could be justified by internal regularities alone as

follows:

a genuine capacity for representation cannot be thought to be governed by

of its own.. .for the simple reason that this would immediately
use as a faculty of representation. Changes in its contents must be
ascribable to changes in what it represents, or else it cannot be safely judged to
represent change outside itself at all.. ..A faculty of representation must be
regularities

undermine

its

primarily sensitive to what lies beyond

it

or give

up

These statements could mean a couple of different things.
be saying that

it

is

12

13

its

who might

own

regularities.

13

claim to representation.

On the

one hand, Guyer could

incoherent to describe a faculty as 'representative'

produces can be justified by
skeptic, however,

its

if the

judgments

it

This would not disturb a Cartesian

simply acquiesce and agree that our purported faculty of

Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical...", p.38.

Guyer, Kant p.428.
,
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representation

is

not authentically representative. This would
simply be equivalent, for

the skeptic, to the expression of his
skepticism

itself.

Guyer could be claiming

that a

Alternatively,

it

does— could not represent what

other words, the claim

is

that

it

does-without the

given

Z could

W corresponding to

an STJ could not represent what

justified in claiming that the objective

subjective sequence described by the

not have the content

it

being true; in

does unless one

sequence which purportedly gave

STJ

it

is

rise to the

actually occurred. This response, however, falls

prey to the very charge of verificationism Guyer claims
his epistemological version
avoids: if this were his claim, then he would be claiming
that STJs could not have the

content they do without our knowing whether their truth-conditions
were satisfied.

Brueckner points

which Guyer

out, this response

(correctly,

would seem

to involve a

As

form of verificationism

on Brueckner's view) repudiates. 14

Despite the problems with Guyer’s response to Brueckner's criticism, that
criticism

not entirely successful. Recall that Brueckner allows that regularities

is in fact

among my

representations could by themselves justify judgments concerning the

temporal order of my representations. Hume, famously, explains causal inferences by
reference to regularities

trait

or instinct to

come

among

one's impressions: he claims that

to expect,

upon the occurrence of a

we have

a psychological

familiar sort of experience,

other experiences of a kind which has been associated with that sort of experience.

However, he

also denied that induction can ever justify such judgments; this

psychological

14

trait

of ours only explains for Hume,
,

Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical...", p.43.
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why such judgments

occur.

He

did

not address the question of the
origin of STJs, but

same

attitude

how

likely that

If

he would have the

Brueckner concedes

that

are justified, and are justified through
induction, he needs also to

this is possible.

Brueckner

is

beliefs are justified,

this,

seems

towards the inductive justification of STJs.

some of our STJs
explain

it

also never clear

on whether he concedes

that

some of our Z-type

and justified explicitly by W-type considerations.

then he must also concede that

some of our

If

he does concede

beliefs about external objects are

justified.

The most important shortcoming of Brueckner's

criticism,

however,

is

that the

inductive justifying process he describes could not apply
to the justification of many,

if

not most, of our STJs. Consider Guyer's original example: that
of my interpretation of my
subjective state as a past representation of a chair being succeeded
by a present

representation of a desk. According to Guyer, such a judgment can be
justified only

if

one has a justified belief about a correlation between one's representations and an
objective succession. According to Brueckner, such justification of STJs could take
place

by means of induction on past conjunctions of similar representations. But
question,

it

is

very unlikely

that, in the past, one's chair-like representations

be followed by desk-like representations; and even
suggest that this alone could do

concedes

that

mysterious

much

to justify the

some of one’s judgments

how they

in the case in

like this

if

they had,

STJ

it

would always

seems strange

in question. If

one are justified, then

Brueckner

it

is

entirely

could be justified by the inductive process he describes.

concern sequences the

like

to

Many STJs

of which have not been experienced before, or which are not
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inductively supported by previous regularities
in representation-types. If Brueckner

concedes that any judgments
possibility

seems

like

Guyer's paradigmatic STJ are justified, then the
only

to be that they are justified

type judgments are justified, then

Brueckner

s

main

to.

is

Humean

any of our STJs are justified.

states is to

concede

that

any of my

world

exists.

Interpretation

not convincing. But Brueckner

1

As Brueckner

^

we have knowledge
that

fails as

ot our

current

order of some of our subjective

that the self

some

points out, the Cartesian

we have knowledge of our

we have knowledge of the

argument which takes as a premise

W-

skepticism because neither sort of skeptic need

generally understood to allow only that

experience, to concede that

is

if

The epistemological version of Kant's Refutation

a refutation of either Cartesian or

skeptic

in stating that a material

criticism of Guyer, then,

concedes more than he needs

that

am justified

The Real Problem With the Epistemological

3.

concede

I

by W-type judgments; and

is

temporally extended.

16

So an

STJs are justified cannot succeed as

a transcendental argument against the Cartesian skeptic: to successfully
refute the skeptic,
a transcendental

skeptic accepts.

argument needs

The same

skeptic, since the

Humean

is

true

to derive the rejection

of skepticism from premises the

of Guyer's argument when

skeptic

is

also not

committed

it

to the

is

applied to the

Humean

immediacy of anything

other than present experience.

This point

is

also

made by

Patricia Kitcher ( Kant's Transcendental Psychology

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 177-8).
16
Brueckner, "Transcendental Arguments II," Nous, 18 (1984), p.2 1
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Guyer does
hypothesizes that

it

is

briefly attempt to discount the
possibility

all

of one's STJs are

false.

His response

is

of a skepticism which

that

hard to think oneself into this position.

If one can really entertain the
of one's even subjective temporal judgments
are false, of
course one can do without commitment to
another set of propositions which could

proposition that

all

provide evidence for these. 17

Guyer thus suggests
or impossible.

that skepticism about (all of) one's

However, he does not give any evidence

possible to doubt the accuracy of
in

which

all

all

for this.

of implication does not by

itself

make

that

that

little

knowledge

states

of affairs. Therefore

STJs might be mistaken would not prevent one from carrying out

any of one's normal judgmental

Brueckner suggests
are justified

one has very

one stop making STJs, or stop

depending on them for judgments about objective events or

some STJs

seems perfectly

a form of skepticism incoherent.

Doubting the accuracy of one’s STJs does not require

the admission that one's

It

one's STJs. Although the hypothetical
state of error

of one's STJs are false would indeed imply

at all, this sort

STJs may be somehow incoherent

activities.

that the only

is to

employ a

way

for

Guyer

to

make

the required claim that

verificationist thesis connecting the

meaningfulness of saying that an experience of mine occupies a determinate place
time-order with the ability to determine what that position
a

more general

18

is.

This could be justified by

its

truth-conditions are satisfied. While

Guyer does not employ

such a principle, there are a wide variety of actual and hypothetical neo-Kantian

Guyer, Kant pp. 426-7.
Brueckner, "Transcendental Arguments
,

18

my

verification principle connecting the meaningfulness of a sentence with

the ability to determine if

17

in

II,"

38

p.217.

refutations of skepticism

which do implicitly or

arguments are the subject of the next chapter.
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explicitly rely

on such a

principle.

Such

CHAPTER III

VERIFICATIONS AND WITTGENSTINIAN VERSIONS

1

Verificationism

meaningful

if

and only

is

if

.

Logical Positivism

the doctrine that a sentence or thought

it

is

that the skeptic admits is

consequently,

we

fits

skeptic

then any proposition about the external

meaningful must also be confirmable or infirmable.

we must

be in a position to

know whether

we make

accepts that any of our statements about the external world

vulnerable to a reductio of his position

know whether an

if

he also claims that

we

If,

about

external objects exist.

our general definition of a transcendental argument, because, on

who

It

is true,

are able to conclusively confirm or infirm a statement

the external world, then

This

cognitively

either tautological or at least in principle
empirically

verifiable or falsifiable. If verificationism

world

is

is

this view, the

meaningful

is

are not in a position to

external world exists.

sometimes sounds as though Kant embraced some

sort

of verificationism with

regard to statements about substances and their causal relations. For instance, he says that

[m]any empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. Since
experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality, we believe
ourselves, even without a deduction, to be justified in appropriating to them a
meaning, an ascribed significance. But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as
fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence
are yet from time to time challenged by the question: quidjuris. (A84/B1 16-7)

He

then goes on to say that the concepts of substance and cause require a 'deduction' to

establish the legitimacy of their use

(A85/B1

17).
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For

this reason

it

has appeared

reasonable to

some

that Kant's anti-skeptical strategy

had something

to

do with finding

the necessary conditions of the legitimate
or meaningful use of external world
terms. This
tact justifies

an examination of verificationism and

its

role in a Kantian or quasi-Kantian

refutation of skepticism.

The major proponents of verificationism,

'logical positivists', fall into three

general categories: phenomenalists, physicalists, and
proponents of a 'thing-language'.

One might

think that one could derive on the basis of one of
these approaches a neo-

Kantian transcendental argument against Cartesian and
section

I

explain

why none

Humean

skepticism. In this

of these hypothetical arguments could supply a satisfactory

response to the epistemological skeptic.

The phenomenalist holds

that all

meaningful statements are either true by

definition or reducible to statements about one's subjective experiences
or sense-data

The phenomenalist thus holds

that all

1
.

meaningful statements about the external world are

reducible to statements about one's sense-data. Such statements were sometimes called

protocol statements'; according to the phenomenalist

all

meaningful empirical

propositions in language, properly understood, can be expressed by such statements.
If

phenomenalism

whether one

is

is

true,

then there

is

no problem with skeptical questions about

radically deceived about the source of one's perceptions, since even the

skeptic admits that our subjective experiences are immediately accessible to us. Since

according to the phenomenalist statements about material objects are reducible to

1

See A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications,

1936 ).
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Inc.,

statements about the immediate objects of
my subjective experiences (sense-data), and

cannot be deceived about the character of my subjective
experiences, then

whether

Because

my
I

can

know

statements about external objects and the external
world are true or

false.

can verify them,

my

statements about external things are thus also meaningful.

The immediate problem

for the phenomenalist to solve is the question
of how

objects can be mind-independent

by

when

the content of statements about

facts about the subjective experience

we saw

them

is

of perceivers. Phenomenalism appears

degenerate into a form of idealism, which
(as

I

I

is

not only questionable in

itself,

exhausted

to

but does not

with Kant) provide a satisfactory response to skepticism.

The standard answer

to this criticism

of phenomenalism

is

for the phenomenalist

to equate statements that certain physical objects or
objective states

of affairs exist with

propositions about what impressions or sequences of impressions one would
have were

one

to

have certain others. ‘ Physical object propositions are thus reducible,

for such a

phenomenalist, either to categorical propositions about sense-data, which are

immediately verifiable, or

to hypothetical propositions about sense-data,

experimentally confirmed.

3

To

this reduction,

however, one can respond

one can describe a possible situation

in

which

that,

which can be

given any physical proposition,

that proposition

is

true but the alleged

analytic consequence of it-the corresponding hypothetical sense-content proposition-is

2
3

See Ayer, Language

Note

,

p.

1

41

that the phenomenalist

assumes an answer

42

to the

problem of induction.

false.

C.I.

me and

front of

seem

Lewis, for example, says that the proposition
(p) that there

is

to the left implies the hypothetical
sense-content proposition
(q) that, if

to see such a doorknob,

and seem

to be reaching for

it,

I

I

in all probability the feeling

of contacting a doorknob would follow. 5 Chisholm,
however, points out
entail q:

a doorknob in

that

p does not

might, for example, be paralyzed but suffering from
delusions about the

motions of my limbs.

A
is

consideration of the basic proposition of Cartesian skepticism
reveals that this

a general difficulty for phenomenalist logical positivism:
given any physical world

proposition (including the proposition that there
in

me

could always bring

proposition

is false.

it

is

none), an evil

demon

about that the corresponding hypothetical sense-content

Alternatively, the consequence of the activity of an evil

hidden faculty could be that any hypothetical sense-content proposition

though the corresponding physical world proposition

is false.

The only

alternative

seems

to

even
analysis

to epistemological

embrace idealism. Regardless of the

success or failure of phenomenalism as a theory of meaning, then,

4

true,

or

be to abandon the attempt to preserve the

objectivity of physical world propositions and

fail

is

demon

The phenomenalist

of propositions regarding material objects must thus assume an answer
skepticism.

or hidden faculty

it

seems

that

it

must

as a non-idealistic response to the skeptic.

Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of Empiricism," The Journal of Philosophy, 45

(1948), pp.512-7.
?

C.I.

Lewis,

An Analysis of Knowledge and

p.240.
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Valuation (La Salle:

Open

Court, 1946),

A

related version of logical positivism

was

the doctrine that, in addition to
(or

instead of) the protocol sentences
of phenomenalism, a meaningful language
can be

reduced to protocol sentences which include
predicates referring to psychological
such as ’being angry' or 'perceiving a dog'. 6
This version of logical positivism

phenomenalism,

in that

that are verifiable

it

acts,

similar to

is

also holds that language should be
reducible to propositions

by considering the contents of one's subjective
experience

advantage over phenomenalism

is that

it

alone.

Its

does not require a private language of sense-

contents which cannot be understood by others. 7

This development of phenomenalism

because

its

treatment of objectivity

is

fails as

essentially the

a potential response to the skeptic

same

as

phenomenalism.

In this

case, statements about objects and objective events
are reducible to hypothetical

statements about subjective experience which use psychological
predicates, rather than
predicates about sense-contents.
of deception,

some

Once

again, the problem

any hypothetical statement about what

other experience

is

I

is that,

owing

to the possibility

would experience were

I

to

have

consistent with any statement about the external world.

Logical positivism developed into another doctrine according to which the
sentences of a meaningful language must be reducible to protocol sentences whose
empirical terms refer to basic objective entities. 8 This doctrine was sometimes called
‘physicalism’. According to physicalism,

all

meaningful empirical terms must be

6

Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," Logical Positivism, edited by A.J. Ayer (New
York: The Free Press, 1959). Also see John Passmore, One Hundred Years of Philosophy

(New York:
7

Basic Books, 1966), p.386.
See Section Three of this chapter.
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translatable into a basic 'thing-language’ of
physical predicates, such as 'heavy', 'warm', or
'blue'. In this

way

the major proponent of this doctrine,
Carnap,

hoped

to preserve the

objectivity of science that the other forms of
logical positivist could not account for. 9

Carnap thus abandoned the requirement

that the basic statements

of a meaningful

language must be directly verifiable. His basic terms
refer to things to which one does not

have direct access
psychological

acts.

in the

way one

has direct access to one's

So Carnap simply took

own

sense-contents or

for granted that statements about the external

world are verifiable or confirmable. Consequently, his verificationism
must take for
granted a reply to the epistemological skeptic.

None of the major
skeptic

is

versions of verificationism, then, manages to

show

that the

inconsistent in claiming that his statements about the external world
have

meaning while claiming

that such statements are

always unverifiable.

A

skeptic could

thus agree with these verificationist theories of meaning without giving up
skepticism.

The
world, for

verification principle also implies that the skeptical claim-the claim that the

all

I

this the skeptic

it

know, might not exist— is

itself

can reply that verificationism

meaningless

is

if

skepticism

is true;

unsatisfactory because, as

but to

we have

seen,

cannot account for the objectivity of statements about the external world without

slipping into idealism or simply taking for granted a reply to the skeptic.

There are also several other reasons

why

verificationism might be considered an

unsatisfactory theory of meaning. Verificationism has been attacked as ruling out as

Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Philosophy of Science (1936-7).
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meaningless certain kinds of statements essential
to empirical science, such as law-like
statements and statements involving disposition
terms and theoretical constructs. 10 Also,
the verification principle

criterion

itself, if

of meaningfulness and

recommendation,

it

construed as an assertion, does not satisfy

is

own

thus self-defeating! If construed as a definition
or

appears arbitrary as well as inconsistent with

Finally, the first variety of logical positivism,

Wittgenstein

its

common

phenomenalism,

is

subject to

criticism of the notion of a phenomenalist language;
this criticism

s

11

practice.

is

the

subject of the third section of this chapter.

2.

Putnam, Burge, and Theories of Reference and Content-Ascription

Hilary

He

Putnam takes

a

somewhat

different tack in attempting to refute the skeptic.

bases his anti-skeptical strategy on his direct' or causal' theory of reference,
which he

illustrates

by the following example.

a planet exactly like Earth,

to the residents

Twin

“

Suppose

Earth'.

The

that elsewhere in the universe there exists

residents of

of Earth, and speak a language exactly

between the two planets

is

that

Twin Earth

like English.

are exactly similar

The only

on Twin Earth the molecular structure of what

See Passmore, One Hundred Years p.386, and Oswald
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp.103-10.
,

difference

is

called

Hanfling, Logical Positivism

Carl Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning"
Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Leonard Linsky (Urbana: U. of
Illinois Press 1952), pp.168, 175-9.
11

See Hempel, "Problems and Changes," pp. 181-3, and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
"Private Languages," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), pp.30-1.
,

12

Meaning of 'Meaning'," volume VII of Minnesota Studies
Philosophy of Science, edited by Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of
Hilary Putnam, "The

Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 139-40.
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in the

water
the

is

word

in other

XYZ instead of H20.
’water’ refers to,

words,

Meaning,

for

languages

when spoken by

a

Twin

what a person means when he

Putnam,

the things they

internal state

is

Call this substance 'twinwater'.

is

can be exactly similar
is,

utters the

is

what they

refer

what

word

'water'

This,

on Twin Earth.

names and

according to him, facts about one's

is that,

to facts

that

XYZ rather than H20.

established in part by causal relationships between

name. The crucial point

mean - that

Earther,

Putnam claims

about another’s, but what internal states or

to-by

their terms

can be different, depending on

facts external to their subjective existences.

Putnam

exploits this doctrine in responding to a

skeptical hypothesis.

The

modem

modem

version of the hypothesis that

soul in the process of being deceived by an evil

demon

version of the Cartesian

I

might be an immaterial

or hidden faculty

is

that

I

might

be a brain in a vat whose sense-impressions are being manipulated by a scientist
or

computer with the purpose of giving
Putnam's key point

is that, if

I

am

me

the impression that

a brain in a vat, then

I

am

not a brain in a vat.

my utterance

of

"I

might be a

brain in a vat" does not really refer to a brain in a vat: the right causal connection does

not exist between brains in vats and

my

idea or concept thereof.

brains in vats, think of or speak of trees, there
the term

'tree'

and actual

connection that

we can

trees.

his view,

refer to trees.

theory cannot refer to trees

13

On

at all

A

is

it is,

13

When

we,

who

are not

a causal connection between our use of

in part,

by virtue of this causal

brain in a vat, by contrast, according to Putnam's

(assuming that trees do not exist

in the universe

Putnam, Reason Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press,
,

1981), p.8.
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containing this hypothetical vat).

connected to images of trees.

A brain

When

tree.

of the word

a brain in a vat uses the

the brain in the vat means, or refers to,

than an actual

in a vat’s use

is

something

word

'tree' is

’tree’,

on

only

his view,

rather

A 'tree-in-the-image' could variously be described as a mental

these things the brain in a vat really refers

A

14

like a 'tree-in-the-image',

or as a set of sense-impressions, electrical impulses,
or computer code; but

consequence of this claim

is

when

to,

it

what

is

image,

one of

ostensibly thinking of trees.

that the truth-conditions

of the external world

propositions of brains in vats will involve only the occurrence
of certain sense-contents
(or electrical impulses, or

the

same

computer code). The

truth conditions

propositions, if entertained by normal

human

of what are superficially

beings, will, by contrast, include

the actual presence of the physical substances or states of affairs in
question.

consequence of this
might be a brain
that

I

am

me,

I

am

Putnam wants

to

draw

in a vat is self-refuting. If

a brain in a vat

might be) a brain
to

that

is false. If

in a vat"

1

am

I

am

is

The

that the skeptical hypothesis that

not a brain in a vat, then

a brain in a vat, than

does not refer to brains in

my

my

statement

vats. In that instance,

speaking not English but rather vat-English, in which

my

I

hypothesis

"I

am

(or

unbeknownst

external world

propositions refer to brains in vats "in the image," or sense-impressions, or electrical

impulses, rather than actual brains and vats.
a brain in a vat being deceived into thinking

14
15

Putnam, Reason

,

15

I

Since on the skeptical hypothesis that

am

p. 14.

Putnam, Reason p.15.
,
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not

I

I

do not have the experience of

am

being a brain in a vat, then the skeptical
hypothesis as expressed in vat-English must be
false as well.

Thus the hypothesis

easy to see

It is

how this

hidden faculty skepticisms.
an external world

On

that

I

am

a brain in a vat

theory could also be applied to Descartes' evil

those hypotheses, one

would

is

demon

or

being deceived into thinking that

thanks to false sense-impressions.

exists,

reference, if these hypotheses were true, then
faculties

is self-refuting.

On

my references to

Putnam's theory of

demons

evil

refer to specific sense-impressions or electrical
impulses

or hidden

(i.e.,

impressions of evil demons or hidden faculties, or corresponding
electrical impulses of
certain kinds). Since

I

have immediate access

to

my

sense-impressions,

I

know

can

that

I

do not have impressions of this kind. Therefore, as with the case of
the brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis,

I

my

were

if

I

am

not being deceived then

statement that

I

was would again be

hypothesis can be similarly

world

my

shown

to be false,

statement that

false.

I

I

am would

false,

and

if

Since any such Cartesian skeptical

can conclude that

I

know

that

an external

exists.

The problem with

this

kind of response to the skeptic, however,

relocates the skepticism to the level of reference, or meaning. All
that a certain sentence

in a vat.

What do

truthfully, "I

I

am

is

false

is that

it

simply

Putnam can show

is

whether expressed by a normal human being or by a brain

not know, however,

is

what language

not a brain in a vat." Specifically,

English, and thus referring to actual brains in vats,

16

be

Brueckner makes the same point

I

need

when

am

I

to

I

in "Brains in a Vat,"

(1986).
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speaking when

know

deny

that

that

I

I

am

am

I

say,

speaking

one.

16

Thus,

at

The Journal of Philosophy 83
,

best, all

Putnam has accomplished

vat (or whether

I

am

is to

take skepticism about whether

being deceived by an evil demon,

skepticism about what language

I

am

etc.),

speaking, or whether

I

I

am

a brain in a

and transformed
can really refer

it

into

to brains in

vats or evil demons.

Putnam responds

that

actual brains and actual vats

know

that

I

am

I

can simply

when

I

say

I

know- i.e., immediately-that I am

am

referring to

not a brain in a vat, and thus that

speaking English rather than vat-English. 17 But

this is

I

simply

simply to deny one

of the implications of the causal theory of reference.
The causal theory of reference
implies that

some of the

facts

which determine what

immediately epistemically accessible

and Twin-Earth

with the word

refer to are not

me. Consider the case of non-scientists on Earth

individuals with no knowledge of the actual molecular
structure of

(i.e.,

what comes out ol

to

my terms

their taps).

Neither can say whether they refer to water or twinwater

'water'. In this case,

it

would be possible

empirically just what they are referring
structure of the fluids in question.

regard to whether one

is

to,

for

each of them to determine

through an examination of the molecular

However,

this is not

a brain in a vat or not.

an avenue one can take with

The nature of the hypothesis

is

such that

the causal factors determining the reference of one's terms are not epistemically
accessible. In order for

Putnam

to claim, as

he does, that

I

can just

tell'

that

I

am

speaking

English rather than vat-English, he must reject the causal theory of reference, which
states that

which one

what one
is

refers to can

be determined

immediately aware.
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in part

by factors other than those of

Tyler Burge's very similar approach to refuting
skepticism focuses on the
attribution of ’thought-contents."

On

his view, the thoughts of a being in a
solipsistic

world regarding the external world would have indeterminate
18
contents.
Imagine a
subject,

Adam, who

exists solipsistically in a

other speakers. According to Burge,
attitude concerning water,

attitude about, for

denies that

could

we

we

we

could not attribute to

Adam

example, twinwater. Because of this kind of indeterminacy, Burge

could attribute any external world concepts to

Adam

Thus

neither

easy to see that this approach will be subject to an objection similar
to the one

skepticism to the level of meaning. If Burge
skeptical hypothesis

s

at all.

about the external world.

given to Putnam. This potential response to skepticism, again,

Burge

a propositional

because such an attitude could not be distinguished from an

fix truth-conditions to his beliefs

It is

world without water or a community of

is

is right,

either false or meaningless.

at best relocates one’s

then one can conclude that the

However, one can conclude from

findings that one does not live in a solipsistic world only if one can assume that

one's skeptical hypothesis

is

meaningful, and thus that one

is

a normal

human

being,

rather than a solipsistic consciousness.

3.

The

Private

Language Argument

Wittgenstein gives a theory of meaning which could also be employed in a refutation of

skepticism similar to those considered above.

17

18

19

see,

19

Wittgenstein introduces his theory of

Putnam, Lecture (Smith College, Oct. 25, 1996).
Burge, “Other Bodies”, 1pp.l
14-5.
1
#

Wittgenstein did not use his theory of meaning in this

way

(although, as

he did suggest that skepticism should be disregarded for reasons related
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we

shall

to his

meaning by introducing an argument which denies
logically impossible for

follows.

20

any other person

His immediate intent

a person could write

is to

down

the possibility of a language

to understand. Wittgenstein's

deny the possibility of a language

which

is

argument runs as
in

which

or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his

moods, and the rest-for his private use. ...The individual
words of this
language are to refer to what can only be known to the
person speaking; to his
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot
understand the
language/
feelings,

Statements about private sense-contents are not translatable
into publicly understandable
statements, since others can never

know

exactly what you refer to

when you

private experience, such as the experience of a color,
sound, or emotion.

sentences of phenomenalism are, as
contents. Both

Humean and

we have

and

seen, sentences about private sense-

from propositions about our

explicitly claims that our ideas are all ultimately derived

that the content

entities or

of ideas

like those

What we

really

objective causal relation exists,

impressions.

Hume

is

is that

we have

infer

from sense-impressions

us, is actually derived

mean, he claims, when we

we

internal states.

of substance or cause, which purport

laws not directly experienceable by

experiences.

The protocol

Cartesian skepticism describe a situation in which

the existence and nature of external objects

Hume

refer to a

to refer to

from our subjective

assert that a physical object or

experienced a certain sequence of sense-

thus an explicit phenomenalist.

He

is

a skeptic, however, because,

What follows is a discussion of a hypothetical argument based on his theory.
I owe portions of the following interpretation to Thomson ("Private Languages"),
Robert J. Fogelin ( Wittgenstein 2nd ed. [New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987])
and Saul Kripke ( Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [Cambridge: Harvard
theory).

,

University Press, 1982]).
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unlike the phenomenalist logical positivist, he
does not suppose that the objectivity of
external world statements can be preserved by
hypothetical sense-content propositions.

He

could not hold

this,

because the verification or confirmation of such
statements would

require induction. Descartes thinks

we can

but he also paints a picture in which

experiences from which

we

all

we

successfully speak of substances and causes,
are immediately

infer the existence

of material substances.

might therefore portray Descartes as a phenomenalist
thus meaningless) inferences.

to

refer to entities

cannot experience them and
experience such things

who made some

A phenomenalist
inappropriate (and

The views of both Hume and Descartes thus could appear

depend on the existence of private languages

whose terms ultimately

aware of are subjective

in the

in Wittgenstein’s sense, or

which are private both

sense that one can never

at all. Wittgenstein's private

languages

in the sense that others

know whether

others

language argument, then, could be

construed as both an attack on phenomenalism and on the epistemological
picture

necessary for external world skepticism.
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language rests on the

observation that, in order to have a meaningful language, there must be rules or criteria

which govern the way the terms of the language
criterion

are to be used. If there

which governs one's use of a word, then

fixed meaning.

that

The case Wittgenstein makes against

word cannot be

is

no rule or

said to have any

private languages consists for the

21

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 3rd ed., translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1958), Section 243, pp.88-9.
,
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most pan

explaining

in

why the

rules governing the use of
terms of a private language

could not be said to be fixed or known.

The Cartesian and Humean

pictures of the use of language

seem

to be that

we

identify and re-identify types of subjective
experiences; the occurrence of, and patterns

among, these events

are then the basis for inferences to external
causes and the

generation of external world concepts. The
re-identification of types of experiences,

however, requires rules of re-identification: rules which will
impression

is

to Wittgenstein, the received

by reference

it.

(e.g.,

Then, on future occasions when

shade of red,

I

re-identify

it

as such

I

think

I

am

by comparing

source of rules for a private language.

He

the use of the term "two"

said, "this is called 'two'."

by ostention

The person

be sure what you are referring to by

'two';

to

On

this view,

I

are re-

simply

having an experience of the same

to a

it

points out,

never be established by ostensive definition alone.

and

a sensation or

an experience of a certain shade of red), and

memory of the one had
I

previously ostensively defined as red. Wittgenstein explains

someone

when

view of how subjective events

to a prior private ostentive definition.

concentrate on a subjective occurrence

name

us

a reoccurrence of a certain type of experience.

is

According
ldentified

tell

first

He

alone.

whom

why

of all,

this

why

cannot be the
the use of a term can

notes that you could not teach

Suppose you pointed

one gives

this definition

to

could never

he could think you were referring to

of nuts, for example.
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two nuts

this

group

[H]e might equally well take the name of a
person, of which I give an ostensive
of a color, of a race, or even of a point of the
compass. That is
to say: an ostensive definition can be variously
interpreted in every case. 22
definition, as that

The

private analogue of pointing

is

subsequently names. The question

knows when one

is

a concentration on

is

how one

the case of a public

language-a language whose terms

can be acquainted-there

is

what

What

determine whether one

criteria to

sensation,

fixes, exactly,

experiencing another instance of it.

independent criterion or

’this'

is

is

which one
and

'this' is,

needed

is

how one

some

using a word correctly. In

refer to entities with

which others

an objective, public practice relative to which one's use of the

language in any given instance can be proper or improper.

Could there be a private practice analogous
one can
cannot.

fix the

He

claims that

to think

one

is

obeying a rule

thing as obeying

The idea underlying

One

is

is

not to obey a rule.

this

is

Hence

it is

not possible to obey

obeying a rule would be the same

23
it.

reasoning

determine whether one

is

is

that there is

no

fact

of the matter one can appeal

obeying the rules of one's private language

then reduced to identifying obeying a given rule with thinking one

cannot constitute rule-following. But

why

can't

I

experience? This would give

me

is,

it

to

my memory

and

this

of the past

a ground to use the same private language term to

describe the current experience.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations , Section 28, pp.13-4.
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to

correctly.

determine that a current sensation or

impression matches a previous one simply by comparing

“

which

use of one's private sensation terms? Wittgenstein argues that there

a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one

in order to

to the public one, relative to

Wittgenstein responds that a practice cannot be
self-confirming. If 1 use only

memory

to

claim that

confirm private rule-following,

I

am

I

can then have no legitimate ground for

my

following the rule correctly:

Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary)
that exists only in our
imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the
translation of a word X by a
word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a
table is to be looked up
only in the imagination? -"Well yes; then it is subjective
justification."-But
justification consists in appealing to

something independent.-"But surely I can
to another. For example, I don't know if I have
remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I
call to mind
how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?"-No; for this
appeal from one

memory

process
has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If
the mental image of the
time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how
could it confirm the
correctness of the first memory? 24

A

dictionary, for example,

is

an objective record of the manner

publicly used; a dictionary

is

a concrete manifestation of a linguistic practice.

appealing to

it,

one can verify

memory cannot
being verified
experiencing

is

serve the

same

now

is

To have

alone to verify that

no distinction between

I

way

am

its

if

my terms

An

I

By

appeal to

what

is

I

am

experienced previously and

I

have

to

be able to verify

are to be meaningful. Since

I

am

relying on

correctly using the terms of my private language, there

correctly the correlation between an

name and merely

thinking

I

do. Furthermore, since there

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Section 202,
,

24

correctly.

are

report itself— the report that the sensation

a legitimate private language,

my remembering

impression or sensation and

TT

memory

of the same type as the sensation

correct rule-lollowing in this

is

one has been using a word

which words

function, according to Wittgenstein, because

the accuracy of a

ostensively named.

memory

that

in

p. 8

1

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 265, pp.93-4.
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IS

no

rule or criterion governing

private language

From
language

is

this

is

my

use of the word, the word has no meaning.
Thus a

impossible.

conclusion one could draw the further conclusion

that, since a private

impossible, there must be accessible public criteria
for the use of my

language. Consequently, an external,

'public',

world must

exist.

This argument would function similarly to the phenomenalist
argument against
external world skepticism. Like the anti-skeptical argument
implicit within

phenomenalism,

it

concludes that the skeptic cannot consistently accept that his language

has meaning and yet suppose that the external world might not
exist. Flowever,
falls

it

also

prey to an objection somewhat similar to that leveled against phenomenalism.
Recall that Wittgenstein claims that a public practice

is

sufficient to establish the

proper use (and thus the meaning) of a word because the public practice gives
us

something objective

to

check our use against; a private practice, by contrast, would no

give us something distinct from our use of a term itself to determine

used correctly. Wittgenstein
to

check one's memory of a

to

check one's

sort

illustrates this contrast

train's

memory of the

"independent" to check the accuracy of one's use:

by appealing

to other

is

being

memory of a

timetable

departure time. Wittgenstein says that the second

of appeal cannot constitute a justification because there

reports

term

by contrasting the use of a timetable

departure time with the use of a

train's

if the

memory

I

is

no appeal

cannot justify

my

to

something

faith in

my memory

reports.

But on what basis can Wittgenstein say
practice can justify our use of a term any

that the appeal to a public timetable or

more than an appeal
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to

memory can? The

claim

that an appeal to public practice can justify
our use

objections.

As Fogelin

I

is

my

consult a timetable to see if

observation reports?

subject to two related

shows

that one's reliance

no more sound than reliance on one’s own

basis for saying they match, other than that they
in

is

points out, the epistemological skeptic

on an 'independent' source of confirmation

memory. 25 Suppose

of terms

matches

it

seem

How do know they are
I

to

my recollection. What

match? What justifies

my

is

my

faith

independent and objective? The

claim that independent criteria for the use of language are
needed does nothing to answer
skepticism, in fact, for this claim to be other than vacuous,
a prior answer to skepticism

is

needed.

Furthermore, any check of one's recollections requires an inference from the
present state ol the world to

some

past state,

which

in turn requires a law-like statement

about the world. The justification of such statements depends on beliefs about what
one
has observed in the past-i.e., recollections. Thus even public checking depends on
recollection.

In response to skeptical challenges like these, Wittgenstein says that, in such

matters,

we simply do

not doubt:

How does

someone judge which is his right and which his left hand? How do I
know that my judgment will agree with his? ...Must I not begin to trust
somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin by not-doubting; and that is
not, so to speak, hasty but excusable:

25

it

is

part of judging.

Fogelin, Wittgenstein p. 1 80; see also Ayer, "Can There
,

Be

26

a Private Language?",

Aristotelian Society Proceedings Supp. Vol. 28 (1954).
“6

translated

On

Anscombe and G.H. von Wright,
by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), Section

Wittgenstein,

Certainty, edited by G.E.M.

150, p.22.
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There

is

remove

a point, on his view, at

all

which we simply no longer doubt, since doing
so would

ground for our judgments. But

the private practice of relying

for rejecting

such a strategy

on memory

is

why
to

can't

we,

in the

same way,

take on faith

confirm private rule-following? His reason

that an objective

ground

is

lacking for the claim that one

using a term consistently with one's practice; but. as the
skeptic points out,

such a justification for our claims about what the public practice
skeptical possibility

of being mistaken about a practice apply

is.

Why

we

is

also lack

does the

to private practices

and not

public ones?

I

can think of two likely and

give to this question.

As

I

shall

now

initially plausible

answers a Wittgenstinian could

argue, however, neither of these hypothetical

responses would result in a refutation of epistemological skepticism.

One could claim

that the skeptical claim that possibly

no public practice) exists implies

same holds

that the doubter's

language

for the expression of the skeptical hypothesis.

self-refuting or impossible, since the very expression of

it

no external world (and thus
is

meaningless— and the

But then skepticism

fact,

is

that,

given the

possible to say something meaningless unknowingly. In

Wittgenstein himself acknowledges this very possibility: in

that skeptics

27

it

either

directly implies the

meaninglessness of that expression. The skeptic, however, could respond

meaning-as-use doctrine,

is

unknowingly speak nonsense.

See, for example, Sections

27

On

Certainty, he argues

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he

#624 and #627 of On Certainty.
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claims again that skeptics unknowingly speak
nonsense

and also adds

that metaphysics, ethics

unbeknownst

to their usual practitioners. 29

skeptical hypothesis

on the ground

meaningless without our knowing

and aesthetics

that

it

his necessary condition for

demand

express their doubts, 28

involve nonsensical questions—

But then he cannot consistently deny the

suggests that our language might be

30
it.

Another route one could take would be
have

all

when they

to hold that Wittgenstien never intended to

meaning contain an epistemological element. His

for independent criteria for correct language use is
misleading: he errs in

implying, via his use of examples like the timetable example, that
meaning depends on an
epistemically accessible confirmation of correct use. All he really wants
the logical distinction between correct and incorrect language use.

term’s having a

what

it

is to

meaning requires the user

to

a

What he

way

says

to

is

make

that a

be able in principle to distinguish between

follow the rule of its use and what

Even supposing

is

it is

just to think

that this is not possible for a private language,

one

it

is

following that

rule.

does not follow that a

public practice must exist - the possibility of a public practice establishes a ground for

language use that does not exist even
principle,

in principle in private use.

between a language which could not conform

could-even

if the

public practice does not, in fact, exist.

One can

to a public rule

Its

distinguish, in

and one which

hypothetical existence (which

->g

Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus translated by C.K.
,

Routledge

& Kegan Paul Ltd,

Ogden (London:

1922), Section 6.51, p. 187.

See, for example, Wittgenstein, Tractatus Sections 4.003, p.63, and 6.421,
,

30

p.

1

83.

There is an obvious parallel between this response and a response given above to
Putnam; Putnam's causal theory of reference, as I mentioned earlier, implies that it is
possible not to

know

to

what one

is referring.
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certainly the skeptic does not deny)

is

enough

to establish a distinction in principle

between language use which could and which could not
conform
then, of course,

we

are

in a position in

still

and the public practice actually

exist.

to a public practice.

which we do not know

if

But

the external world

Thus we can accept Wittgenstein's theory of

meaning, along with his denial that a private language

is

possible, without giving

up

skepticism. At best, his theory of meaning could force the
skeptic to give up

phenomenalism, but not

language— a language

to give

up the possibility

would be public

that

that one's

language

is

an external world were to

if

a 'private public'

exist.

Another argument Wittgenstein may give against private languages also

answer such skeptical doubts. Fogelin claims
Wittgenstein's thesis: he calls

who

it

'the training

that there is a

argument'.

31

second argument for

Wittgenstein holds that a person

follows a rule "has been trained to react to a sign in a particular way." 32 This

explains

how

the person

continues, "is that there

which

is

thinking

this to

knows how
a

is

exhibited in what

I

we

call

I

a rule

'obeying the

which

rule'

in

which

must have been trained

I

is

"What

my

it

— to conform

Fogelin, Wittgenstein pp. 175-9.
.

•11

,

“

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Section 198, p.80.

'

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 201, p.81.

,
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,

it'

non-interpretively follow

to follow

shows," he

in actual

following a rule and

practice.

3-)

this

not an interpretation but

and 'going against

be a distinction between

am, there must be a sense

be possible,

to follow the rule correctly.

way of grasping

In order for there to

cases."

31

fails to

it.

my only

In order for

to the public

Could

this training take place in the

gives no reason

why

for

evil

example, an

absence of an external world? Wittgenstein

the perfect illusion of training in a
language— an illusion created by,

demon

or hidden faculty-could not produce the

training in a public practice.

The

result

same

result as actual

of illusory training would, again, be a private

public language: a language which as a matter of fact
no one else understands, but which

could be comprehensible to others
existed. Thus, again, there is

if one's

experience were veridical and other people

no violation of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning inherent

the skeptical hypothesis, even if the skeptic

4.

were

to

choose to accept

in

that theory.

Strawso n’s Objectivity Argument and His Reading of Kant's Refutation

In his

book on

the Critique of Pure

Reason

,

P.F.

Strawson gives two widely

discussed anti-skeptical arguments, which he thinks reflect the essence of Kant's actual

reasoning on the issue. The goal of these arguments

is

to

prove what Strawson calls "the

objectivity thesis":

experience must include awareness of objects which are distinguishable from
experiences of them in the sense that judgments about these objects are judgments

about what

is

the case irrespective of the actual occurrence of particular subjective

experiences of them.

The

first

34

such argument, often called Strawson's 'objectivity argument', takes the form of

an attack on the alleged possibility of a pure "sense-datum experience." 35 According to
the skeptic (Cartesian or

sense-data, from

34
35

Humean),

which we

P.F. Strawson,

all

we

are immediately

infer the existence

aware of is a succession of

of objects around

The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen

Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p.99.
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us.

& Co.,

The

skeptic also

1966), p.24.

agrees, however, that

we

are self-conscious, in that

we

ascribe

all

these subjective

impressions to a single, temporally extended subject
of experiences. The sense-datum
theorist's hypothesis, then, is that

it

is

possible to have the concept of a self without

having experience of objects independent of one's
subjective experiences. Strawson
responds by arguing that one's concept of a subject of experiences
presupposes the

concept of an objective world independent of one's experience
of it. Without such a
concept, he asks,

how

can we attach a sense to the notion of the single consciousness to
which the
successive 'experiences' are supposed to belong? We seem to add nothing
but a
form of words to the hypothesis of a succession of essentially disconnected
impressions by stipulating that they all belong to an identical consciousness..

..The

seems to contain no ground of distinction between the
supposed experience of awareness and the particular item which the awareness
[skeptical] hypothesis

an awareness

He

thus suggests that, on the sense-datum hypothesis, there are no criteria on the basis
of

which one could pick out a subject of experience
is

is

36

of.

no such thing as a

explicitly

distinct perception

acknowledged by Hume, and

from

its

experiences. That there

of a self separate from

its

experiences

implicitly

distinct

is

by Descartes. Without such a

perception, and without the concept of an objective world, Strawson argues, there would

be no basis for conceptually distinguishing experiences from a subject of them:
the

minimum

least

implied [by the possibility of self-consciousness]

is

that

some

at

of the concepts under which particular experienced items are recognized as
such that the experiences themselves contain the basis for certain

falling should be

of a subjective component within a
seems to me as if this is a heavy stone' is
distinguishable within 'this is a heavy stone'); collectively, the distinction between
the subjective order and arrangement of a series of such experiences on the one
allied distinctions: individually, the distinction

judgment of experience

36

(as

'it

Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p.100.
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hand and the objective order and arrangement of the
items of which they
experiences on the other. 37
I

f

'

per imP° ssibile

i

all

are

of one's experiences lacked the "conceptual
character" of being

such as must be conceived of as existing independently
of the experience of them,"

even the basis of the idea of the referring of such
experiences to an
subject of a series of them by such a subject would
be altogether

identical

lacking; and if

the basis of this idea

were lacking, it would be impossible to distinguish the
recognitional components in such 'experiences' as
components not wholly
absorbed by their sensible accusatives; and if this were
impossible, they would
not rate as experiences at all.
Strawson's argument seems to be that the distinction between an
experience and a

conscious awareness of an experience requires conceiving of an order
of events

from the subjective order of experiences:
subject, there

to

thesis

is

"it

how

even attempted

38

it

would be impossible"

But

37

it

to.

To conceive of an
that they

the "basis" for the distinction between

make).

He concludes

that the objectivity

correct, in that only objective experience can provide the basis for a subject's

conceptual distinction between
claims,

is

we know we

subjective and objective (which

to contrast

some of one's experiences must be such

"must" be conceived of as objective. This

distinct

conceive of the subjective, and thus of the

must be the conception of an objective

objective order, the argument goes,

self-

and
to

can Strawson draw

to

show

is

that the

its

experiences. Without objective experience, he

be self-conscious— to ascribe experiences to oneself. 38
this anti-skeptical

conclusion? All he appears to have

concept of a subject requires the concept of an

Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, p.101.
Strawson's argument has been very influential: Strawson-inspired arguments

by Richard Rorty ("Strawson's Objectivity
Argument," The Review of Metaphysics, 24 [1970], pp. 207-44), Genova ("Good
essentially similar to his are also given
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objective world;

all

objective. His claim

that

seems required

must be

the belief that

is

that a succession

some of one's experiences

of merely subjective experiences

are

is

insufficient to give rise to the idea of objects
or an objective order (and, in turn, the

subjective/objective distinction).

On

the skeptical hypothesis,

regularities in our subjective experience

experiencing an objective world.
lacking in

it

What

and are led on

wrong with

is

we

experience certain

their basis to think that

the skeptical picture?

we

What

are

is

such that the self-ascription of experiences would be impossible?

Strawson exhibits the same anti-skeptical strategy
defense of Kant

s

thought

in the Refutation.

in his interpretation

and

Like Guyer, Strawson thinks that the

Refutation, in speaking of the necessary conditions of "empirical
self-consciousness,"

concerns the temporal ordering of one's subjective experiences. Unlike Guyer, however,
he thinks that the Refutation concerns the necessary conditions of making subjective
temporal determinations, rather than those of makmgjustified ones.

Strawson says that the essence of Kant's reasoning
claim that the raw successive order of subjective states

is

in the Refutation lies in the

insufficient to "sustain" or

give any content to the idea of the subject's aw’areness of himself as having suchat such-and-such a time (i.e., at such-and-such a position

and-such an experience

temporal order). To give content to this idea we need, at least, the idea of a
system of temporal relations which comprehends more than those experiences
themselves. But there is, for the subject himself, no access to this wider system of
temporal relations except through his own experiences. Those experiences,
therefore, must be taken by him to be experiences of things (other than the
in a

among themselves the temporal relations
only one way in which perceived things can

experiences themselves) which possess

of this wider system. But there

is

supply a system of temporal relations independent of the order of the subject's

Transcendental Arguments," Kantstudien 75 [1984], pp.469-95), and Shirley (“A NeoKantian Refutation of Cartesian Skepticism”, The Southwest Philosophical Review )
,
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perc epti ° ns of them-viz. by lasting and being
re-encounterable in temporally
different perceptual experiences. 39

On

this basis,

Strawson concludes.

Awareness of permanent things

my

at different

He

distinct

assigning experiences to myself, to

from myself is therefore indispensable to
my being conscious of myself as havinu.

times, different experiences.

thus claims that a necessary conceptual
presupposition of the notion of a determinate

subjective order of experiences

is

the notion of an objective temporal order,
separate from

the accidental subjective order of perceptions-in
other words, he claims that having the

concept of a subjective order requires having the concept
of an objective order, in much

same way

the

that

Kant argued

in the First

Analogy

that the concept

of an objective order

of events requires the concept of substance. The skeptic must
agree, since

do make STJs and are empirically self-conscious,
a subjective order.

Thus the

skeptic,

that

we

we have and employ

obviously

the notion of

by the above reasoning, must also agree

that

we have

and employ the notion of an objective world and objective temporal order.
Again, however,

from the claim

we

that the idea

are left with the

same problem.

of an objective order

is

How can

Strawson move

a necessary conceptual

presupposition of the idea of a subjective order to the claim that the actual experience of

an objective order

is

a necessary condition of one's having the idea of a subjective one?

Strawson's claim, again,

is

that experience

must provide a

distinctions, or else such distinctions are impossible.

for

making such

'basis' for

making such

But the skeptic does provide a basis

distinctions: patterns or regularities in subjective experience.

The

skeptic

then simply points out that such regularities alone are an insufficient basis for knowledge

39

Strawson, Bounds of Sense pp. 126-7.
,
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Of an objective world. The challenge for
Strawson,

any hope of success against the skeptic,
sufficient for

is to

Kantian arguments are to have

show why having experience

know ledge of an objective world

that is sufficient for conceiving

if his

is

that is

necessary in order to have experience

of an objective world.

One answer could be thought

to lie in Strawson's "principle

of significance":

there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful,
employment of ideas or concepts
which does not relate them to empirical or experiential
conditions of their
0
application.

According

to Strawson,

Strawson often says

that, if

certain concept, then

significance

makes

Kant accepts a principle

it

we

like this (see. e.g.,

are not in possession of "adequate" criteria to apply
a

has neither meaning nor legitimate use. 41

clear,

B298). Elsewhere.

when he

says

'criteria',

As

the principle of

he means experiential criteria— criteria

defined in terms of sense-experience. Although the principle of significance
(like the
Wittgenstinian 'meaning-as-use' doctrine) concerns the meaningfulness of
concepts rather

than propositions,

it

has more in

common

meaningfulness of ideas or concepts

with the verification principle, for

to their possession

it

ties the

of empirical content.

Recall, however, that the skeptic thinks he has given experiential criteria for the

application of external-world concepts: criteria defined in terms of regularities in sense-

experience.

The

skeptic points out that the occurrence of such regularities explains, but

does not justify, conclusions about the external world.

40

Strawson, Bounds of Sense p. 1 6.
See Strawson, Individuals (New York: Methuen
,

41

67

& Co.,

1959), pp. 31,35, and 71.

Presumably, then, by ’empirical (or experiential)
that provide

more of a

criteria',

Strawson means

basis for applying the concept of an object
than

criteria

mere sense-data

alone; otherwise, the skeptic's pure sense-data
experience would be rationally sufficient
to infer the existence

must show

that these criteria

whether the concept

seems

to

of an external world. To establish the objectivity

make

must be 'adequate'

in the sense

thesis,

Strawson

of adequate to determine

in question is instantiated. In the context

of another argument, he

this claim:

Clearly there is no sense in talking of identifiable individuals
of a special type, a
type, namely, such that they possess both M-predicates
and P-predicates, unless
there is in principle some way of telling, with regard to any
individual

of that

and any P-predicate, whether that individual possesses that P-predicate.
And
the case of at least some P-predicates, the ways of telling must
constitute in

type,
in

some sense
predicate.

42

logically adequate kinds of criteria for the ascription of the P-

But then, for Strawson
objectivity

to

be successful

argument and from

significance must

amount

to

meaningfulness of concepts:

know whether

or not

verificationism,

so,

it

is

must mean

that a concept

is

that a proposition is

meaningful only

meaningful only

however, then the arguments Strawson gives to support

are superfluous, because, if a principle like this

is true,

from our (meaningful) use of external world concepts

42

Strawson, Individuals

,

p.

1

own

like a verification principle for the

instantiated. This is similar to the classic version

which says

his

his interpretation of Kant's Refutation, his principle of

something very

it

what he concludes from

in establishing

05.
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if

it

one can

of

can be verified.

If

his anti-skeptical conclusions

we can immediately

that

if

we

conclude

are in a position to

know

whether or not the external world and
is to

show

that

we must

employ

in fact

all

43

What Strawson's arguments do

one just described

we would need

is true, all

to

know

is

if

a

that

external world concepts, and that they are
meaningful.

One problem with
subject to

contents exist.

use external world concepts in order to be
self-conscious. But

verification principle like the

we do

its

this strategy

of responding to the skeptic

is

the objections raised against verificationism
generally.

accept this form of verificationism and yet respond
that
external world concepts are meaningful,

on

we

this definition

cannot

that

The

it

will be

skeptic can

know whether

our

of meaningfulness. Thus, as

in

the case of an anti-skeptical argument based on classical
verificationism, the skeptic can

respond by relocating his skepticism
respond by denying that
indeed, this

strictly

essentially

can

what

know

Hume

of meaning: the skeptic can simply

that our external

does,

when he

world concepts are meaningful-

says that our concept of substance,

speaking, has no content!

As
that,

is

we

to the level

in the case

of the classic version of verificationism,

given this verification principle,

adjudged meaningless.

(It is

it

could also be objected

many of the concepts of empirical

less clear,

however, that

this version

science must be

of the verification

principle falls prey to another objection to the classic version-namely, that
satisfy its

own

it

does not

condition on meaningfulness.)

43

Similar arguments against Strawson are given by Barry Stroud in The Significance of
Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)) and Brueckner in
"Transcendental Arguments I," Nous, 17 (1983), pp.551-76.
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This principle also must not be allowed to
collapse into phenomenalism or
idealism, as

some versions of verificationism

As we have

do.

seen, neither of these kinds

of positions can provide a satisfactory answer to
the skeptic.
Proponents of a Strawsonian response to the skeptic are thus
confronted with a

dilemma: Strawson can either

which case
it

in

it is

can confine

subject to

itself

rest his anti-skeptical

many of the problems

merely

to

conclusions on verificationism, in

that beset traditional verificationism, or

being an argument about what

is

conceptually presupposed

judgments concerning self-consciousness and subjective time-determination.

reading,

all

Strawson can claim

is

that the concept

of an external world

is

On

this

analytically

necessary to the concept of subjecthood and a subjective order. If he
confines himself to
this,

however, his argument can have no more anti-skeptical weight than can the

First

Analogy, which merely says that the existence of external objects must be
posited

in

order to distinguish conceptually an objective order from a subjective one.

Even

if

Strawson can overcome objections

to his verificationism, the 'principle

of

significance', read as a verification principle for concepts, does not yield the conclusion

Strawson draws from

it,

namely, that

it

is

"impossible" to

make

subject and subjective experiences without suitable criteria;

that if the skeptic is right

the distinction

all this

between

principle can

show

is

one could not legitimately or meaningfully make the

subjective/objective distinction and the subject/subjective experience distinction.

As we

have seen above, Strawson draws the conclusions that "awareness of permanent things
distinct

from myself is therefore indispensable

to

my

assigning experiences to myself,"

and "the fundamental condition of the possibility of empirical self-consciousness
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in

time

IS

the awareness of enduring objects in space." 44

He

does not limit his claim to the

necessary conditions of the legitimate or meaningful use
of external world concepts and
thus to the necessary conditions of the legitimate
or meaningful self-ascription of

experiences: he seems, rather, to

external-world entities

Strawson

is

is

make

the stronger claim that actual contact with

a condition of self-consciousness.

right that

Kant

articulates, at times, a

view

like that

expressed by

Strawson's principle of significance:

We

demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in
general, and, secondly, the possibility of giving it an object
to which it may be
applied. In the absence of such an object,

lacking in content.... We therefore

it

demand

has no meaning and

that a bare concept

is

completely

be made sensible

,

an object corresponding to it be presented in intuition. Otherwise the
concept would, as we say, be without sense, that is, without meaning
(A^39that

is,

that

40/B298-300)
But Kant does not say that
says

that

is

we

that

we cannot employ

concepts which are without sense;

he

cannot do so legitimately or meaningfully. All Kant says, furthermore,

an object to which a given concept can be applied must be "presented

for the use

all

of that concept

to

is

in intuition"

be legitimate; but evil demons and hidden faculties can be

responsible for the presentations of intuition just as well as external objects.

One

possibility is that

Strawson

is

simply conflating the conditions of the

meaningful or legitimate use of concepts with the conditions of employing them

at all.

This, in addition to the claim that the meaningful use of concepts requires being in a

position to

know

if

they are instantiated, would allow him to conclude that actual

awareness of objects

44

is

a necessary condition of self-consciousness.

Strawson, Bounds of Sense, pp. 127-8.
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What would remain

mysterious, however,

is

exactly what

the fact that

all

Hume

is

why one

says

we

our knowledge

cannot use external world concepts illegitimately.
This

do:

is

on

we

his view,

use external world concepts despite

based on sense-impressions merely;

we

are led to use

these concepts illegitimately because of regularities in our
experience and the action of
irrational,

psychological dispositions.

possibility,

By

conflating the legitimacy of concepts with their

Strawson would simply be denying

that this

is

possible; but such a denial

is

no substitute for an argument.

The more

interesting possibility

is

that

Strawson

is

making some kind of claim

about the psychological conditions of having certain beliefs; in other words,
that he is pointing out certain necessary conditions

the

first

place, meaningful or not. If so, then he

it

is

possible

of generating certain sorts of belief in

would

at least

avoid the problems

associated with his version of a verification principle of meaning.

Of course,

this

approach would then require some kind of principle different from, and stronger than, the
principle of significance.

However, and perhaps unfortunately, Strawson
intent in giving the kind of

genetic psychology.

"make

it

seem

" 4?

He

explicitly denies that this

argument he does: he denies

that

says, rather, that this kind of

argument

intelligible to us. ..that

we have

the conceptual

what he
is

is

doing

is

is " a

his

priori

simply intended to

scheme we have." This

characterization of his project tends to suggest that he limits himself, as Stroud claims,

either to giving a verificationist

argument or

to

self-consciousness.
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merely supplying a conceptual analysis of

Strawson has since conceded that anti-skeptical reasoning
of Sense cannot rebut the skeptic

we

are so constituted that

we

falls

back on saying

that skeptical doubts are "idle,"

cannot truly doubt the existence of an external world.

Our conceptual scheme, he

argues, requires positing one, and so

hypothesize that

exist.

it

does not

transcendental arguer faces a

now concedes

Strawson

He now only

sort

we

cannot truly

Stroud's claim that the

dilemma between an argument

and one which merely establishes "a certain
capacities and beliefs.

Bounds

by providing conclusive proofs of the existence of

independent substances. 46 Rather, he
in that

like that in his

resting

on verificationism

of interdependence of conceptual

represents his reasoning as the latter—

connective analysis' which shows only what our conceptual scheme
conceptually
requires. Skeptical doubts are idle',

on

his view,

skepticism, accepts that self-conscious thought

because the skeptic,

is

in

forming his

possible; since, as Strawson thinks he

has shown, this requires positing-or believing in-an external world, skeptical
doubts

about such a world are incoherent or pointless. As he puts

it,

the skeptical hypothesis

"involves the pretended acceptance of a conceptual scheme and
silent repudiation

with

4^

Hume

at the

same time

of one of the conditions of its existence." 48 He claims

and Wittgenstein

in

holding this position.

that

the

he stands

49

Strawson, Individuals p.l 12.
,

46

Strawson, Scepticism and Naturalism:

University Press, 1985), Ch.
47

Some

Varieties

1.

Strawson, Scepticism
and Naturalism rp.21.
x
Strawson, Individuals p.l 06.
,

48

,

49

See Scepticism and Naturalism pp. 10-1
,

1

and 14-5.
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(New York: Columbia

This position

can accept that

it

is

is

disappointing as an answer to the skeptic.

clear the skeptic

necessary for us to posit or believe in
the existence of external

objects, while questioning

inability actually to

It is

whether

we

imagine ourselves

our conceptual scheme;
exists independently

it

really can be certain they exist.

in a solipsistic

world only

tells

remains an open and reasonable question as

Our alleged
us something about

to

what actually

of that scheme.

5.

Bennett’s Revision of Strawson's

Argument

Inspired equally by Strawson and Wittgenstein, Jonathan
Bennett gives a revision

of Kant's Refutation which rests on a principle similar to the
principle of significance and
which, like Strawson's argument, draws a conclusion which appears
to go beyond a claim
about conditions for the legitimate use of concepts.
Bennett begins by describing what he regards as the failed strategy of the
Refutation, and then goes on to give a revised version which he thinks

is

describes Kant's Refutation as a Wittgenstinian 'public check' argument.

argument

fails

successful.

He

He

says that this

because of reasons similar to those cited above against Wittgenstein's

private language argument; he thinks, however, that a revised-and

more

clearly

Wittgenstinian-version of this interpretation can work as a refutation of skepticism.

Bennett agrees that the Refutation
that

we must have

is

logically prior to the First Analogy,

showing

experience of objects outside us, while the First Analogy shows the
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manner

in

which we must conceptually parse

summation of what

this external

the Refutation has proved

is

world into substances. 50 Kant's

that

outer experience

is really immediate, and that only by means
of it is inner
experience— not indeed the consciousness of my own
existence, but the
determination of it in time-possible. (B276-7)

Bennett thinks that Kant's reasoning to this conclusion
went along lines similar to
51
Wittgenstein's 'public check' argument against private
languages.

Like Guyer and Strawson, Bennett holds that Kant's notion
of a "determination of
time

refers to

states.

Also

one

like

s

placing of a given subjective state in a subjective time-order
of

Guyer, Bennett thinks that Kant

is

conditions of X\\q justification of such judgments.

thought

I

can

is

trust

that

my memory

my memory

against other

tells

me what

only by checking

memories

alone,

I

fail

state

it

I

concerned with the necessary

He

was

hypothesizes that Kant's line of
in at

any

earlier time, but

I

against objective states of affairs: if

thereby to justify

my

practice of relying

know
I

that

check

it

on memory.

Bennett describes this as a Wittgenstinian argument, even though he does not mention
necessary conditions of the meaningful use of language; he only mentions conditions of
justified subjective temporal determinations.

Bennett thinks that this

is

what Kant has

in

mind when he says

that

"representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which

and so

their change,

(Bxxxix

50

n.).

I

my

existence in time wherein they change,

may

require objects and objective states of affairs to justify

be determined"

my

practice of

Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966),

p.203.
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relying on

Kant

s

memory

to order

my

subjective states.

On

conclusion that "the existence of outer things

his view, this is the rationale for

is

required for the possibility of a

determinate consciousness of the self’ (B278).

(What Bennett does not explain
irom the claim

that the existence

that the existence

of outer things

is

invalid as

how, even

of outer things
is

determinate consciousness of the
represents as Kant's

is

it

necessary to

self."

is

in principle,

Kant

is

supposed to get

necessary to justify STJs to the claim

make STJs

Thus the argument

at all,

and thus

to acquire a

that Bennett actually

stands.)

Bennett continues by noting two objections that he says are "fatal"
to the above

argument, that the practice of relying on

memory

is

just as epistemically trustworthy as

the practice of relying on public checks, and that public checking
itself requires reliance

on lawlike statements and thus on

recollection.

52

However, he thinks

that a different

version of the same argument can be successful.

He

bases this

new argument on

his "theory

of concept-utility":

one has a language L in which to describe a subject-matter S, it is legitimate to
add a new concept C to the stock of concepts in L in proportion as L-with-C can
describe S more simply than can L-without-C/ 3
If

Suppose someone were limited
Cartesian and the

acquainted with

Humean

is

to

purely inner experience (this

support); in other words,

sense-data.

all this

Could such a person, Bennett

is

the picture that the

person

is

immediately

asks, "enlarge the scope of

his language so as to describe not only his state at the time of his speaking but also his

51

52

Bennett, Kant's Analytic, p.204.
Bennett, Kant's Analytic, p.206.
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states at earlier times?" 4

states

would depend

Bennett notes that what this person says

on

entirely

now

about his past

his recollections. Bennett suggests that, in this
situation,

the concept of the past will not satisfy the
theory of concept-utility: the addition of the

concept of the past

is

useless, since there is a one-to-one relation

between what

this

person can say about his past states and what he can say
about his recollections. The
distinction

between

'I

recollect being thus'

because any evidence for the one
state

is

and

'I

was

thus' is "idle,"

on Bennett's view,

evidence for the other. Adding the concept of a past

does not add anything to the descriptive power of the person's
language: so

concept has no

By

utility for this

this

person.

the theory of concept-utility, this person cannot

ot the past to his stock of concepts.

As we have

seen, this

refute the skeptic: the skeptic can always respond that,

is

legitimately " add the concept

not a sufficient conclusion to

unbeknownst

we

use such

much

stronger

to us,

concepts illegitimately. However, from this conclusion Bennett draws a
one:

for the man who has only inner experience there is only one way in which
anything can seem to have been the case, so that his so-called judgments about the
past pair off neatly with his present-tense judgments about his so-called

recollections.

He

therefore cannot construct a past out of his present data: his

'past' states collapse into his present 'recollections' of them, because no work is
done by the distinction between the two. ...I conclude that someone who had only
inner experience could not make judgments about his past: for him to do so would

be not rash but impossible.”

53

54

Bennett, Kant's Analytic, p.206.
Bennett, Kant's Analytic p.207.
,

” Bennett, Kant's Analytic, p.208-9.

77

By

contrast, the

man

with genuine outer experience can "bring several present
data to

bear on a single judgment about the past," since he has
access not only to his
recollections, but also to information about the present state
of the world,

from which

information about his past states can be inferred. Because of
this, the

with outer

experience "has a complex relationship between

concept of the past

is

'I

was...’

and

'I

man

recollect...'."

Thus

the

not idle for him, so by the theory of concept-utility he can

legitimately use the concept ot the past; and as a consequence of
this, according to

Bennett,

it

is

possible for this

man

to

make judgments about

his past.

Bennett thus moves directly from conclusions about whether concepts can
be used
legitimately to conclusions about whether such concepts can be entertained
at

all.

What

could license such a connection? Like Strawson, Bennett seems to be conflating the
legitimate use of concepts with the possibility of generating them.
this is just to

deny what

Hume

asserts: that

concepts on the basis of mere regularities
If

we

As

before, however,

illegitimately generate external

among mere

world

sense-data.

Bennett (or Strawson) had made a case for the claim that certain external world

concepts are psychologically impossible without our being in a position to

know whether

they are instantiated, then they might have had an anti-skeptical argument.

As

however,

at best all

they each can claim to have

shown

is

that external

formed on the basis of sense-data alone are meaningless or
skeptic can happily agree.
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it

stands,

world concepts

illegitimate.

But

to this the

There have been a few recent attempts made
that external

world experience

is

in the direction

of directly arguing

a necessary condition of the possibility even of

entertaining external world concepts. These arguments
are the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF EXPERIENCE

1

In his

.

The Problem of the Refutation

book on Kant, Henry Allison indeed denies

proto- Wittgenstinian fashion,

verification of particular

is

that in the Refutation "Kant, in

concerned with the conditions of the justification or

knowledge claims about

the self."

rather with the conditions of the possibility of making such

inner sense) at

1

Kant's concern, he says, "is

judgments (judgments of

all."

Allison's interpretation of the argument

is

very simple.

First,

Kant’s claim

is

that

the consciousness of one's existence as an enduring subject of successive experiences that
the skeptic agrees

we have

involves consciousness of the order of one's states in time and

placement of oneself in a universal time-order. 2 But the determination of the existence of
anything in time "presupposes the perception of something permanent
Therefore the skeptic cannot consistently doubt that

imagine or believe that

we

:

1

I

may

be summarized as follows:

ascribe to myself a determinate order of temporally successive experiences.

Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University

1983), p.297.
2

actually perceive, and not just

perceive, enduring spatial objects.

Allison's version of the argument

PI

we

in space."

Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism pp. 302-3.
,
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Press,

P2: The formation of beliefs about
temporal order requires the perception of something
enduring in space.

C.

I

have perceived something enduring

Allison seems to think this

falls short,

however,

is

in space.

a successful response to the classical skeptic. This
argument

one crucial respect: P2 depends on the undefended
assumption

in

Allison calls the "Backdrop Thesis," which he believes

The Backdrop Thesis

is

the

view

supported by the First Analogy.

that

the unperceivability of time

accessible

is

makes

it

necessary to presuppose some perceptually

model

for time itself as a condition of the possibility of
determining the
temporal relations of appearances. ...Consequently, an enduring,

perceivable object
required to provide the backdrop or frame of reference by means
of
which the succession, coexistence, and duration, of appearances in a
common

(or objects)

is

time can be determined. 3

The

first

Analogy:

part of this claim is the claim

that one's

I

have previously said

is

made by Kant

having the idea of enduring external-world substances

is

in the First

a necessary

condition of one’s forming any beliefs about an objective temporal order of events. The

second part of the claim

argument also shows

in

that

an addition on Allison’s

part:

he thinks that the

First

Analogy

an external-world object must actually exist in order for one to

get the idea of an objective temporal order.

In Chapter

understanding

One

I

why Kant

said that the basic

problem

in reading the Refutation lies in

thinks that actually perceiving an enduring external object,

rather than just thinking one has perceived such a thing,

is

necessary for subjective time

determination. Allison answers this question by referring us to the First Analogy. But

have argued

that the strongest conclusion

we can
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get

from the

First

Analogy

is

that

I

we

must assume the existence of enduring
objects (substances) when we distinguish
between
the subjective change of mental states
and objective change in an external world.
Allison

moves

directly

from

this to the

claim that

we must

actually perceive enduring objects as a

condition of making this distinction. But
this just relocates the problem to the
First

Analogy (though

I

will not

deny

that there are passages in the First

lead one to think Kant has this stronger claim
in

could justify this

move

in the First

mind

there).

to explain this

Morris Lipson’s neo-Kantian refutation of skepticism
s intentions in the

Refutation.

I

shall therefore

what

tell us.

key move, there are a couple of

contemporary writers who say something which might help

Kant

Now the question is,

Analogy? Allison does not

While Allison does not attempt

Analogy which could

may

fill

in the gap. In particular.

provide some clues in divining

examine Lipson's argument

in detail

before returning to Kant's.

2.

Mental Contents and Objective Experience

Morris Lipson thinks he can supply what Strawson, and others,
direct connection

between

(a) the

fail to offer:

a

very ability to conceptually distinguish between an

objective temporal order and the order of one's subjective experiences and
(b) the

existence of an objective world. Lipson agrees that, as

it

refutation of idealism does rely

of verificationism. 4 Lipson also

3

on an implausible

sort

stands, Strawson’s neo-Kantian

Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism p.203.
.

4

Morris Lipson, "Objective Experience," Nous 21 (1987), p.321.
,
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recognizes that, as

I

argued in the previous chapter, Strawson does not
explain

how

he

can get from the necessary conditions of employing
certain concepts legitimately to what

he needs: namely, the necessary conditions
of employing certain concepts at

Lipson would

like to

claim that the distinction

we make between

all.

a subjective

order of perceptions and an objective order of
events could not take place without there

being some non-subjective feature of our experience;

in other

words, some component of

our experience must genuinely indicate some facts
about an external world. Otherwise, he

would

like to claim,

it

would be psychologically impossible

subjective/objective distinction at
skeptic s position by

showing

all.

Lipson's goal, then,

is

for us to

make

the

to provide a reductio

that skepticism about the external

world

is

of the

inconsistent

with a claim the skeptic must accept: namely, that he does distinguish
between his
subjective states and an objective order of events.

As we saw

in

Chapters

Two

and Three,

neither the epistemological approach nor the verificationist approach can
accomplish this,

since those approaches say that the ability to make, respectively, justified
STJs or

meaningful reference

to external things is inconsistent with skepticism.

As we saw

those chapters, however, the skeptic can avoid inconsistency by denying that
justified or that

do, one can

about

my

my

show

external world propositions are meaningful. But

that

it

would be psychologically impossible even

if,

my

in

STJs are

as Lipson tries to

to generate a belief

subjective order of mental states without genuine experience of objects, then

the skeptic

would be

stuck: he cannot

deny

that
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we do have

beliefs

of that kind.

Lipson notes, with Strawson (and Kant), that the only
order our immediate
experience presents

the subjective one. But "that

is

to give rise to the idea"

of the subject

s

is

not enough," he claims, "for them

of an independent objective order. 5 Neither the temporal
ordering

subjective states nor the content of any particular
state can explain, he

claims, the thought of an objective order. Yet this

is all

that

is

"presented" in the subject's

experience.

Lipson thinks

what

is

that there

must be some further feature of experience, separate from

presented there, which explains' the idea of an objective order.

think this

is

He answers

so?

this

nothing more; from

states,

does he

by examining the content of experience on the skeptical

hypothesis. According to that hypothesis,

of our actual

Why

we have

this, the

only the merely subjective experience

skeptic

would

like to say,

we

unjustifiably infer the existence of things independent of our experience.
Lipson asks us
to

imagine a subject

who

no conception ofpossible states different from
the actual ones he experiences. Is there anything concerning his actual states or
as yet has

their succession (or both)

which would give him the idea of distinguishing
between himself qua subject and the states of which he is the subject?
The subject experiences variegated phenomena. But the phenomena are
not 'referential'. Nothing about them indicates that they are about anything. On the
contrary, the blue patch say, bears precisely

information,
the patch

is

More
as to

whose

identify

it

content which, though

it

may be

important, the content of any such state does not include information

There is nothing in the content of the state which could
ofX, rather than of Y. But then, it can't be that it is just
the subject, on the basis of his experience of any such state, that he
state

it is.

as the state

apparent to

5

its

not information that the patch has such and such a source, or that
information, or that the patch bears a certain relation to other states.
is

Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.324.
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is

a subject For

what exists for him (as per our stipulation) are all and
only actual
will frame no idea which the content of
these states does not
immediately present to him. And no such
content presents anything whatsoever

states oi his.

He

about ownership.

Finally, Lipson claims that this subject
could not

even acquire the idea of a subjective

succession of states:

to get the idea

of succession in this case, one needs the idea
of states which
succeed each other. But since there is nothing in any
of the states which presents
(or even suggests) to the subject the idea
of himself, he will not be able to
distinguish between himself and his states. He
will, therefore, have no idea of
a

state either. Indeed, our

himself as subject than
If

>ou look

at the

imagined subject

is

a

is

in

no better position

movie camera.

content ot the states of a subject

succession of subjective states, there

is

who

experiences only an actual

no obvious explanation--no immediately evident

source-for the additional content contained

in the

thought of an objective order separate

from the subjective one, which the subjective one represents; nor
for the content of the idea of a succession

the skeptical position, in short,

distinction

is

to recognize

is

there an explanation

and a subject experiencing

that the content

it.

The problem with

of certain of our judgments— such as our

between subjective and objective and our STJs-is " underdetermined by
'

subjectiv e experience alone; the input' of mere subjective experience
does not account for

the 'output', the idea of oneself as a subject of successive experiences of an
objective

world. Lipson wants to claim that,

if the skeptic

were

right,

limited to our actual subjective experiences alone, then

judgment

6

we

and our experience were
could not

make such

a

6

at all

.

Obviously the term

'content' plays a

key role
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in this

argument. This notion

is

used by

Hume, however,

thinks that our judgments about
external substances can be

explained by patterns, or regularities, in our experiences.

On

his

conjunction with inborn psychological tendencies,
cause us to
external objects exist. Speaking in Lipson's terms,

Hume

view these

infer, unjustifiably, that

might agree

content of a given mental state must be explained by
reference to

would

process, but he

insist that this

of a pattern or regularity

explanation can be

in subjective experience.

It is

made

true

patterns, in

in

(still

that the empirical

some

adventitious

terms of the occurrence

speaking

in Lipson's

terms) that the content of the thought of a substance or cause
goes beyond the content of
the thought of a subjective regularity; but this

is

exactly what

Hume

cites in

making

the

further claim that our references to substance and cause are, strictly
speaking,

meaningless.

merely refer

It is

Hume s

view, recall, that these terms either are nonsense or in actuality

to subjective occurrences.

Lipson as a primitive concept, to designate whatever it is that makes a thought a thought
about a given thing. For instance, we may say that the difference between a perception of
blue and a perception of red
content.

is,

simply, the presence of blue-content rather than red-

The key difference between

and Jack and Marcie

is

a thought of John and Jack and a thought of John

the presence of 'Marcie-contenf in the

latter.

How to describe

more precisely is a difficult question; however, most
would agree that it is reasonable to describe thoughts as having a certain content, which
determines what they are thoughts about. A very similar way of looking at thoughtblue-content or Marcie-content

content

is

as the truth-conditions of a thought,

when

that thought is expressed as a

we would say that the thought of a unicorn is a composite
of two thought-contents: the thought of a horse and the thought of a horn. Each is needed
in order to think of a unicorn. So, when speaking of the difference between the thought of
proposition. Using this notion

an actual mental
that the thought

state

and the thought of a possible

of a possible, non-actual mental

state,

we

could note, as Lipson does,

state involves the notion

of a temporal

order different from the actual one, and thus involves a thought with content that seems to

go beyond what

is

contained in the thought of an actual mental state or
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set

of actual

Lipson anticipates

this objection.

His response

is

that a subject

whose experience

merely patterned" will not develop the idea of
an alternative present. 7 That

is

his

is

because

judgments are made solely on the basis of 'successful'
expectations. Such

expectations, he claims, will give rise at best
to judgments about his past and
present
actual states,

and

his future actual states; the idea

might have been experienced but which never
of a merely patterned input of actual

Once

states,

again, then, Lipson's idea

is

of a pure possible state-a

will

state

which

be-cannot be explained on the basis

no matter how well-ordered

that the idea

of a pure possible

that input

is.

state involves

representational content which cannot be explained
by the experience of actual states

(however patterned) alone. Without the idea of merely
possible experiences, he adds,
there can be no idea of an order independent of
the subjective order of experiences. So, he

concludes, there must be more to our experience than our
merely subjective experiences;
otherwise,

we

could not form judgments about an objective order.

Lipson goes on

to say that the notion

of a merely possible experience will often be

conceived by the subject as related to a different stance or point of view
that the subject
could have taken with regard to the objects of his experiences. 8 Experience,
he says, as
the skeptic conceives it-as consisting just in a patterned sequence of
subjective

representations-cannot be sufficient to provide one with the idea of a point of view.

Suppose the contrary were the

mental
7

case;

states.

Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.329.
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then the idea would arise either out of the content
of (some of) the subject's states,
or out of their succeeding each other according
to rules. But it is a

familiar
the content itself of a state presents
nothing whatever on the basis of
which one point of view rather than another could be associated
with it (the
content)— and hence presents nothing whatever about point of
view itself.
fact... that

Lipson agrees that some order or apparent rule-govemedness
among a subject's

might allow the subject
subject

to

made Humean

to get the idea

of merely possible

states.

This might happen

if

a

associations between certain sorts of experiences, and then
failed

have the kind of experience such an association leads him

form the idea of something
that this

states

might have taken place but did

that

would not be enough

to expect;

not.

he might then

But Lipson claims

for a subject to get the idea of his taking a stance with

respect to his states (by taking a different stance, or point of view, with
regard to an

objective world), as opposed to his states simply being governed by a set of
rules
different

from the one

that the subject

had previously attributed

to them.

There would be

insufficient data, in other words, for the subject to get the idea of his being in a position
to experience different

sequences of perceptions by taking a different stance towards an

objective order, as opposed to getting the idea that his states can take up different stances
9

with respect to him. If there

is

no reason for the subject

alternatives over the other, Lipson claims, "there

the idea of either of them."

8
9

Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.333.
Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.334.

88

is

to

choose one of these

no reason

to think

he could come to

In order for the subject to get the
required idea of his

different points

agency with regard

to

of view, Lipson concludes, there must be
(and the subject must

experience), in addition to the subject's
states,

p° ints of reference

relative to

which the

some independent,

subject's point of

relatively abiding,

view can change. Natural

candidates for such points of reference would be
enduring material objects or places

independent of the subject. The point

is

that

some such

objective entity or entities must

be experienced by the subject in order for the subject
to make the requisite distinction

between

his states

and an objective order independent of them; and

this

would give us

the

desired anti-skeptical result.

Lipson notes

that

one might object

that

it

would be

sufficient if

us that such independent points of reference existed without

do

10
.

He responds

it

it

just

seemed

to

being the case that they

that

way to us. To suppose otherwise is to think we could come
of our agency solely on the basis of an experience consisting of states
and a non-temporal ordering of them which determined their temporal ordering in
us. But we have seen already that that experience is not sufficient
to give rise to
it

cannot just seem that

to the idea

the idea of that agency. Rather, a condition of that idea's arising is that there
actually exist independent points of reference with respect to which our points of
view are fixed.

Why

is

it

that the non-veridical experience

would seem

to

of an independent point of reference— which

have the same representational content as a veridical experience of the

same-cannot explain

the content of my subjective/objective distinction? Lipson does not

address this question in more detail; however, his reasoning
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may

run along the following

lines.

The reason why

the

reference cannot explain

mere (non-veridical) appearance of independent

my

subjective/objective distinction

independent points of reference

of a distinction between
distinction,

I

my

to

me

appear to

as enduring,

my

subjective states as representative of an objective

world containing independent points of reference
to

must already have the idea

subjective states and an objective order. Without such a

could not interpret

would require me already

in order for

is that,

I

have interpreted

my

in the first place.

states in

such a

Any

way

taken to be representative of an objective order; but this capacity on

what we need the experience of independent points of reference
no alternative

points of

to the actual presence

such inference

that they could be

my

part

to explain.

of such independent markers: without

cart-before-the-horse strategy'.

The following

is

is

an instance of what

it,

is

thus

no

would be

like to call the

a general statement of this strategy:

The Cart-Before-the-Horse Strategy:
Show that having some particular sort of objective
making

I

precisely

There

interpretation of one's experience as representing anything like such markers

possible. This piece of anti-skeptical reasoning

is

experience

is

a necessary condition of

judgments about an objective world. From this conclude that the
original objective experience must have been non-inferential and thus not subject to
inferential

skeptical doubts concerning one's ability to infer facts about the objective world from

subjective states.

If

one can show

that objective experience

is

a necessary condition of inferential

judgments, then one can say that the skeptic,

making

10

a mistake.

By

in questioning all

such inferences

at

once,

is

accepting the existence of inferential judgments about the external

Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.337.
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world, he

is

accepting objective experience
not subject to his doubts about inferential

objective judgment. His doubts about our
objective inferences presuppose beliefs about
the objective world based

on inference; but these

beliefs (Lipson claims)

depend

for their

existence on objective experience. Thus the
skeptic puts The cart before the horse' by

placing beliefs about an external world before
the actual experience of such a world.

we

shall see in a later section,

Kant could be interpreted as employing a very similar

strategy in the Refutation. First, however, by
this type

of argument,

I

shall

As

way of gaining

a deeper understanding of

examine Anthony Brueckner’s criticism of Lipson’ s version

of it.

3.

Bruecker

Brueckner's Criticism and Lipson's Reply

criticizes the

above argument as essentially similar

to the

Strawsonian

tvpe ol argument that he and Stroud had revealed to be dependent on a sort
of verification
principle tor concepts. Strawson, recall, claimed that

we had

to

have the concept of an

objective order of events in order to conceive of a subjective order of experiences
and

thus to represent ourselves as having experiences at all."
unjustifiably to the conclusion that

are to

make

we must

From

this

he seems to leap

actually experience an objective order if we

the required subjective/objective distinction.

Stroud and Bruecker both claimed that this argument could be valid only

if

one

includes a quasi-verificationist principle connecting the possession of external world
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concepts with the possession of experiential
in

It

criteria

adequate to

tell

whether the concepts

question are instantiated. Such a principle would
be prima facie implausible, however.

would make any

also

from

further anti-skeptical

some of the

at least

other defects of the original verification principle.

Brueckner believes

He

argument superfluous and would suffer

that

Upson's argument represents exactly the same mistake.

agrees that, in order to have the idea of my being
an agent with respect to

view,

I

not see

need

to

my

points of

have the idea of points of reference independent of myself. 12
But he does

how any

anti-skeptical conclusion could be inferred

from

this

without the use of a

verification principle connecting the possession of the
concept of a point of reference

with the knowledge that the concept has instances.

As
shown,

I

have noted, Lipson anticipates the objection

it still

might be

that

although in fact they do not.

shown

that the existence

it

just

He

seems

argument has

that there exist independent points of reference,

responds that this

of such points

that, for all his

is

is

impossible, because he thinks he has

a condition of there even arising the idea of

one's agency.

In attacking this response

subject

who

Brueckner asks us

to

compare the experiences of a

actually experiences independent points of reference with those of a self-

aware subject

who merely seems

to experience

such things and whose judgments

11

See Chapter Three, Section Four, above.
'"Anthony Brueckner, "Another Failed Transcendental Argument," Nous 23 (1989),
,

pp. 527-8.
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concerning such things are always non-veridical. 13 Although
Lipson argued
scenario

is

impossible, Brueckner simply claims that nothing
could justify such a

contention except

argument

some kind of verification

principle.

14

He concludes

that Lipson's

fails for this reason.

In an

criticism.

that the latter

15

unpublished manuscript, Lipson gives an interesting
response

He

first

to Brueckner's

explains the general skeptical position as stating that
our experience

underdetermines our judgments concerning the external
world and that alternative

judgments are compatible with the available evidence—
e.g.,
it

appear to

me

"Given

it

is

that there

enough

an

evil

demon

is

making

an external world of physical objects.

is

this setting,"

natural

that

Lipson explains,

to

suppose

that a transcendental

argument

16

disputes that

skeptical charge and, in particular, that
is

Although
rejects

it tries to show that the relevant evidence
sufficient to establish the related existence judgment. 17

this is a likely interpretation

of the Strawsonian response to the skeptic, Lipson

such a description of transcendental arguments

in general.

He

notes that

Brueckner, in response to his original argument, simply asked us to consider the
experience of two persons with exactly similar phenomenal experience, one veridically
perceiving an external world, and the other being deceived and experiencing only non-

13

Brueckner, Another Failed...," p.528.

14

Brueckner, Another Failed...," p.529.
Lipson, "How Not To Understand Transcendental Arguments" (unpublished
manuscript).
16

Lipson does not, as

have (see Ch.l, above), distinguish between an anti-skeptical
transcendental argument and transcendental arguments generally.
I
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veridical perceptions.

us that this scenario

Brueckner merely claimed, Lipson adds,
impossible

is

if

we

that nothing could

show

did not assume a verification principle like the

one Brueckner describes.

As

I

understand him, Brueckner's point

external things

is

sufficient to guarantee

is

that

any inference

no phenomenal experience of
to their existence without a

principle analytically connecting the possession of
certain concepts with

knowledge of

experiential criteria adequate to determine their
instantiation. Lipson, however, sees this

as a misconstrual of the strategy of an anti-skeptical
transcendental argument. 18 His idea
is

that

Brueckner thinks the proponent of such an argument

is

trying to dispute that

external world concepts are underdetermined by experience.
Lipson responds that this

underdetermination

is

in fact the

main premise of an

argument. What the transcendental argument

how

the external world

Lipson

is

anti-skeptical transcendental

intended to do, he claims,

judgments we make are possible, given

illustrates his

is

to explain

this fact.

claim by reference to Kant's Second Analogy. 19 According to

Lipson, in the Second Analogy Kant attempts to

show

that the

concept of cause

is

presupposed by the distinction one makes between a subjective order of experience and

an objective order of events. -0 In

17
18

19

Lipson,

Lipson,
Lipson,

"How Not
"How Not
"How Not

this

way Kant

holds that

we must

possess an innate

To...," p.3.

To...," p.4.
To...," pp.4-5.

20

Kant goes on in the same section to claim that, in fact, those objects which are
possible objects of our experience must therefore be causally related, and that our innate
concept of cause is for this reason "objectively real"-i.e., justifiably applicable to the
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concept of causation which

Analogy Kant agrees with
us.

What Kant

we must

Hume

that experience does not reveal causal connections to

seeks to explain, however,

given succession of internal states
events [A, B],

He

apply to our experience. In the Second

in turn

is

[A', B’] is

how, given

this fact,

can judge that a

a representation of an objective sequence of

explains such judgments by claiming that

by conceiving of the order of our perceptions

distinction

we

we make

[A', B’] as

the required

necessary, and by

accounting for that necessity by reference to a causally determined
objective sequence [A,
B] which gives rise to the corresponding subjective sequence
of perceptions. Thus the
notion of causation

means

Hume

that

is

involved in the original subjective/objective distinction; this in turn

must be wrong

our concept of cause to unjustified

in attributing

inferences from experiences already conceived of as objective.

objects of our experience. Kant deduces this claim directly from the claim that we must
represent the order of certain of our experiences as being determined by objective rules,
as a necessary condition of thinking that there

an accidental sequence of perceptions (see,
A199/B244, and A201-2/B246-7).

is

e.g.,

an objective order of events

distinct

from

A193/B238, A198-9/B243-4,

The only way I can explain this transition is by reference to Kant's doctrine of
transcendental idealism, which reduces objects to the status of representations. He seems
to think that by showing that applying the concept of cause is a necessary condition of
our thinking of an objective order of events he can conclude that objects, insofar as they

and are objects of our experience, really are causally related. The only way I can see
Kant to make this inference is for him to rely on some highly problematic principle
(i.e., transcendental idealism) which says that, if we must represent objects in a certain
way, then any objects we represent must really be that way. But this would be to lose any
robust sense of objective independence.
exist
for

As

I

explained in Chapter One,

Analogy regarding

I

think that the parallel argument in the First

the concept of substance

is

also unsatisfactory, for the
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same

reason.

Lipson wishes
that the experience

to

emphasize

that Kant's

argument

of the subjective succession

A', B'

must be

particular objective sequence; indeed, the fact
that this
calls for explanation. Lipson’s
point is that

in the

is

Second Analogy

is

not

sufficient to indicate a

not the case

is

precisely what

"Kant does not argue from the content of A'

and B' to the causal relatedness of what they
21
represent." He concludes,

rather, that,

given the fact that the content of experience
underdetermines any judgment of causal
relatedness, the idea of causality

Only

in

our possession prior to any causal judgment.

can explain the content of causal judgments, since

this

Kant both observe,

Analogy

must be

(as

I

is

this content, as

Hume

and

not contained in our experience. In a similar manner,
in the First

noted earlier) Kant holds that the employment of the idea of
substance

is

a

necessary condition of the representation of objective alteration.

Lipson

argument

is

analogous to Kant's

argument sees
(as

Hume

feels that as regards skepticism, the starting point

in the

of a transcendental

Second Analogy. The deviser of a transcendental

that experience presents, say, a set of features

A1 ...An. This

of features

and Kant agree) underdetermines our external world judgments; yet those

judgments take place anyway. The deviser of an

anti-skeptical transcendental

accepts that the content

of subjective experience underdetermines our

judgments and seeks

show what more our experience must

to

presentation of features

21

set

Lipson,

"How Not

A1 ...An

argument

external world

contain beyond the

in order to explain the "excess content" contained in

To...," p.5.
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our

external-world judgments— and thus to explain

This

is

what Lipson thinks
If

Lipson

is

is

fail to

are

even possible. 22

Kant's general procedure in the Refutation.

correct, then the criticism

leveled by Stroud and Brueckner

only

how such judgments

is

of Kantian transcendental arguments

misguided.

On

Lipson's view such arguments not

premise a verification principle but also deny any necessary
connection

between having external world concepts and possessing
adequate experiential
their application. In

some

criteria for

supposing that any Kantian transcendental argument must endorse

verification principle, Lipson says, Stroud and Brueckner
mistakenly suppose that

the only empirical content thinkable

presentations of experience. But

denies."'-

Lipson agrees that

it

is

it

is

must be extracted from, or

at least traceable to, the

exactly this point that the transcendental arguer

possible for

it

merely to seem

independent points of reference. But he denies that

it

is

to us as

though there were

possible for us even to think that

there exist such points of reference if there do not exist such points. Since the

presentational features of experience-those aspects of one's representations that are
traceable to actual sense-experience— underdetermine objective judgments, experience

must also contain some "non-presentational" features which explain the empirical content
of objective judgments. The only features that could do the

have

22
22

to involve, at the least, the existence

Lipson,
Lipson,

"How Not
"How Not

trick,

he continues, would

of independent points of reference.

To...," p.5.

To...," p.7.
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If

such

independent points of reference
basis of this

argument we can rightly claim

There
explicit.

exist, the skeptical

is

to

hypothesis must be mistaken.

know

that

an external world

On

exists.

a crucial principle underlying
Upson's reasoning that he does not

His key point

is that, if

the

make

the content of ('presentational') experience

underdetermines the content of objective judgment,
then there must be some source of
that content other than presentational
experience.

Lipson requires

this

premise

in order to

conclude that there must be some other aspect of experience
which makes the judgment
possible.

Given

this conclusion,

he infers that the most likely candidate for

this role is the

presence of independent points of reference.
This argument assumes that
all

parties agree,

for

me

is

I

myself cannot be the source of the content which, as

underdetermined by

my

presentational experience. If

originally to generate the additional content necessary to

inherent in judgments about the external world, then

it

fulfill

it

were possible

the content

would not follow from

underdetermination of objective judgments that something independent of me
I

the

exists.

conclude that Lipson must be assuming the truth of a principle something

like

the following:

The No Original Empirical Content
It is

impossible for

It is

easy to see

strategy.

me

Principle [NOECP]:

to generate original empirical

how NOECP

is

mental content.

necessary to Lipson's anti-skeptical cart-before-the-horse

That strategy denies that

my

subjective-objective distinction can be based on the

non-veridical experience of independent points of reference (or independent substances),
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because such non-vendical experience would require
that

I

make

inferences based on

subjective states already understood as representative
of an objective order. Lipson

concludes that

my

experience must contain genuine experience of
independent points of

reference.

This reasoning, however, relies on the claim that the
content inherent in

between subjective and objective needs

distinction

Why

can

seems

1

1

just

come up with

the idea that

way Lipson can answer

that the only

impossible to do so;

in other

my

to be

states represent

this is

kind, did say that

this

was

all

in fact the

an external world?

words, by assuming that something like

NOECP. Hume, one

in experience.

by implicitly assuming

Whether we should accept Lipson's argument
to accept

accounted for

clearly

that

NOECP

it

is

It

simply

is true.

depends on whether we want

of the natural targets of a refutation of skepticism of this

our ideas must ultimately be traceable to impressions of our senses;

fundamental tenet of his empiricism. 24

the Stroud/Brueckner quasi-verification principle?

The

How does NOECP

latter

would connect

possession of any concept with the ability to determine whether that concept
instantiated.

my

Lipson does not want

to say that,

differ

from

the

is

whenever one makes a judgment

underdetermined by the available evidence, there must be some 'non-presentational'
aspect of one's experience which justifies the judgment. Consider Hume's celebrated

comments on

"4

induction.

Hume

pointed out that no amount of observation could justify

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 2nd
,

1978), p.4.
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ed. (Oxford:

The Clarendon

Press,

judgments concerning future observations or events. Unlike
Hume's skeptical claim about
substances independent of us, Hume's claim concerning
induction has been widely
accepted.

And

yet

we do make judgments

involving induction, even though, using

Lipson's terms, experience 'underdetermines' such
judgments. Lipson's claim thus cannot
plausibly be based on a general principle stating that,
anytime a judgment one

makes

underdetermined by the available evidence, one's experience must
be sufficient
determine whether that judgment

is

true; for

it

would then follow

that our

for

one

would follow

from the

directly

furthermore, would be implausible on

from

it

that

it

is

Lipson

face, as

it

is

not clear about what principle he

cannot ultimately be due to our

of such a principle. Such a principle,

would

also be possible to conclude

own

NOECP

is

relying on; however, he need not be

only says that the contents of our concepts

imagination.

As

in the case

of the quasi-verification

employed by Strawson, one cannot immediately conclude from NOECP,

conjunction with the fact of the possession of external world concepts, that

whether such objects

show
only

exist. In

order to draw this conclusion,

that the presence of the content in one's external

if

anti-

essentially impossible to arrive at an unjustified belief!

relying on such an overly strong one.

principle

its

truth

to

judgments

concerning induction must be justified: as with the quasi-verificationist
principle, an
skeptical result

is

such concepts are instantiated. While

Hume

it

would

we

can

in

know

also be necessary to

world concepts can be explained

agreed that

we do

not invent

representational content, he also held that our judgments concerning an external world
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can be explained by reference to patterns or regularities
among our experiences

in

conjunction with a natural tendency on our part to explain
these patterns by positing

enduring existences which give
substance

is

them. Furthermore,

lacking in content. If our idea of substance

no underdetermined content
This

rise to

Humean

to be

alternative

about his strategy so that

accounted

thought our idea of

without content, then there

is

for.

must be ruled

we can determine

is

Hume

if

out,

it

and Lipson does not

can succeed

at this.

tell

Thus

us enough

there are several

questions to be answered in assessing an argument employing a
strategy like Lipson's.
First,

should

we

accept

NOECP?

Second, would the truth of NOECP, in conjunction with

the fact of the awareness of temporal succession, entail the existence
of an external

world? There

is

reason to believe that Kant held something like

credible interpretation of his Refutation which has

argument against epistemological skepticism.
interpretation

The

First Edition

In the following sections

it

I

in refuting

like

is

it

a

in his

shall sketch this

such skepticism.

Argument From Idealism

In the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique

skepticism by applying to

and there

him employing something

and also discuss NOECP's potential usefulness

4.

NOECP,

Kant attempts

to refute

his doctrine of transcendental idealism: he describes this

doctrine as the view that the objects that appear to us "are to be regarded as being, one

and

all,

representations only, not things in themselves" (A369):
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[Transcendental idealism] removes all difficulty in
the way of accepting the
existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our
mere self-consciousness, or of
declaring it to be proved in the same manner as the
existence of myself as a
thinking thing is proved. There can be no question
that I am conscious of my
representations; those representations and I myself,
who have the

representations,
therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however,
are mere appearances, and are
therefore nothing but a species of my representations,
the objects of which are
something only through these representations. Apart from
them they are nothing.
Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and both,
indeed, upon the

immediate witness of my self-consciousness.. ..For in both
cases alike the objects
are nothing but representations, the immediate
perception (consciousness) of

which
It is

is at

the

same time

difficult not to read this

a sufficient proof of their reality. (A370-1)

argument as expressing a straightforward form of idealism.

Transcendental idealism

is

objects— including even

their spatiality

the doctrine that the characteristics

which we ascribe

to

and temporality— hold of objects only insofar as

they are considered representations or appearances, and not insofar
as they are considered
things in themselves.

Thus our statements about objects should be confined

about representations; any attempt to

make claims about

things in themselves

inappropriate use of reason. Kant and Kant's defenders have tried to explain

transcendental idealism

is

different

to statements

is

an

how

from the empirical idealism of Berkeley, but

it

is

not

clear that they have succeeded in any substantive way.

Kant's argument could be sketched as follows:
PI

:

All external objects exist only by virtue of being represented. 25

P2: Representations of external objects exist.

C: External objects exist.

“5

In Chapter

One

explained that, while Kant would hardly have agreed to this
premise, no one has yet succeeded in giving a plausible reading of his argument in the
Fourth Paralogism in which he does not in some way commit himself to an idealism he

wanted

I

to avoid.

102

It

hardly seems possible that this

to see

what

else can be

is

what he actually had

made of the above

commentators on the point

that

it

in

mind, but

it is

equally difficult

passage. Kant has been criticized by

seems impossible on the one hand

to say that

many
it

is

a

mistake to make claims about objects independent of our
representations and, on the
other, to claim that robustly independent
material objects exist.

commentators have concluded

Many

of these

that he does not successfully distinguish transcendental

idealism from empirical idealism. However, shortly after the
above passage he gives a

somewhat

different

and more interesting argument against the

argument includes some idealistic-sounding comments,

I

skeptic.

do not think

While
rests

it

this

second

on idealism

('transcendental' or not) to the extent the first one does.

5.

The

First Edition

Immediately following his

Argument From Empiricism

idealistic

answer

to skepticism,

argument, which involves a claim similar to Hume's claim that

all

Kant gives another
simple ideas are

ultimately derived from simple impressions of the senses. This claim

is

then combined

with Kant's idealism regarding space:

Space and time are indeed a

priori representations... But the material or real

element, the something which

is to

be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes

perception. Perception exhibits the reality of something in space;

and

in the

absence ofperception no power of imagination can invent and produce that
we take pleasure and pain, or the
sensations of the outer senses, colors, heat, etc ..perception is that whereby the

something. ...This admits of no doubt; whether

material required to enable us to think objects of sensible intuition must first be
g/ve«....[S]pace is itself nothing but mere representation, and therefore. ..what is

given

in

it,

that

is,

represented through perception,
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is

also real in

it.

For

if

it

were

not real, that

is,

immediately given through empirical

pictured in imagination, since what

is

intuition, it could not be
real in intuitions could not be invented a

priori.

All outer perception, therefore, yields
immediate proof of something real
in space, or rather is the real itself.
In this

question; that

(A373-5,
In this passage

my

is,

sense empirical realism is beyond
there corresponds to our outer intuitions something
real in space

P

'

emphases.)

Kant declares

that the imagination is unable to invent empirical or

qualitative content, such as the empirical content of
perceptions of color or heat.

he adds the transcendental idealist claim that what

is

To

this

represented in space actually exists

in space.

It is

would be

not obvious

how

this

argument

to ignore all the talk in the

to invent qualitative content

must actually

is

supposed

we

On this

reading, this

is

that

what

it

would seem

argument of the Fourth Paralogism, which we just discussed.
it

Paralogism refutation of skepticism
idealism

),

which

is

represented in space

this

I

idealistic

think that

what above

I

main

many

way, as one sees many references

(i.e.,

is

to 'the' Fourth

called the ‘argument from

then described and usually decried as a simple application of

transcendental idealism.

6

is

to follow that objects exist

no more than a restatement of the

commentators on Kant have seen

it

represent objects as being in space, and space

described as nothing but "mere representation,"
in space.

to interpret

above passage about the imagination not being able

and just focus on the claim

exist in space. Since

One way

to go.

26

See, for example, A.C. Ewing,

A

Short Commentary on Kant

Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1938), pp. 176-7;
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’s

Critique of Pure

Norman Kemp

Smith,

A

But
the

first

I

one.

think that the second argument
represents a strategy different from that of

The

Fourth Paralogism argument rests on reducing objects
in general to

first

representations; the second mentions only that space
the spatiahty of objects

argument Kant
objects,

and so

is

it

representations.

seems possible
first

a

mere representation. Thus, only

assured in this argument. In contrast to the

is

explicitly sensitive to the fact that

The

is

that

we

we

can imagine the presence of outer

should actually be imagining

argument would objectify

all

the second

first, in

all

our outer

our outer representations,

regardless of whether they had their source in perception or
imagination. In the second

argument Kant recognizes

that he has to

ideas of the external world must

transcendental ideality of space

come from
still

is,

genuinely,

Kant responds

in this

perception rather than from imagination. The

guarantees the spatiality of outer representations; but

skeptical scenarios such as Descartes’

representation

prove that some of my apparently adventitious

dream argument question whether we can know

if

'outer'.

argument by making the Humean claim

content of my external world representations cannot ultimately have

that the qualitative

its

origin in the

imagination; there must have been original perceptions which supplied this content. So
least

some of my

external world representations

creations out of the whole cloth of

ones they

are; all this

Commentary

to

Kant

argument

's

a

is

my

must have been perceptions

imagination. This

meant

is

not to say that

to refute is a global skepticism

Critique of Pure Reason, 2

nd

ed.

1962), pp. 301-5, 462; Strawson, p.246; Bennett, p.2 1
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5;

I

at

rather than

know which

based on the

(New York: Humanities
and Allison, pp.14-5.

Press,

ability

of the imagination

to generate its

own

objects-a skepticism which questions

whether any of my supposedly adventitious ideas come from external
objects.

To

this

Kant adds

that those representations that are outer perceptions

representations ol spatial objects, since space
this,

by contrast

to the

is

just the

argument from idealism,

is

must be

form of outer representation. But

to apply transcendental idealism

regarding space only to representations which have (supposedly) already
been shown to

be representations of things which exist independently of the perceiver,
rather than to

show

that all

my

representations of external world objects are genuine outer

representations just because they are representations of something outer.

This argument depends on the claim that
content which

is

original to

me-in

I

am

other words, on

incapable of generating empirical

NOECP. We

could sketch this

argument as follows:
PI

could not have ideas of empirical qualities without perceiving something
independent of me which bears them. [NOECP]
•'

I

have ideas of empirical qualities.
P3: I have perceived things independent of me. [P1,P2]
P4: Space is just the form in which I represent that which is independent of me.
P5: Anything I represent as independent of me is spatial. [P3.P4]
P2:

C:

I

Some

spatial objects

have existed

In assessing this argument, there are

now

deal with in turn:

in

my

lifetime.

two important questions

“Do we have reason

to accept

NOECP

to consider,

as

which

Kant expresses

I

it

argument?" and, “If we do, should we then conclude on the basis of this argument
external objects exist?”
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shall

in this

that

6.

The challenge

What Reasons Do
for

and empiricist skeptics

Kant

is to

will accept.

assess their likely attitudes toward

There
principle

is

some

We

Have

get a valid

So

his

NOECP?

argument whose premises the
to Descartes

rationalist

and Hume, and

NOECP.

indication that Descartes

would follow from

Accept

now return

shall

I

to

famous

would

reject

'causal principle',

NOECP. 27 The

when

it

is

denial of this

conjoined with his

theory of reality, or perfection. His causal principle, applied to ideas,
states that there

must be
as

is

at least as

much

or 'perfection' in the efficient and total cause of an idea

'reality'

contained in that idea either formally or objectively (whichever

According

to Descartes,

reality than substances.

human mind

On
weak:

all

to

human minds

Thus

it

are substances,

be the efficient and

have

less

causal principle for a

the other hand, Descartes's support for his questionable causal principle

he says

is

that

God) or an obviously

This fact

its

truth is evident to

is

fallacious

light'

him by

the "natural light."

is

very

The only support

involves either an argument which circularly

(his

cosmological argument for the existence of

argument (the ontological argument

for the existence

of

not derived from his doctrine of innate ideas, however, since he thought

those he identified were placed in

Rene Descartes, Meditations

trans.

28

cause of the idea of an empirical quality.

total

assumes the causal principle as a premise

8

greater).

qualities

would be consistent with Descartes'

he cites for relying on the 'natural

~7

and sensory

is

by John Cottingham

et al

me

by

God

[see, e.g.,

CSM II, pp.76-7,

132],

in vol.II of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.28.
,
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God). Secondly, the conclusion that
identification of

human minds

(Kant actually argues against

NOECP

is false

also

would depend on

as substances and their thoughts as

this in his "First

hypothetical a priori argument against

his

modes of substance

Paralogism" [A348-9]). Descartes'

NOECP

thus

is

not a source of great concern for

its

proponent.

A

more pressing worry than

the preceding

is

contradicted by Cartesian hidden faculty skepticism.

that

As

NOECP
I

explained in Chapter One, one

of the sources of Descartes' skepticism was the possibility that

unknown

to

possibility

me which

is

capable of producing

my

might be taken by a Cartesian skeptic

also might be

I

have a hidden faculty

apparently adventitious ideas. This

to cast

doubt on

NOECP,

hidden faculty might, despite appearances, have capabilities which
faculties

I

have which

I

am aware

of)

do

to generate original empirical content,

not.

Such

capabilities

I

since such a

(or, rather, the

might include the

such as shades of blue and the

ability

like.

Descartes responds to this concern by establishing the reliability of clear and
distinct perception

and then claiming
distinct

from

through his two (rather questionable) proofs of the existence of God,
that

he can clearly and distinctly conceive of his mind as existing

his body. This establishes that

essence of mental substance

of any faculty

would by

in

him

is

minds are substances. Since, on

his view, the

thought, he concludes that he must be aware of the activity

(since the product of any such faculty

definition be aware).
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is

a thought, of which he

Unfortunately, since Descartes' support for
his active faculty awareness thesis
questionable, so

the claim that

is

producing faculty
accessible to our

in us

mind

:9
.

we

One might

is not, strictly

are necessarily

aware of the

is

of any idea-

activity

respond, however, that any faculty which

not

is

speaking, part of our mind, and thus represents

something independent of us; so positing the possibility of
such a faculty requires the
rejection of solipsism.

I

shall return to this point later, after

I

have spelled out

my

reading

of Kant's Refutation.

There

is

a line of thought

which would support the acceptance of NOECP by

The most extreme form of skepticism

Cartesian.

that Descartes

Meditations arises from the possibility that the evil
real

source of

causing

me

to

my

demon

adventitious ideas, but also affects

make

my

mentions

the

in the

not only deceives

me

about the

ability to reason, thus routinely

gross logical errors about even the simplest matters

30
.

Descartes

thinks he responds successfully to this sort of skepticism through his proofs
of the

existence and non-deceptiveness of God, but

it

is

an obvious answer to say that those

proofs themselves are called into doubt by an extreme skepticism about

my

very ability to

reason.

One might be tempted by
doubt

my

”
^

It is

ability to

make

this to consider

any form of skepticism which

calls into

correct logical inferences of even the simplest kind to be a

one way of characterizing anti-skeptical transcendental
which purport to show that mind cannot be conceived of as

interesting to note that

arguments

is

as arguments

existing distinct from body, if we think of those

capacity to distinguish between what

is

minds as having,

subjective and what

109

is

for example, the

objective.

skepticism on another level from the more ordinary forms
of Cartesian and
skepticism concerning

my

from skepticism about

my own reason

will

depend on

my

beliefs about the external world.

ability to reason,

any argument

that

and thus

is circular.

It

seems

Humean

to follow trivially

give against such skepticism

I

One might argue

that

it

is

reasonable to separate a discussion about basic external world
skepticism from a
discussion about this most extreme form of skepticism and to
treat them as two entirely
separate topics. If so, then

it

seems a reasonable procedure

ability to reason as a constant as

If

I

am

warranted

I

try to

in taking

my

to provisionally consider

prove that an external world

ability to reason

more ordinary forms of skepticism, then

it

on

faith as

might be said that

I

am

taking certain other of my basic cognitive capacities for granted
skepticism.

NOECP

empirical content.

tor granted, then

it

implies that

I

that if

it is

respond to the

also warranted in

when

reasonable to take

seems especially appropriate

negative principle which puts a limit on

my

discussing baseline

to generate original

my

capacity to reason

This line of thought hardly establishes

The case

to

on

my

of NOECP, a

ability to

some questionable

NOECP as certain,

that a Cartesian skeptic could consistently maintain

existence of external objects.

in the case

abilities (in this case,

generate empirical content), instead of extending them into

30

try to

also reasonable to take a broader basic description of my cognitive

capacities for granted as well. This

shows

exists.

do not have the cognitive capacity

One might claim
is

I

my

but

NOECP

I

think

it

area.

at least

while questioning the

be made in favor of Descartes' acceptance of the

Descartes, Meditations p.14.
,
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principle in question
that he

is

even stronger, given

that Descartes did think

would be aware of any idea-producing

he had established

faculty in him. He, at least,

consequence accept as sufficient evidence the reason

Hume

would as

gives for thinking that

a

we

are

not the ultimate cause of our empirical ideas-i.e.,
the evidence of introspection. 31

This brings us to the empiricist skeptic.
classical empiricist

would

NOECP

does appear

to

accept, as part of the general principle that

traceable to original impressions of the senses.

constructed from simple ones, and

"all

from simple impressions" 32 He bases

As Hume

puts

simple ideas in their

this principle

it,

first

all

be something the

all

ideas are

our complex ideas are

appearance are deriv'd

on the evidence of introspection and

the observation of the inability of children and the blind or deaf
to acquire ideas of

empirical qualities without corresponding impressions.

He

finds that

any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea,
which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness. The
constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the
one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal
proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not the ideas of our

impressions.

He

also notes that

33

would be

it

to

proceed "absurdly" to

try to

scarlet or orange, or a taste, like sweet or bitter, to a child

give the idea of a color, like

who

did not possess them

without exposing the child to the proper sensory input. Also, he claims that the blind and
deaf, respectively,

31

32

33

do not experience any ideas of visual or auditory

See below.

Hume,
Hume,

Treatise p.4.
,

Treatise, p.5.

qualities.

In relying

on these empirical considerations

source of simple ideas,
that

what

Hume

thinks

Hume seems
is

to

to

prove his contention about the

be presupposing something

NOECP.

like

I

think

absurd about the idea of a child getting an idea of a color
or

taste is the notion that the child could just

come up with

own

the idea on his

without a

corresponding impression to supply the child with the
sensory content contained in the
idea.

Hume
the case

does concede that there could be an exception

to

NOECP:

he says

where a person has encountered every shade of blue except one and

with a set of color swatches representing

all

is

that, in

presented

the shades of blue except that one, that

person could actually use his imagination to generate the idea of the missing
shade of
4

blue.-

He

says, however, that this exception

not merit that for

it

alone

we

should

alter

is

it

would seem

observed, though,

to warrant altering the

can generate a simple idea of an empirical quality

Hume

does not say

why

this

it

"does

our general maxim."

As many commentators on Hume have
exception to the rule, then

so "particular and singular" that

would be impossible;

were a genuine

if this

maxim

in this instance,

then

his support for the

in question. If

why

I

not in others?

maxim

is

inductive,

and, in the cases of the child and the blind man, rests not even on direct observation but
rather

on inferences made

at best

on the basis of the reports of such subjects

not have sensory ideas of the kind in question. Antony Flew claims that

4

Hume,

Treatise p.6.
,

it

is

that they

perfectly

do

conceivable for a
did, he

man

35
blind from birth to have colored
mental images. But even if he

would not be able

to the public

to identify the

image

as colored, since he

language of visual qualities, and would thus have no

would have no access

criteria

by which he

could confirm that what he was experiencing was
the same sort of thing that the sighted

by using color terms. (Even

refer to

if

such

criteria actually exist for the sighted.. .we

might imagine a cross-sensory problem analogous
if

Flew

is right,

to the inverted

spectrum problem.) But

then neither the verbal reports nor the behavior of the blind could
count

as evidence for or against

So, while

Hume

principle (which implies

NOECP.

supports the principle, his empirical support for his general

NOECP)

is

As an

tenuous.

empiricist, of course, he could hardly

allow an a priori argument for any non-analytic principle (as

this

one surely

is).

Kant, on

the other hand, does allow for a priori synthetic principles, and so in principle
could at
least consistently attempt

NOECP

in his

such an argument. Unfortunately, he does not: he introduces

"Fourth Paralogism" without further argument.

NOECP could

Let us suppose for the time being that
to investigate

short step

in

me,

what can be proved on

from

NOECP,

to the existence

its

basis.

in addition to the

Kant

be established and proceed

in the Fourth

Hume

disagrees.

maintained the truth of NOECP, but certainly did not think that

35

exist.

Antony Flew, David Hume (Oxford:

it

is

a

occurrence of simple empirical representations

of empirical objects. But

used to prove that external objects

Paralogism thinks

He

Hume,

after all,

this principle

could be

thought that our ideas of external objects are

Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), p.22.
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complex ideas constructed out of ideas of qualities. 36 Thus

there

would be no problem

with the imagination coming up with the idea of such an
object, so long as there were
prior impressions

NOECP

which supplied us with the component simple

ideas.

So how can

be used as evidence that external objects exist?

7 1 UTi ether Kant's

Argument Shows That

the Existence of External Objects Follows

the Truth of
If

it

is

true that

I

From

NOECP

cannot invent empirical content, and thus that

I

can infer the

existence of outer things from the occurrence of empirical ideas
in me, then clearly no
other argument

would be necessary

to refute skepticism. Descartes,

and rejected a very similar argument

in his First Meditation.

dream skepticism, Descartes suggests

elements out of which dreams are fashioned must be

and "quantity" of extended things, the "place

demon may

exist

may

which

endure."

is

3

his initial response to

that, despite the possibility that

judgment of mine about the world may unbeknownst

through which they

As

however, considered

But

in

in

to

me

real,

any particular

be based on a dream, the

including the "nature," "shape"

which they may

exist"

and "the time

response to this suggestion he notes that an evil

the real cause of my ideas of all these things, so

I

cannot infer

with certainty any facts about the external world from the mere occurrence of empirical
ideas in me.

36
37

Hume,

Treatise, p. 1 6.

Descartes, Meditations p.14.
,

Kant appears

seems

to counter his

to agree with Descartes:

own

Kant himself in the Fourth Paralogism

argument, by admitting that

the inference from a given effect to a determinate
cause
the effect may be due to more than one cause.

Even

of the perception to

its

internal or external.

(A368)

NOECP

it

is

true

cause,

it

is

always uncertain, since

Accordingly, as regards the relation
always remains uncertain whether the cause be

and we cannot ultimately be the cause of the empirical content of

our representations, that cause

may

still lie

in a

hidden faculty

in us, or in

outside us, rather than in actual spatial objects. In other words,
even
that

my

passive faculty of sensation— rather than

have been involved

in the creation

my

if

an evil

we can

establish

active faculty of imagination— must

of certain representations

in

me,

this

does not

eliminate other possible explanations of the origin of those sensations. At best,

can show that

I

have been passive with respect

representations. But this does not

As Hume

tell

me what

also said, while ideas

demon

to the acquisition

active cause

is

NOECP

of certain

responsible for them.

must ultimately be traced

to sensations, the real

cause of those sensations must always be in doubt:

As

to those impressions,

my

opinion, perfectly inexplicable by

which

arise

from the senses,

human

their ultimate cause

is,

in

reason, and

'twill always be
impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the

object, or are

produced by the creative powers of the mind, or are derived from the

author of our being.

38

So even the empiricist Hume, who thought
feel

he could conclude from

that all ideas

this fact that external

come from

sensation, did not

causes resembling the images given in

sensation exist; he recognized that the senses could be stimulated by other causes, and
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thus that any inference regarding objects on the
basis of sense-impressions would be
uncertain.

This argument
in the first edition

the reason

is

of external objects

NOECP-based argument

external world

is

in

me

in the

he must show-as he

tries to

do both

come by

on whose basis

"

is

immediate ," rather than

inferential.

It

does not deny that

my judgments

inferring the existence of external objects

it

I

But the

Fourth Paralogism does not show that our experience of

non-inferential.

states internal to myself;

qualities

feels

"Fourth Paralogism" and the second edition "Refutation of Idealism"-

that the experience

the external world

why Kant

concerning the

from the occurrence of

claims only that the occurrence of the ideas of empirical

ultimately infer facts about the external world could not occur

without corresponding sensations. But any inference from the occurrence of certain

sensations (even though they are genuine sensations, as opposed to images created by

imagination) to the existence of some particular cause of them

is

my

uncertain.

Perhaps as a consequence of this reply Kant also presents,

in the

Fourth

Paralogism, the argument from idealism, in which he appears to reduce objects to mere
representations in the mind. Since space

is

the

form of outer representations, we know

objects exist and are spatial just from the fact that

outside us. Since

we have immediate

immediate knowledge of objects

8

Hume,

Treatise p.84.
,

we have

representations of objects

access to our representations,

in space.

we must

also have

As noted above, however,

Kant's argument from idealism would indeed

demonstrate our immediate knowledge of objects, but would do
nothing to refute
skeptical idealism.

In the

second edition of the Critique Kant omits the anti-skeptical
argument of
,

the Fourth Paralogism that

Paralogism which
he abandons

rests

NOECP

think that there

is

is

based on

NOECP

(along with the argument in the same

on an unattractive form of idealism). Flowever,

it

is

not clear that

altogether in the anti-skeptical strategy of the second edition.

a possible reading of the "Refutation"-as

it

is

I

elucidated by Kant's

"General Note on the System of Principles" and his

later

-which has him basing his argument on

conjunction with a specific claim

NOECP,

in

Reflexionen on the "Refutation"-

about the necessary conditions of the possession of a particular sort of empirical
representation.

8.

The Refutation of Idealism Revisited

In the second edition of the Critique

which

I

Kant introduces the Refutation of Idealism,

will repeat here:

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of
time presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot
be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are

to

be met with

in

me

are representations; and as representations themselves

require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to

my

existence in the time wherein they change,

perception of this permanent

is

which

may be

their change,

and so

determined. Thus

possible only through a thing outside

me

and not

through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the
determination of my existence in time

is
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possible only through the existence of

actual things

my

which

existence

is at

I

the

perceive outside me. ...In other words, the consciousness
of
same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of

other things outside me. (B275-6.

1

have made changes

in

accordance with Kant's

instructions in his preface to the second edition [Bxxxix])

Kant claims

my

in this

argument

existence in time."

that

I

must perceive a "permanent"

The permanent needed

in order to "determine

for this cannot be a

mere enduring

representation, he continues, because the succession of my
representations cannot be

determined by

me

without

—

it.

My

ability to

determine

my

my own

states in time

states as

succeeding each other in some determinate order.

One
perceive

is

my

ability to

thing problematic about Kant’s argument

some permanent

As we saw

dependent on

in

Chapter Two, Guyer takes

we saw

in

conceive of my

why

is

own

this to

Chapter Three, takes

it

—

to order

subjective

he concludes that

thing in order even to conceive of succession in

conditions of making justified judgments about

Strawson, as

existence in time

I

must

my own

states.

be an argument about the necessary

my

subjective order of perceptions.

argument about the necessary

to be an

conditions of making legitimate or meaningful judgments of this kind. Yet a more
straightforward reading of the argument would be that

conditions of making any 'temporal determination'

-at all.

The

difficulty,

of course,

lies in

it

describes the necessary

—any judgments about temporal

order-

finding an argument which plausibly identifies a

necessary connection between this ability and the existence of objects in space.

Kant claims

in his First

Analogy

that the notion

the notion of an alteration in a substance.

Why

is
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this?

of a temporal succession involves

Because time

itself is not

an object

of perception, and thus time's successiveness
must be given by something other than a
direct

apprehension of it. In other words, time's successiveness
must be found

in the

successiveness of the changing states of substances.

On

this basis

conclusion

is

Kant can conclude

that the notion

of substance

is

innate in us. This

not problematic for him, because the notion of a substance

the notion of logical or grammatical subjecthood.

As

is

derived from

such, the notion has no intrinsic

empirical content.

The key question then becomes, "How do we acquire

the idea of alteration, and

thus the concept of temporal succession?" In his "General Note on the
System of the
Principles,"

answer

is

which comes shortly

that

we must

after the Refutation,

Kant answers

this question.

perceive alteration, because the concept of alteration

empirical and cannot be produced by the operation of reason alone.

He

is

claims

His

irreducibly

that, in

order to comprehend alteration,

we must take as our example motion, that is,
can we obtain the intuition of alterations, the

alteration in space.

possibility

Only

in this

way

of which can never be

comprehended through any pure understanding. For alteration is combination of
contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing.
Now how it is possible that from a given state of a thing an opposite state should
follow not only cannot be conceived by reason without an example, but
incomprehensible to reason without intuition. (B291-2)

Here Kant makes the claim

He

that

we must

is

actually

experience alteration in order to conceive of it.

also explains that the notion of alteration cannot be understood without the notion of

different times , since the notion of alteration involves the notion of a thing being in

two

different

and mutually exclusive

states; for

(completely) blue to (completely) red, then

blueness and redness. This

is

example,

it is

if

a thing alters color from

true that the thing instantiates both

a contradiction, and thus not conceivable, unless

understand these states as being instantiated in the thing

view
and

that the notion

of alteration

is

inextricably

at different times.

bound up with

So

we
it

is

Kant’s

the notion of individual

distinct times.

Leibniz thought that both spatial and temporal facts and relations could
be

reduced

In his

to

facts or relations, respectively.

"Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics" Leibniz says that "we deny that what

occurred

the

and derived from non-spatial and non-temporal

last

same

year and this year are simultaneous, for they involve incompatible states of

thing."

39

It

was

Leibniz's

view

that

we

invent the notion of a temporal relation to

account for apparent contradictions in perception of the sort Kant alludes to in the
General Note. This would account, then, on Leibniz's view, for the idea of temporal
succession.

But Kant goes on
the only

change

way

in

in the

General Note to reject Leibniz's answer.

for us to gain the idea of a temporal succession

is

He

claims that

actually to experience

an external object:

The

intuition required

is

the

movement of a

point in space.

The presence of the
is what

point in different locations (as a sequence of opposite determinations)

alone

first

afterwards

39

yields to us an intuition of alteration. For in order that

make

inner alterations likewise thinkable,

we must

we may

represent time (the

L.E. Loemker, ed. and trans., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz-Philosophical Papers

Letters (Dordrecht, 1969), p.666.
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and

form of inner sense) figuratively as a
drawing of this line (motion), and so

make comprehensible
reason of this

is

and the inner alteration through the
this manner by means of outer intuition

line,

in

the successive existence

that all alteration, if

it

something permanent in intuition, and that
is to be met with. (B292, my emphasis) 40

Kant sees

that the content

in inner sense

succession of representations

is

not the

represent a succession, he claims,

now observes— the

Kant

alteration) cannot

in different states.

no permanent

of my judgments concerning temporal order

underdetermined by the mere experience of my actual

as

of ourselves

I

same

states: as

states, a

as a representation of a succession. 41

must perceive something undergoing

To

alteration.

But—

come from

introspection, because he agrees with

self.

The claim Kant makes

is

Hume

that the

own

that

mere experience
succession of

because any temporal determination requires the idea of change, and such an idea

cannot originally

that

is

he repeatedly

of my actual states cannot explain the content of my thought of my

is

intuition

idea of such a thing (an enduring substance undergoing

introspection reveals no enduring

states,

The

is to be perceived as alteration, presupposes

it

come from

reflection

on

my own

must come from genuine outer sense:

it

inner workings. So Kant's conclusion

must come from the

actual experience of

alteration in an external object. Therefore external objects exist.

But

how can Kant justify

order to conceive of it?

To

this

his claim that

I

must have an experience of alteration

he gives no explicit answer.

likely-and completely overlooked-answer to this

40

The experience of motion

in

space

may

or

is

may

I

think, however, that a

evident. Kant's claim

is

that the idea

not be only one example of how one

could get the idea of alteration. Presumably, the experience of other kinds of objective
alteration,

such as change of color

in

an object, could also do the
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in

trick.

of temporal succession must be
given by such an experience;
allow

me

opposed

own

to resolve the inherent contradiction in the
notion

states; this resolution, finally,

would allow me

to

this idea in turn

of a single thing instantiating

conceive of succession

subjective states. Since the skeptic surely must
concede that

temporal order, then he must admit that

I

I

must temporal succession be given by an experience of alteration?

notion of temporal succession, the
is in

play.

On

conceive of

it,

this reading, Kant's

and thus

way Leibniz

claim that

to represent

intended to follow from the general

assign

have experienced objective

spurred by apparent contradictions in perception to use

I

my

must experience

claim that

I

my own

alteration.

Why

in

can’t

my

states a

But why

just be

I

imagination to construct the

suggests? Here

temporal succession in

Humean

would

is

where

I

think

NOECP

alteration in order to

my own

cannot use

states,

my

would be

imagination to

invent empirical content, in conjunction with the claim that the concept of alteration
(or
rather, the

concept of change over time)

notion of alteration

is

from experience. As

I

is

irreducibly empirical. In other words, the

held by Kant to contain a

noted

earlier,

Humean

simple idea, which must come

some of Kant's comments

in the

Fourth Paralogism

strongly indicate that he did endorse a principle like this and attempt to apply

it

in

refuting skepticism. Also, in the Refutation he echoes the 'argument from empiricism'

when he

says that representation by the imagination

"is

merely the reproduction of

previous outer perceptions, which. ..are possible only through the reality of outer objects"

(B278).

41

See, for example,

A99 and B225.
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For the application of NOECP to the idea of temporal succession
to be
appropriate, however,

primitive, or

we must

also be convinced that the idea of alteration contains a

(Humean) simple,

idea: only then can

we conclude from NOECP

experience of succession (or something embodying
necessary to conceive of
irreducible to

it.

ideas,

which

in turn

contains a primitive idea.

4
'

Vogel thinks

nothing outside of what happens

at a

could be supplied by experiences

may have

that this claim

thought that alteration

depends on the point

that there is

have no inherent characteristics by which they

be distinguished. In the section of the Critique devoted to a discussion of Leibniz's

Law, Kant contrasts

different yet exactly similar drops of water with different parts of

space (A263-4/B3 19-20). Even

common, he

says, they

may

if

two drops of water have

still

spatial or temporal location. In the

may

is

given time to distinguish individual times from each

other; in other words, individual times

in

the idea of alteration

the existence of outer things.

Jonathan Vogel has an account of why Kant

may

all their

internal characteristics

be distinguished by their external characteristics— their

same way, we might suppose, exactly

be distinguished by their spatial and/or temporal locations. This

is

similar events

not so, however,

with regard to individual times.

42

an

viz., objective alteration) is

So we need an account of why

some component

which do not imply

it,

that

Jonathan Vogel, "Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism* Reconsidered" (unpublished

manuscript), pp.l 1-2.
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According

to Vogel,

when Kant

says that

we must

experience objective change in

order to comprehend the possibility of "contradictorily
opposed determinations in the
existence of one and the

means

is

that the idea

same

thing" (be that thing an external object or myself),
what he

of a change of property

in a thing (and thus the resolution

of the

apparent contradiction) cannot be derived from the direct
postulation by the

understanding of individual temporal locations

(i.e.,

times) at which the object can

display different determinations without contradiction. This

would require

the direct

postulation of distinct, indiscernible individuals. Only after postulating
the existence of

such individuals could one then identify distinguishing characteristics on

by

their part

hypothesizing that they represent different times. But the point of saying that individual
times are indiscernible

is

that

one cannot postulate the existence of different times

to

explain different perceptual contents without presupposing the relation of temporal

succession needed to differentiate them. Once

temporal succession,

we can

we have

or understand the notion of

interpret our current subjective state as a

complex

representation involving components representing a single object at different times. But
since the relation of succession can neither be directly given by the experience of
different times nor invented

distinguish

puts

it , "

direct postulation of individual times with nothing to

them other than succession

in concreto,

claim that time

43

by the

is

i.e.,

itself,

in the intuition

succession must be experienced, as Vogel

of something that

41

alters."

This follows from the

not an object of perception: if the temporal location of an experience

Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” p.l

1.
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could be read directly off the content of that experience alone,
then there would be no

problem

marked

in

coming up with

the idea of change over time. If times were discemibly

as being located in a particular order, the distinction
between a subjective and

objective order of events could be derived from a comparison
between the order indicated

by the marks and the order of their reproduction by memory or imagination.
Any
deviation in the latter would be direct evidence of a distinct subjective
order of
experiences. Since times are not so marked, then by

be got by something

NOECP the

namely, by an experience which

else:

is

idea of succession must

not the result of a judgment

presupposing the idea of succession.

But

why

can't

we

successive change of our

get the idea of succession from introspective experience of the

own

mental states? In other words,

from inner sense, rather than outer? Vogel thinks
to this question.

distinct

from

good reason
intuition

state

He

their objects

to say this?

(A190/B235, A368,

is

at a

we

get this idea

compelling answer

As Vogel

would help avoid a

MAN preface AK 4.471).

Does Kant have

notes, "the identification of a mental state with

certain kind of infinite regress."

cannot exist unperceived, then for each mental

which

Kant hints

can't

notes that Kant states repeatedly that intuitions of inner sense are not

an intuition of it. But since the

44

that

why

latter is also a

mental

an intuition of that one, and so on.

Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation',” p.15.
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44

If

one thinks

that a

state there will exist another

state,

its

mental

which

then there must be another

is

Vogel thinks

that Kant's

answer

to the suggestion that

I

could get the idea of

succession by reflecting on the succession of my inner
states

of succession

in this

way because

mental states of which they are
direct perception

is that

I

cannot get the idea

the intuitions of inner sense are not identical with
the

intuitions. Inner sense,

Vogel

says, cannot provide a

of change because:

Inner sense discloses determinations of the subject itself, so that
a change
disclosed by inner sense would have to be the transition of the
subject from one
mental state to another. That is, one's mental state would not continue
to exist

when the change occurs. Yet, in order to observe a change,
one’s mental state (the representation of that change) has to continue
over the time
throughout the time

interval of the change. Thus, we have a dilemma. If one's
mental state remains
unchanged, there is no change to be perceived. Alternatively, if one’s state does
change, there is no persisting representation that comprehends the change. Inner

sense alone, then, does not allow for the observation of alteration. 45
If

we assume

claims that

that intuitions

we can

of inner sense are not distinct from their objects, Vogel

then conclude that there cannot be a direct intuition of the change of

one's inner states: for this, there

would have

to

be a continuing representation (a

perception of inner sense) which endured through a change in mental
a change in mental state, then there

experience of the change. This

is

is

no enduring

how Vogel

state

while time, and therefore everything that

45

46

is

which could serve

interprets the intended

Kant's claim that "space [the form of outer sense] alone

state.

is

But

if

there

as the

consequence of

determined as permanent,

in inner sense, is in constant flux" (B291).

Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” pp.7-8.

See Vogel, Appendix to “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” p.4
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46

is

It

state.

he

is right,

then there can be no direct perception of change

Such a change can be inferred by recollecting

change has taken place

in one's

mental

states.

mental

different mental states and

concluding, since they are not the same, that they
took place
that a

in one's

But

this

at different

times and thus

presupposes the idea of

succession and the ability to order one's states in time. So this non-direct,
inferential
ol noticing that one's mental states

undergo change cannot be the explanation

having the idea of succession; some

direct, non-inferential perception

reasoning goes) must be responsible for such an idea. But there
directly intuit

means

change

in

your mental

the non-continuity of

states as such, since

any intuition of inner sense

is

change

for

of change

way

my

(this

no time when you

in

your mental

states

that could count as an experience

of change.

But

is

my

actually perceiving an external object undergoing change the only

can come to have an idea of succession? Not for Hume.

He

is

He

agrees with Kant that

not an object of perception:

The idea of time

not deriv'd from a particular impression mix'd up with others,
and plainly distinguishable from them. ..The ideas of some objects [the mind]
certainly must have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at
is

any conception of time; which since it appears not as any primary distinct
impression, can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects
dispos'd in a certain manner, that

47

Hume,

is,

succeeding each other.

Treatise pp.36-7.
,
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I

has a different account of the

acquisition of the concept of alteration in an enduring substance.

time

way

47

Hume

thus agrees that our idea of time

is

derived from a succession of perceptions which

are themselves ascribed to objects undergoing
alteration.

But

Hume

does not agree that the fact

the existence of objects independent of me.

demonstrate that

it

is

not a violation ot

that

He

it.

He

idea of succession proves

has an account which

NOECP

alteration without actually experiencing

we have an

for us to

is

intended to

have an idea of objective

thinks that our judgments about external

substances can be explained by mere patterns, or regularities,

among our

experiences.

He

says that these patterns, in conjunction with inborn psychological
tendencies, cause us to
infer, unjustifiably, that external objects exist

(and undergo alteration).

He

therefore, that the experience of alteration in an enduring external thing

unjustified inference from a succession of internal states.

the possibility that

my

conception of temporal succession

is

What does Kant
is

thinks,

just an

say to rule out

derived from this kind of

process?

I

believe that Kant rules out

Hume's

alternative

by implicitly employing,

in the

Refutation and the above passage from the General Note, a version of what above
called the 'cart-before-the-horse strategy'. Kant's later reflection

I

have

on the Refutation of

Idealism strongly suggests this kind of reasoning:

The

intuition

of a thing as outside

me

presupposes the consciousness of a

determinability of my subject, whereby
therefore does not belong to

my

me... Therefore the possibility

I

am

not myself determinant, which

spontaneity, since the determining object

of representing things in space

consciousness of a determination through other things...
That dreams produce the illusion of existence outside

is

is

not in

grounded on

me

proves nothing

against this; for there must have always been preceding external perceptions.
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the

Originally to acquire a representation of something
outside
being passive is impossible...

me

without in fact

we were

affected only by ourselves, yet without noticing
this
spontaneity, only the form of time would be found
in our intuition; and we would
not be able to represent any space (an existence
outside us )....[E]mpirical
[I]f

consciousness as the determination of my existence in time would
be caught
and presuppose itself— but obviously be impossible since even the
representation of that which endures would be lacking. (R5653,

in

a

circle

,

18: 307-8,

emphases throughout) 48
Kant's response to the

Humean

account

is

my

that the idea of an independent, enduring

substance undergoing alteration cannot be merely inferred from
some sequence of inner
states of

mine because

the idea of alteration, and thus the idea of a substance,

is

a

condition of the recognition of any subjective sequence as a (temporal)
sequence.

only after

I

order

my

states temporally that

which could then be taken by

my

I

It is

will be able to detect a pattern in those states

understanding to indicate the presence of an external

object (or an internal object—i.e., the self) causing that pattern; but the experience of a

substance undergoing alteration, Kant's claim goes,

my

is

a necessary condition of ordering

49

states.

48

Trans, by Guyer, "Kant's Intentions
Review 92 (1983), pp.367-371.

in the Refutation

of Idealism," Philosophical

,

49

As

I

noted in Chapter One,

Hume

claims that present perceptions and memories are

distinguished on the basis of their relative "force and vivacity" ( Enquiries

p. 1 7); present
perceptions exhibit, on his view, a greater "pitch of vivacity" than memories, which
allows us always to distinguish between the two. One possible Kantian response to Hume

might be

that this

phenomenological

feature,

even

if

it

exists,

,

could not be the original

my ability to make the requisite sort of distinction. For to associate
phenomenological features with certain kinds of representation in the first place,
must already be able to make the distinction between these kinds of representation;
explanation for
certain

otherwise,

I

would not be able

to correlate a particular sort

with a particular sort of representation. Thus, to
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come

of phenomenological feature

to the understanding that

my

I

We
Suppose
the

I

can

image of an object

in

and so on.

undergoing motion

is

one part of my visual

Hume

says that

me to

my

to infer

in place,

I

and Kant as follows.

I

have a psychological

in a slightly

is

before

trait,

on Hume's view, which

take impressions demonstrating such relations as representative of
an

from

this

I

sequence of perceptions

must have already decided

his claim is that, in order even to

that SI

make such

the notion ot temporal succession,

undergoing

S2 the image of it

field,

subsequent judgment that an object

enduring object undergoing motion in space.

me

Hume

an inference based on the resemblance and apparent continuity

and contiguity of the impressions;
leads

of difference between

experience a succession of subjective impressions Sl....Sn,
where SI presents

different part,

me

illustrate the point

which

I

think Kant's response

that there is

of one by outer sense. But then

is

believe.

etc.

I

And
need

can only get by perceiving a permanent

me

to order

my

subjective perceptions.

not to be found in inner sense,

my judgment that there

To claim

an object undergoing alteration

a judgment (whether justified or not),

change cannot originally come from inference on

would have us

order for

preceded S2, and S2 preceded S3,

alteration; this notion in turn allows

Since (his claim goes) such a permanent

is that, in

my

I

must be aware

are external objects undergoing

subjective experiences, as

otherwise, as Kant says in R5653,

is to

Hume

give a circular

account of the development of my conception of myself as a being that experiences an

current state

is

interpretable in these kinds of ways,

distinguishing between them.
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I

must have some prior basis

for

independent world by means of a succession of
subjective experiences. As Kant says

in

R5654,
[I]f there were not an external sense,
that is, a capacity to become immediately
conscious ( without an inference of reason of something
as outside us and of
)

ourselves, on the contrary, in relation [to it], then the
representation of outer
things as such, space itself, would not even possibly
belong to our intuition.

(R5654,

18:

313-14,

Kant concludes
necessarily

first

emphasis mine)

in the Refutation that

"consciousness of my existence in time

bound up with consciousness of the condition of the

determination, and

it

is

therefore necessarily

bound up with

there

would be no way

objective order.

to think

I

of my internal

my

determined by

my

Once

for

me

to

all

possibility of this time-

the existence of things

outside me, as the condition of this time-determination" (B276).
representations of outer objects were

If,

per impossible,

my

merely spontaneous inner representations, then

make judgments-justified

or

not-conceming an

have the required representation of an objective order,
states as

is

I

can begin

themselves having a determinate order— an order

experience of objective events: in Kant's terms, this

is

to 'determine

existence in time', or to have 'empirical self-knowledge'. Without this empirical self-

knowledge, any inference from internal
Therefore

my

beliefs about

states to external objects

representation of alteration cannot originally

my

would be impossible.

come from an

inference from

internal states.

Kant finds on

this basis that "the

consciousness of my existence

is at

the

same

time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276): his

argument shows

that

I

must have some immediate— some non-inferential-contact
with

external objects in order to order

my

experiences and thus

self as subject of successive
experiences

become conscious both of my

and of my experiences as potentially

representative of an objective order.

I

PI

I

:

conclude that

we can summarize

Kant's argument in the Refutation as follows:

can make inferences about external things on the basis
of beliefs about

my

subjective states.

my subjective states in time.
my subjective states in time. [PI ,P2]
order my subjective states in time, then have

P2: If PI, then

LP3:

P4. If

I

can order

can order

I

can

I

I

a concept of temporal

succession.

LP5:
P6:

have a concept of temporal succession. [P3,P4]
itself cannot be perceived (i.e., temporal succession

I

Time

is

not itself directly

apprehensible).

TP?:

have a concept of temporal succession, then I have a concept of alteration.
[P6]
(This deduction relies on Kant's reasoning in the First Analogy.)
P8: I have a concept of alteration. [P5,P7]
P9:

If

I

NOECP.

P10: The concept of alteration contains a simple idea.
LP1 1 If I have a concept of alteration, then I have had a perception of alteration
[P9,P10]
:

LP12: Therefore

my

I can make inferences about external things
on the basis of beliefs about
subjective states only if I have had a perception of alteration. [PI -PI
1]

LP13:
LP14:

have had a perception of alteration. [P8.P 10-1 1]
I have had a non-inferential perception of alteration. [PI,
PI 2- 13] (The cart-beforethe-horse strategy is implemented.)
PI

5:

I

A non-inferential

perception of alteration must

come from

either inner sense or outer

sense.

PI 6: Inner sense cannot yield a non-inferential perception of alteration.

LP17:

have had a non-inferential perception of alteration by means of outer sense. [PI 4-

1

16]

PI

8: If

C:

An

have had a non-inferential perception of alteration by means of outer sense, then
an external object undergoing alteration has existed during my lifetime.
I

external object has existed during

my

lifetime. [PI 7,P1 8]
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This argument explains

why Kant

feels

inner experience, which for Descartes

of outer experience" (B275). Since

my

follows from

that

I

cannot

Note

ability to order

know
that

my

that an external

Kant

is

I

he can claim

is

in the

indubitable,

Refutation that "even our

possible only on the assumption

is

can prove that the existence of an external object
inner experience, the skeptic

world

exists.

is

wrong

in

claiming

50

not claiming that any of my particular judgments about
the

external world are true, or even justified. In a note
appended to the Refutation, he

observes

that,

[f]rom the fact that the existence of outer things is required for
the possibility of a
determinate consciousness of the self, it does not follow that every
intuitive

representation of outer things involves the existence of these things,
for their
representation can very well be the product merely of the imagination
(as in

dreams and delusions). ..Whether this or that experience be not purely imaginary,
must be ascertained from its special determinations, and through its congruence
with the criteria of all real experience. (B278-9)

Kant

s intent in the

that there

may

Refutation

for all

is

we know

only to defeat a sort of global skepticism which states

not be any material reality outside us at

judgments about the world remain dubitable, thanks

to the possibility

judgment being based on dream or delusion. Kant's argument,
that

I

must

at least at

some

point have been in contact with

50

Or

is false:

the skeptic

an external world exists, or

is at least

has ever existed, since

wrong

all this

in

at least

claiming that

argument

(if

I

some

sound) proves
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of any particular

is

own

know
that

shows just

external object as a

states.

must have existed

cannot

Particular

if successful,

necessary condition of my being aware of the succession of my

skepticism

all.

I

if

at

So global

some

point in

an external world

have

at

one time

my

lifetime.

that

Knowing

some of one

their

s

that global skepticism is false,

is

it is

reasonable to suppose

experiences are veridical and to measure their
credibility in part against

coherence with the

— How

however,

rest

of our experience.

the Refutatio n of Idealism Different

From

the First Edition ’Argument

From

Empiricism’?
I

have proposed

that the Refutation

of Idealism

in the

Critique of Pure Reason relies on the empiricist premise

from empiricism'

in the first edition

held that

we

NOECP, just

like the

'argument

of the Critique.

But does the Refutation succeed

NOECP-based argument

second edition of the

in

avoiding the same problem that beset Kant's

in the first edition

Fourth Paralogism? In that argument, Kant

could not be the cause of our representations of empirical qualities like

colors and sounds, and concluded that they must

come from

external things.

He

conceded, however, that inferences from internal representations to external things are

always uncertain, owing

to the possibility

of more than one cause of those

our representations of empirical qualities could not

could

still

have

their source in a

hidden faculty

come from our own

in us or

experienced an object independent of my mind.
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an evil

demon

states.

Even

if

imagination, they

outside us.

In the Refutation,

Kant holds

of alteration and concludes
in

is

can’t

this not

an

evil

we

that, since inner

which we might perceive

But

that

could not be the cause of our representation

sense does not reveal an enduring substance

alteration, this representation

must come from outer sense.

another case of inferring external things from inner
representations?

demon,

"moving point

in

for

example, be responsible for our alleged outer intuition of the

space”?

In fact, despite a superficial similarity, this

NOECP-based Fourth Paralogism argument. The

argument

is

not parallel to the

reason for this

is that,

argument from empiricism, the second edition Refutation of Idealism
interpreted

it)

Why

unlike that

(as

I

have

concerns not only the necessary conditions of gaining a certain kind
of

representation (in this case, the representation of alteration), but also the
necessary

conditions of making any inferences at

all.

This

is

the defining characteristic of the cart-

belore-the-horse strategy, and explains the advantage the Refutation has over the
edition

view

NOECP-based argument. The

that our

knowledge of external things

imagination could not produce
contrast, the

denies that

first

all

edition argument from empiricism accepts the

is

wholly

inferential,

while claiming that our

the inner states representing empirical qualities.

second edition argument, through

all

first

its

By

use of cart-before-the-horse reasoning,

our knowledge of external things can be inferential, because the experience

of something external— alteration

in

an enduring substance— is a necessary condition of
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subjective time-determination, and
thus of the possibility of any external-world

inferences at

all.

So the Refutation argument

differs

from the 'argument from empiricism' by

denying that our contact with external world objects

is

always

inferential.

The Cartesian

and Humean skeptics do not question our beliefs
about our current, immediate subjective
experiences; the Refutation argument, unlike the
'argument from empiricism', shows
successful) that

some of my experience of external world

epistemological status as

does not question the

Once

it

Since

is

I

latter,

immediate subjective experiences. Therefore,

aware of its

is

to

same

if

the skeptic

he should not question the former.

has been established that

objects, the final step

which

my

objects has had the

(if

I

have had non-inferential contact with external

claim that the only possibility

states as successive,

is

the

that

I,

as a consciousness

have actually experienced objective

have perceived an external object during

Transcendental Aesthetic) space

is

form

in

my

lifetime

and (according

alteration.

to the

which independent objects perceived

through outer intuition are presented to me, an object

in space has existed during

my

lifetime.

Note
lor

Kant

s

that this

argument requires no transcendental

views on space. The language of the Refutation

the idealist language of the

first

idealist premises, save

is

to

be contrasted, in

perhaps

fact, to

edition argument from idealism: there Kant explicitly

reduced objects to representations; in the Refutation he says that the required perception
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of an external object

‘is

possible only through a thing outside me, and not through
the

mere representation of a thing outside me" (B275). On
have given, Kant

may

be taken seriously on

this:

the reading of the Refutation

since his argument lacks transcendental

idealist premises, objections regarding his
transcendental idealism

appreciation of this

This
Experience.

is

is

more mature

the very

anti-skeptical

same general

need not affect our

argument of the second

edition.

There, like Kant, Lipson argues that experience of
things independent of us

did not do a good job of explaining his reasoning,

order to be aware of subjective succession,

it is

I

argued that

own
it

states.

necessary for us to think of ourselves as

of points of reference independent of ourselves. But
(this is

where

I

suggested Lipson

appear to us that such points

exist; this

is

we

relying on

would

While Lipson

went as follows. In

agents with respect to our points of view. In order for this to be
possible,

own

51

strategy that Lipson uses in his "Objective

a necessary condition of our being aware of succession
in our

our

I

require a

cannot

we need

come up with

NOECP).

Neither can

the idea

this idea

it

on

merely

judgment based on subjective

experiences already thought of as subjective and organized temporally, and such an
ordering

where

51

I

is

impossible without the prior idea of an independent point of reference

(this is

thought Lipson was implicitly using a cart-before-the-horse-type strategy).

Paul Guyer in fact argues that

Kant's intention all along in the Refutation to
depart fromn his transcendental idealism and establish the existence of objects in a preit

is

and non-phenomenal sense (Guyer [1987], pp.280-3). Whether or not this is so, it
of interest that Kant’s argument on my reading does not have to concern objects in the

critical
is

transcendental idealist sense.
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So, if Kant and Lipson are arguing as

I

have interpreted them, the only major

difference between their argument lies in
the necessary condition they focus on for a
subject's

awareness of the succession of his internal

states, a

condition they take to imply

the existence of something independent
of a self. In Kant's case the necessary condition
the presence of the idea of alteration; in
Lipson’s case

is

it

is

the presence of the idea of an

independent point of reference. In each case, they claim that
the relevant idea could
originally arise neither spontaneously as a result of the
action of the imagination nor from

an inference based on a succession of one’s internal
the only possibility

is

that

I,

as a consciousness

states.

which

is

Their final step

aware of its

is

to claim that

states as successive,

have actually experienced either objective alteration or independent
points of reference;

and

means

this

lifetime

that

an external world must have existed

at

some

point during

my

52
.

The argument

as

I

philosophical arguments.

Although

it

is

have construed

It

it

occupies an unusual niche

among

has one foot in both the a priori and empirical camps.

an a priori argument not relying on any particular observations,

it

is

empirical in relying on the fact of empirical experience in general--on the premise, that
that

52

one does make judgments about enduring and causally related external-world

Note

that

some

verificationist

arguments discussed

in the

argument says
meaningful,

I am examining here. Strawson's neo-Kantian
assuming our subjective/objective distinction is legitimate or
must be in possession of adequate criteria to apply external-world

that,

we

objects.

previous chapter give a

stronger result than the line of reasoning

concepts; but then

we must

be

in a position right

currently exists.
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now

to

know whether

the world

is,

These judgments indicate

From

this

that

one must be capable of ordering one's experiences

reasoning Kant feels one can conclude
that something exists or has existed--

namely, an external object undergoing change,
the perception of which

my

capacity to order

my

is

responsible for

experiences.

Descartes looked for

some marks by which

dreaming and waking experience; his

way

in time.

led to Cartesian skepticism.

evidence that one's experience

definitively to distinguish

failure to identify

Kant does not look

is

for

any such marks

in a

between

convincing

any such phenomenological

veridical:

In the realism

of outer sense nothing is asserted except that not even
imagination
could make any things at all representable as objects of
the senses outside

us as
such, unless there really were such a sense; thus we
do not distinguish the latter as
a capacity distinct from the imagination by sensation
alone, but by a certain
inference...

Kant looks

for

(R63

16, 18:622-3)

some capacity any

represent an outer world,

which

experiences— and gives reasons

skeptic must agree

in turn is

why

we have-in

dependent on the

that capacity

this case, the ability to

ability to order one's

would be impossible

in the

absence of

external objects. This allows us to infer from the reality of our inner sense
that outer

sense really does present (or

is

at least

has in the past presented) an outer world. The result

a reductio of the skeptic's position; Kant demonstrates (or hopes to) that the skeptic's

acceptance of the reality of inner sense
the reality of an external world.

is

incompatible with complete skepticism about

Thus Kant's argument
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is

an anti-skeptical transcendental

argument: an argument that the necessary conditions
of experience

in general include the

existence of outer objects.

Lipson considers

this sort

of argument

to be a distant relative

of the Cartesian

Cogito argument, which he represents as follows:

P 1 An experience occurs at t.
P2: If an experience occurs at
C: A self exists at
:

t,

then a self exists

at

/.

This argument premises not some particular empirical
experience, but rather

some experience

From

this,

it

is

taking place (which

I

can

just that

know immediately whenever I am

thinking).

concludes that something independent of experience exists— namely,
a

Like the Refutation argument (according to

my

construal),

it

self.

does not depend on some

suppressed premise connecting the possession of a concept of a certain sort
with access to
criteria sufficient to

verificationist

determine whether the concept

argument and

is

is

instantiated.

It is

not, therefore, a

not subject to the standard criticism of anti-skeptical

transcendental arguments given by Stroud and Brueckner.

10.

If

his

more

we

Making Sense of Non-Idealistic Immediacy

reduce objects to lawfully related representations, as Kant appears to do

idealistic

with them. But

if

moments, then

we do

Refutation— then what

is

it

is

easy to see

not want to do this— and

I

how we

don't think

a non-inferential alternative?
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can be

in

in

immediate contact

Kant wants

to

do

this in the

What

the Refutation says

is

necessary

is

a perception of alteration which

not

is

arrived at by inference from beliefs about
a succession of different perceptions. Neither

can the content ot

needed

is

this

mental representation be spontaneously arrived

at.

whether the only way

to sense

change

is

to sense

change

in

an

object.

come from

introspection on

Vogel's argument that there
intuition of

is

change of mental

my

changing mental

states

this leaves

The

original contact with temporal succession-the
original contact that

-could

is

an account of perception which describes single,
direct perceptions of change,

without degrading the status of objects to that of
representations. What

my

So what

any change

in

is

possibility that

NOECP

demands-

appeared to be blocked by

no intuition of inner sense which could count as a

state, since

open

direct

mental state means non-

continuity of any inner intuition. However, there are several available
compromise
positions which could be thought to explain the possibility of a non-inferential
perception

of change, though they each

fall

short of a refutation of skepticism.

There are several existing views on perception which would explain
could directly sense temporal complexity in an intuition which

complex

(i.e.,

The

first

two of these views employ what

account of perception.

On

Lipson,

"How Not

is

is

an apprehensible property like sound
called the ‘specious present’

the specious present account, experience

atomic moments of perception, each of which

53

not itself temporally

not itself in need of ordering). In other words, there are several views of

perception according to which temporal extension
or color.

is

how one

To...," p.

is

1
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is

temporally extended.

composed of

One such view

holds that one

may

be able to sense change by means
of a single intuition which

temporally extended, and thus comprehend an
extended span of time,

may

take place and be represented by

it;

this

view has been put

forth

in

is itself

which change

by Henry James,

A.N. Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, and Adolf
Grunbaum. Another view maintains

one may be able

which

is

to directly sense

an extended span of time by means of an intuition

not itself temporally extended; this view has been
maintained by

and C.D. Broad. Finally, Jonathan Vogel claims
an intuition which

is

that

Thomas Reid

one can sense change by means of

neither itself temporally extended nor able to directly
present a span

of time. The

first

perception.

shall discuss

I

that

two of these three theories employs

the notion of a 'specious present' of

each of these three views, respectively,

in the

next three

sections.

1 1

Taking

when we

his lead

.

Grunbaum's Specious Present

from James

4

and Whitehead,

attend to the "coming into being" of the

phenomenological evidence points

to the stream

^

Adolf Grunbaum claims

component

"4

were made up of infinitesimal temporal

parts of processes or events,

of our consciousness being divided into

atomic, temporally extended acts of consciousness. 56 Peter

life

parts,

Mclnemey adds

that, if

55

mental

any mental act of recollection or

See William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green,

1948), pp. 154-5.
56

that,

See A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, 1929), p.53.
Adolf Grunbaum, "Modem Science and Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion," The
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synthesis

would be of infinite complexity. 57 Grunbaum consequently divides
perceptual

experience into a series of 'specious nows' whose
duration

is

determined by the duration

of our acts of becoming aware of the occurrence
of events. Consider his description of
our perception of the movement of a runner:

suppose that we are perceptually aware of a runner's motion as it
and think of it as actually happening. Then our actual experience

is

taking place

of its
becoming. ..has the following feature: there is a first event of the motion,
constituted by the runner’s presence at the point of his departure,
a temporally
event right after the departure event, consecutively ordered
temporally
intermediate events... and the terminal event of the motion constituted
arrival there.

by his

58

Our temporal experience, on Grunbaum's view,
pet ceptihilia

next

which themselves— in

is

constituted by temporal

the case of the experience of a process

"

minima
which

involves continuous change— may encompass a change in perceptual content. 59

This might be thought to solve the problem of how
experience of alteration, because on this view what

consciousness

is

we

it

is

one can have a direct

experience with a single act of

an extended event; assuming a change in perceptual content over the

period in question, one could assert that one has had a non-inferential experience of
alteration— at least, that

Does

is,

of alteration

in perceptual content.

the notion of the direct experience of alteration in subjective states conflict

with the doctrine of the First Analogy? In the First Analogy Kant argues that the

Philosophy of Time, ed. by Richard M. Gale (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p.436.
57
Peter K. Mclnemey, "What Is Still Valuable in Husserl's Analyses of Inner TimeConsciousness," The Journal of Philosophy, 85 (1988), pp. 605-16.
58

Grunbaum, "Modem Science," p.437.
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distinction

between a subjective order of experiences
and an objective order of events

requires the postulation of enduring substances
its

necessity

(i.e.,

the non-accidentalness of

as the characteristic

which we use

its

whose

order). This necessity is

to distinguish

not inconsistent with the suggestion that

we

alteration gives the objective order

what he

identifies

between subjective and objective. This

is

perceive changes in perceptual content

within a single act of apprehension; one could

still

maintain

that, in

order to distinguish

an objective order from such a subjective succession,
one needs to postulate enduring
external objects

whose change

is

responsible for the change in states which one directly

apprehends.

Note

that,

even

if

we

accept this account of temporal awareness,

necessarily get an anti-skeptical result:

ol the passage

of events

is

all this

view says

is

we would

that our subjective experience

divided into a sequence of atomic, temporally extended

awarenesses. This theory would get us non-inferential awareness of change
since
,

would not take some unification of separate subjective

some independent

object.

However,

objects or their alteration; what

it

it

states in order to infer a

would mean

is

that

we

rule out the possibility of

This

is

not intended by

Grunbaum

in

itself tell

to

us nothing

itself: this

something other than external

objects being responsible for our changing experiences (recall that

59

change

experience changes in

about the cause of these changes in content, or about the cause of the content

would not

it

would not give us non-inferential contact with

perceptual content in the space of a single intuition. This would by

theory, in other words,

not

all

the First

Analogy

be a claim about objective, or physical, time.
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shows

is

we must suppose

that

that those

changes are caused by enduring external

substances).

The question
this atomicity?

for

Grunbaum

is,

"Why

does our experience allegedly demonstrate

His answer appears to be that perceptual experience, insofar
as

it

can

represent experience placed in a determinate subjective
temporal framework, requires

judgment; and judgment requires time. He claims

that our experience

of temporal

succession involves an awareness of the passage of a succession of
'nows' he calls

temporal

attribute

becoming.'

60

This becoming, he thinks,

"is

mind-dependent because

it is

not an

of physical events per se but requires the occurrence of states of conceptualized

awareness”.

6

'

As he

says,

what qualifies a physical [or mental] event as belonging to the present or as
now.. .is that at least one human.. .is conceptually aware of the following complex
having the experience of the event coincides temporally with an
awareness of the fact that he has it at all. 62
fact: that his

So

the extendedness or atomicity of experience

awareness of temporal passage
extended process to arrive

is

at the

is

accounted for by

fact that

our

a conceptual awareness, and so requires a temporally

judgment

that

an experience conforms to the concept in

question.

60
61

62

Grunbaum, "The Status of Temporal Becoming," The Philosophy of Time,
Grunbaum, "The Status...," p.324.
Grunbaum, "The Status...," p.333.
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p.322.

Izchak Miller questions Grunbaum's original
impetus for the claim that our
experience

made up of enduring

is

acts of awareness.

He

first

denies that reflection

reveals this, and also claims that,

we cannot reflectively individuate an instantaneous
act,
we do reflectively experience the continuity of our acts.
It

[although
an

act,

or a phase of

is

an overly

narrow empiricism which demands that every
theoretical notion of a
phenomenological theory be directly linked with reflective

observables.

Even

if

we

ignore this objection, Grunbaum's account cannot
be the ultimate

explanation for our awareness of succession. According
to Kant's argument,

unable to

make

63

we

are

subjective temporal determinations and thus order
our states in time

without the (non-inferential) experience of alteration.
Our hypothesis was that

Grunbaum's account of experience could explain how we can have
a

non-inferential

experience of alteration, since his account implies that our
perceptual acts are themselves
temporally extended and thus capable in a single act of comprehending
a change
perceptual content. But

we

see

now

in

that this account cannot fulfill the required role: a

temporally extended conceptual process requires the mind to go through
steps and

comparisons between data and a concept; but

and thus requires the

ability to

of temporal becoming

is

in

involves successive stages

a conceptual awareness that an experience

in

is

if

the awareness

'now', then the

such an awareness; but Kant's claim

Izchak Miller, Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness (Cambridge: The

Press, 1984), p.
64

it

determine the order thereof. 64 In addition,

concept of temporal change must be employed

6

doing so

make

1

73.

Also see Miller, Husserl

,

p.

1

69.
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is

MIT

that this concept

cannot arise on

its

own, and thus requires a prior perceptual experience

of succession. Grunbaum’s account thus

falls

prey to a cart-before-the-horse-type

argument, which would point out that a conceptual
awareness of temporal succession
cannot be presupposed by the ultimate explanation
of our ability to have a conceptual

awareness of temporal succession.
For these reasons, then, what Kant's argument demands,
as a necessary condition

of time-consciousness,

is

a temporally extended perception (or ‘intuition,’ to
use his

term), rather than a temporally extended conception.

account— regardless of whether
temporal experience

it

is

So the James/Whitehead/Grunbaum

a correct account of the conceptual nature of human

cannot account for an original, single experience of change.

12.

Broad's Specious Present

Following Reid, 65 C.D. Broad maintains that the contents of our acts of awareness
themselves have to have some duration. 66 Broad and Reid both think so basically because
it

is difficult

to see

how

a durationless event could be an object of perception. 67 Broad

claims that "a sensible event has a

time during which

65

66

it

is

finite duration

which may be roughly defined

as the

sensed, as distinct from being remembered...; what can be sensed

Thomas

Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers ed. by A.D. Woozley, p.209.
J.D. Mabbott notes that Locke also maintained this (though later also seemed to deny
,

See Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience of Time," The Philosophy of Time, p.304.
Broad also maintains, like James, et al, that acts of awareness have duration. But his
claim about the extensiveness of the objects of acts of awareness rather than the acts
it).

67

deserves independent scrutiny as a potential answer to the problem
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at

hand.

at

any given moment stretches a

little

way back behind

that

moment" 68 To
.

illustrate this

view, J.D. Mabbott uses the analogy of a searchlight
illuminating a continuously
changing, extended span of
time.

its

object (the stream of sense-data) as

it

69

There
of Principles

is

is

some reason
his section

to think

Kant shared

this

view. Another part of his Analytic

on the Axioms of Intuition." Like the Analogies, the Axioms

describe for Kant things which

we can

(in

some

sense)

know to be

independently of experience, since thinking of them in this

way

is

true

Axioms

is

that "all intuitions are extensive

of objects

a condition of

representing things objectively, or as part of an objective order. The
the

moves through

'a

priori principle'

magnitudes" (B202). This

is

of

to say that

everything which can be an object of perception must be generated out of parts

(A163/B203). According
perception,

is

I

to Kant, in order to think

must think of it as made up of extended

definitive of objects of perception that they be

extended

(in

of something as an object of

space and/or time, as the case

Kant further claims

(this

time

may

parts; in other

words, Kant thinks

made of parts which

it

are themselves

be).

in the Anticipations

of Perception)

that

Space and time are quanta continua because no part of them can be given save as
enclosed between limits (points or instants), and therefore only in such fashion
,

that this part

that

is,

is itself

again a space or a time. ...Points and instants are only

mere positions which

limit space

viewed as constituents capable of being given prior
nor time can be constructed. (A169/B21 1)

68
69

limits,

and time. ..and out of mere positions,
to space or time, neither space

C.D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923), p.348.
Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," pp.313-4.
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Kant appears

to be saying that infinitesimal points in space

logical constructs

which are

parasitical

on an a

and time are mathematical or

priori notion of, or

experience with,

objects extended in space and/or time (see also A25/B39,
A31-2/B47-8).

be Kant's position that what

is

basic to perception

is

So

it

appears to

objects (or at least sense-data) which

are extended in space and/or time.

If this

account were correct,

direct experience ot alteration, for

it

it

might solve the problem of how we can have a

implies that

we

are directly

aware

of perception of a temporally extended span of sense-data.

'instant'

comprehend a change
change,

we

in data,

then

could then use this to

we might

fill

in that

If

at

any given

such a span were to

characterize this as a direct perception of

condition identified by Kant as necessary to

gain awareness of ourselves as temporal beings with successive perceptions in a

determinate order.

70

1 his account, so long as

it

did not also maintain the necessity of temporally

extended acts of awareness, would be superior

which says only

that the objects

to that

of Grunbaum, since an account

of our awareness have duration does not require a

conceptual unification of an act of consciousness

itself

immersed

in

temporal succession.

70

The perceptive reader may wonder at this point whether this doctrine might conflict
with the First Analogy, which employs the premise that there is no direct perception of
endurance. Broad's account suggests that there may be a direct perception of the
endurance of sensory

states. But what the First Analogy actually requires is that there is
no direct perception of endurance through changes in mental state or sensation; such a
perception would explain the distinction between objective and subjective which the First
Analogy says must otherwise be derived from the postulation of independent substances
enduring through changes in their qualities.
,
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It

would not beg

the question, as

Grunbaum's does, of how we gain the

ability

of make

judgments about temporal succession.
Kant does

in fact say that

[apprehension by means merely of sensation occupies only an instant,
do not take into account the succession of different sensations. As

if.

that

sensation

element

is

is.

I

that

in the [field of]

appearance the apprehension of which does not involve a
successive synthesis proceeding from parts to the whole representation,
it has no
extensive magnitude. (A167/B209)

Kant thus seems

to explicitly

endorse the view

that,

while the objects of sensation have

extension in time, sensation itself does not; this he distinguishes from a case in which
a
synthesis of parts

if

is

one were engaged

required in order to arrive at a representation. Such would be the case
in a act

of judgment,

concept. Broad’s specious present account

in

is

which some data were brought under

a

primarily an account of a direct perceptual

awareness of endurance (and change), rather than one of a conceptual awareness thereof;
this is

what Kant's argument

Note

that, as in

requires.

Grunbaum’s account, even

if

the application of the theory of a

Broadian specious present of perception were successful,
to the skeptic. All Broad's account requires is that

we

it

would not provide an answer

be directly aware of change

sense-data; this says nothing about what the source of that data must be.

Broadian specious presents gives us

is

What

in

the

a direct perception of change--but not a direct

perception of objective alteration. Thus, again, even
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if this

account were correct and

our

successfully

employed

as fulfilling the key necessary condition of

making STJs

cited

by

Kant, proof of independent, temporally extended objects
would not follow.

There

is

also reason to think that Broad's account

cites the arbitrariness

of deciding just

the specious present of sense-data

measurement

are used, such as

the results of those

A
a duration

be.

71

just not accurate.

minimum

(or

is

Mabbott

maximum)

duration of

Whatever psychological methods of
can be recalled without

that

will vary across individuals, levels of fatigue

methods of measurement have produced widely

deeper problem

is

must

long the

amount of information

measurements

ol sense. Also different

how

is

error,

and types

different results.

suggested by the psychologist E.G. Boring. 72 Boring asks,

immediately observed, when do you observe

difficulty in understanding the connection

it?"

"if

His question points out the

between the 'moment' of observation and the

enduring input of the sense data which is— allegedly— immediately assimilated by the
observation. If the observation takes place in a
the sense-data,

it,

which

fall

moment, then what

is

the sense in

under that observation and yet do not occur

at the

can be contemporaneous objects of observation? This objection does not

fact that there

What Broad's account

implies

is

currently and directly aware of sense-data which are not actually present.

71

72

is

that this implication

is

just hard to accept.

Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," pp.315-7.

As

cited

same time

as

on the

rest

can be delays between events and our perceptions of them that are owing

limitations of the speed of sound or light.

Boring's point

which

by Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," p.3 1
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8.

I

that

I

can be

think that

to

One way

to

avoid Boring’s objection might be to conceive of
acts of awareness as

themselves temporally extended. But

if the

observation— the mental act of awareness-

comprehending the supposed specious present of perception

is

conceived of as

itself

temporally extended, then the account becomes subject to the same
cart-before-the-horsetype reasoning leveled against the use of Grunbaum's specious present
as the explanation
for our original idea

of alteration: such an account would presuppose the awareness of

succession in attempting to account for that awareness.
Miller questions one original impetus for the extended present of the real
or

phenomenal objects of awareness, namely the
durationless events.

He

fact that

claims, with Richard Gale, that

we do

not reflectively encounter

we can

derive the theoretical

existence of instantaneous slices of events from the existence of ostensively identified

enduring events.

73

"It is

an overly narrow empiricism," Gale says, "which demands that

every theoretical concept of a physical theory be directly linked with observables through
co-ordinating definitions."

74

So Broad's specious present would provide,
demands: a

73
74

direct perception of change.

in theory,

But Broad's account

Miller, Husserl , p. 1 73.

Richard M. Gale, The Philosophy of Time, p.394.
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what Kant's account
is

problematic.

13.

Vogel's

Jonathan Vogel has a suggestion as to

complex without

itself

Answer

how

being extended (and thus

a single intuition can be temporally

itself requiring

temporal synthesis) or

comprehending a temporally extended span of sense-data. His suggestion

is

that a single

’moment' of sense-data can exhibit or present temporal complexity-and
thus present

change

directly.

change without

Note how a graph of change
itself changing; thus a

glance

in population

at the

over time can represent such

graph can take

in the notion

of change

over time without a synthesis of temporally diverse pieces of information. Similarly, the
notation 'pp. 1-12’ can describe a sequence of pages without itself being a temporally

extended sequence. Obviously, the perception of a graph or a notation describing a

sequence requires an interpretation involving one's prior understanding of the notion of
succession.

Thus these

sorts

of perceptions cannot be ultimately responsible for our idea

of succession.
Consider, however, the blur you see
vision.

Vogel suggests

that a sense-data

when

'moment'

the notion of change without requiring either a

present.

The

succession in one's

76

76

of that experience can communicate

Grunbaumian

or Broadian specious

blurring of the object, in other words, supplies the content needed (according

to Kant's empiricist

77

a fast-moving fly crosses your field of

argument

own

in the Refutation) to

states.

Since no inference

conceive of change and thus, in turn,

is

required, the intuition of change in

Private conversation.

Each such 'moment'

will

have a manifold of sense-data as
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its

sensory content; thus

I

question can be called immediate. The key
difference between this view and those
of

Grunbaum and Broad

is

that

no change

of change: rather, the change

intuition

in content is postulated as being
part

is

supposed

to

of the single

be part of the temporally simple

sense-data presentation.

Vogel

s

communicated

account could also explain

how

non-inferentially. If Vogel's

Lipson's 'points of reference' could be

view

is

correct, then

we

could also get the

idea of an independent point of reference by noting
the change in perspective regarding

an external object through the same blurring

effect; in other

words, the idea of an

independent point of reference could be communicated directly
by the non-inferentially
perceived motion of one object relative to another, or of the
change which takes place

when

I

move my body

relative to

some

(relatively) fixed object or location.

Note, however, that, as in Grunbaum's and Broad's accounts of the
specious
present, this account

concede

that

would do

little

to

respond to the skeptic: even

change could be communicated non-inferentially

if

in this

the skeptic were to

way, he could

still

claim that the real source of the sense-data moments which communicate changes

remains a mystery. Vogel concedes

employing

this:

he says that Kant's argument, construed as

his explanation for the experience of change,

ambitious

in

some ways,

in other

ways

successful, it would show
some thing external to the mind had undergone some
change at some time. Thus, it would eliminate the possibility that your whole life
has been a dream. I'm not certain how much it would count against the possibility
is

that

call

we have knowledge

that

them sens e-data moments.
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it

is not. If

>ou have been a brain in a vat, whose events
object affecting your sense-organs. 77
that

Vogel

feels

are caused

by some material

he can conclude that the source of the sense-datum in question
(the

perception of the blurred fly) comes from 'outside', because, like
Kant, he
relying on the claim that the idea of change

must come from experience. But

my

sense-data

must be

come from

(or, rather,

must

this

at least at

implicitly

primitive or simple and that simple ideas

is

argument says nothing

external objects as

is

I

to secure the conclusion that

conceive of them;

all it

shows

one time have been) passive with respect

is

that

I

to a single

sense-datum presentation of change.
In addition to objections to the

Humean

principle

(i.e.,

NOECP)

at

work

Vogel's version of Kant's argument, a couple of objections to Vogel's suggestion

mind.

First

of all, can

we assume

that the temporal

in

come

to

complexity presented in simple sense-

data presentations can be detected without an act of inference or interpretation? Vogel's

view of the perception of change

is

meant

to supply

something which can play the role of

the intuitive presentation Kant's argument requires as a necessary condition of STJs.

STJs, furthermore, are a necessary condition of making any judgment, since any

judgment requires

the synthesis of temporally diverse mental contents.

Thus

if

Vogel's

alleged non-inferential presentation of change itself requires an act of judgment or

inference in order for the idea of change to be derived from

it,

then this sort of perception

cannot be the ultimate explanation for our ability to make STJs.

77

Vogel, "Kant's 'Refutation'," p.21, n.4.

155

On

Vogel's conception, however, the non-inferential
perception of change

a

is

presentation of sensory content which exhausts the
perceptual content of the simple idea

of alteration

78

in the

,

same way

that the experience

of something blue exhausts the

perceptual content of an idea of that shade of blue.
Vogel's claim

is

precisely that the

perception of change-as essentially similar to a perception
of any simple quality-does
not require interpretation; this
idea and that

we can have

Hume's claim
is

saying

is

is

the force of claiming that the idea of change

a single intuition of it. Vogel's claim, in

that all simple ideas

that the idea

from a simple impression of change.
idea of change

is

If the

Humean

is itself

simple,

this

Vogel

indeed derived

accepts the premise, then, that the

moving

blur of a fly

past. Is this blur

elementary component of my perception of rapid motion, or
conscious mind's collection of a series of moments?

is it

When you

an irreducible,

the appearance of my

take a photograph of

something moving rapidly, you see a

blur.

moving object over a period of time;

the film captures a blur because,

insufficient sensitivity, the shutter

could register on the film.

we

all

conclusion involve? Consider again Vogel's example of the

momentary impression of the

If

is

senses;

with

simple, then he should accept Vogel's conclusion.

But what does

78

a simple

fact, is consistent

come from simple impressions of the

of change, which he believes

is

I

The

blur

is

the impression

on the film of the

owing

needed to be open for a period of time so

would suggest

to the film's

that

that this reason for the blur appearing

an image

on film

believe the First Analogy, to the sensory content of the idea of change must be

added the a

priori

concept of substance

in

order to get an idea of alteration.
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is

roughly analogous to the reason for a blurred perception:
the blur represents for us the

combination of a series of perceived

fly positions.

a single impression of a blur apparently caused

required for our capacity to

make STJs,

if

Vogel's Kantian argument

by a "moving point

in space" is

is

what

that

is

then Vogel’s account of the impression must

involve the notion of a Broadian specious present:

combined

But

if

we

see a blur because of the

effect of a sequence of impressions, then a single impression of
a blur

encompass a temporally extended segment of sensory

must

input.

This leaves Vogel's account of the non-inferential perception of change open to

whatever criticisms pertain
those criticisms, as

we saw

observing something which

to Broad's notion

above,

is

is

of a specious present. The most troubling of

that Broad's account implies that

not present.

I

we can

be currently

also noted that, if we try to answer this

objection by conceiving of mental acts of awareness as themselves temporally extended,

then the reasons

direct

why Grunbaum's

account of temporal awareness cannot explain the

awareness of change required by Kant's argument will also undermine Vogel's

account.

Suppose, however, that Vogel's account about the direct experience of change
right

and

that concerns about the

Broadian specious present can be alleviated. There

remains a question as to what the Refutation— filled
picture of our

in this

way— adds

knowledge of the world. The Refutation, construed

the idea of change

is

is

a necessary condition of our
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to the

in this

Humean

way, says

that

making judgments concerning our

subjective temporal order. Using

Hume’s

principle that simple ideas

impressions and assuming that the idea of change
Refutation (as

have been reading

I

objective change

what

is

it)

a simple one, the argument of the

concludes that the non-inferential experience of

a necessary condition of STJs.

that non-inferential experience could be,

of our existence as temporal beings,

is

come from

we

When we

apply Vogel's version of

get the result that, if we are conscious

we must have been

at

some

point passive recipients

of a sensory impression of change. As noted above, Vogel agrees

that this conclusion

does not refute epistemological skepticism based on brain-in-a-vat (or
skepticism, but

come from

it

does show that the claim that

is,

what does

Hume's premise concerning
at all? If

skepticism

fact that

it

(i.e.,

it,

is

we

argument add

that

does not already follow from

the origin of simple ideas and the observation that

ideas of shape and color?

we have

come from dreams)

follow from the

The argument of the Refutation,

as

I

have

an attempt to show that the idea of change can be got inferentially only
in

could be got inferentially,

is

our allegedly adventitious ideas could

accept Hume's premise, then doesn't the falsity of global dream

was already employed

change

this

the claim that all our ideas might

we have

construed

demon)

ourselves-e.g., from dreams-can't be right.

The question

any ideas

all

evil

simple, and by

making STJs. This shows

it

come

cannot originally

Humean

reasoning

it

that,

to us

if

though the idea of change

by

this

method. So the idea of

must then come from a simple impression.

Thus our idea of change must come from something independent of us. But we already
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knew

before

all this

that the idea, say, of a particular shade of blue
is a simple idea that

must come from a simple impression and,
independent of us;

we knew

shades of blue cannot

all

at the outset

particular shades could).

to the idea

of change?

is

Hume

inferentially

So why go

denied that

must come from something

(we may suppose)

have been derived

some such

Recall that

therefore,

we have

from something

to all the trouble

why Kant

states

not.

A

would do something

of proving

this in regard

my perceptions.

This might

that

its

application to other simple empirical ideas

of a substance, could be described as a direct perception of endurance.

we

could not

fact that there is

know that

from

this that, if

Hume

no direct perception of endurance not only

substances exist, but also that the idea of a substance— i.e., an

independent, relatively abiding external-world object— was without content.
led to think

NOECP to

direct perception of change, if legitimately attributed to an alteration of

concluded from the alleged
that

else (even if

(and perhaps also Vogel) might be led to think that applying

the idea of change

would

of the various

a legitimate idea of substance because there

not a direct perception of endurance through changes in

explain

that the ideas

one could show

that

One might be

one had a direct perception of

endurance, then Hume’s skepticism would be refuted.

But the argument as Vogel construes

argument shows
necessary

it

may

is that

one has a

it

could not accomplish

direct perception

of change

this: at best, all

in one's states.

However

be for us to postulate (as the First Analogy claims) the existence of
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the

substances in order to distinguish conceptually
between a subjective and an objective
order of perceptions, this does not

show

that

such things

Alternatively, one could argue that, if Vogel

change

is

in one's states is possible, the direct
perception

also be possible.

object’s

But

this

would not

exist.

right that a direct perception

of

of endurance

must

in those states

constitute a direct perception of an independent

endurance through a change in mental

meaninglessness of our references to substance

states;

rests

Hume's point about

the

on the lack of a perception of the

latter sort.

Either way, whether

change, the most

is false.

material world: an evil

it

relevant to skepticism by this reasoning

is

that global

This does not allow us to reject Cartesian skepticism about the

demon could

still

be responsible for our sense-impressions of

could be responsible for our other adventitious ideas. At best,

Refutation can do

comes from

focus on the idea of a shade of blue or on the idea of

we can conclude

dream skepticism

change just as

we

is

'outer'

to

show

that

my

sense rather than

idea of change

'inner' sense;

it

is

all

the

indeed adventitious and thus

cannot show that

it

comes from

the

experience of a material object in space.

There
that

is,

some of my

in fact, a footnote to the Refutation

ideas

come from

outside

me was

all

which suggests
Kant

really

that

wanted

merely showing
to prove:

The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer

things is, in the preceding
presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness
understood by us or not. The question as to its possibility would be this: whether
thesis, not

we have an
It is

clear,

inner sense only, and no outer sense, but merely an outer imagination.

however, that

in

order even only to imagine something as outer, that
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is.

to present

it to sense in intuition, we
must already have an outer sense, and must
thereby immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of
an outer intuition from the
spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination. For
should we merely
be imagining an outer sense, the faculty of intuition, which
is to be determined

by

the faculty of imagination,

Vogel claims

that, if

unperceived, then

we imagine

we

itself

the existence of mental states

at least to a certain extent,

Presumably the same would hold true

However, even

if

we

make them

for faculties

n.)

which can

whose ontological

objects in the 'external

which produce mental

way

is

weak and

showing

that

something other than one's mind

skepticism primarily question whether what
external to

states.

dissatisfying as an

to the skeptic. Skepticism is not limited to an absolute solipsism

refuted by

exist

disregard the other problems with this line of reasoning, the

conclusion of this argument understood in this

answer

be annulled. (B276-7,

are thereby imagining mind-independent items

independence "would,

world

would

my mind-namely,

I

which can be

exists. Cartesian

and

Humean

think of as the components of the world

spatially extended enduring objects-exist.

What Kant

needs to repair the "scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general" perpetrated by
Descartes and

Hume

is

something altogether stronger: what

is

needed

is

the true

"immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" he lays claim
the Refutation. But through

Kant hints

at

what mechanism could such consciousness be achieved?

an answer. In the second edition preface note concerning the

Refutation he suggests a closer connection between

my

ability to

existence in time and the existence of an object outside me:
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determine

my own

to in

This

must therefore be an external thing distinct from all
my representations,
existence must be included in the determination
of my own existence,
constituting with it but a single experience such
as would not take place even
inwardly if it were also at the same time, in part, outer.
How this should be
possible we are as little capable of explaining further
as we are of accounting for
our being able to think the abiding in time, the
coexistence of which with the
changing generates the concept of alteration. (Bxli, n.)
and

There are
in

latter

its

at least

two ways of reading

this passage.

which the sense-experience of change conditions

in time; the other is to

read

it

more

experience of an external object

is

literally, as

somehow

determination of my existence in time. The
skeptic's inferential picture, in

experience. But

if there is

which we

any way

to

One

my

is to

read

ability to

describing the

way

demonstrate the

falsity

in

my

way

existence

which an actual

identical to (or a proper part of) the original

latter

would

constitute a rejection of the

infer facts about the

make such

world from sense-

a rejection coherent without degrading

tell

us what

it is.

Concluding Remarks

The mature Kantian approach
to

as describing the

determine

the status of objects to that of mere representations, Kant does not

14.

it

to the

problem of skepticism

is

a tantalizing attempt

of the radical skeptical hypothesis by using premises about

general and undeniable facts about one's

own

experience in conjunction with a

fundamental, widely accepted view of the origin of our mental contents-a view explicitly

embraced

at least

by the empiricist

skeptic. This

several respects.

79

Vogel, "Kant's 'Refutation'," pp.25-6, n.26.
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approach

may

fall short,

however,

in

First

of all, for the skeptic to be refuted,

certain; as long as

NOECP

which depends on

it.

need

show

to

rests

on

needs to be established as

remains dubitable, so does the conclusion of any
argument

For Hume’s introspective evidence for

that Descartes is right

of any faculty

activity

NOECP

in

me (my

when he

says that

I

am

NOECP

to

be sufficient,

we

necessarily aware of the

mind). But Descartes’ support for this belief ultimately

his outdated demonstrations of God's existence. In
defending Kant's argument,

Vogel suggests
introspection

80
.

that

we

should just trust the intuition that

my

mental

life is

transparent to

But when one considers the contemporary acceptance of talk about
the

unconscious and subconscious mind,

this faith in inner transparency is not very

compelling.

Vogel also suggests

dreams because
dreams
that

my

rests

my

of my idea of succession cannot come from

awareness of the alteration

in

my own

on a prior grasp of the idea of succession

idea of succession

faculty in

that the origin

me

is

inferred

from

my

81
.

states that takes place in

But the relevant hypothesis

is

not

dreams, but that some unknown mental

might be capable of spontaneously and non-inferentially generating the idea

of succession. The feeling that such a faculty cannot exist

is

based on an empiricist

prejudice which can be questioned by the epistemological skeptic just as readily as the
prejudice that

I

am

clearly in regular contact with an external world

by means of my

senses; that this prejudice has not often been questioned in epistemological discussions

80
81

Private conversation.
Private conversation.
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is

just a result of the fact that

one

relevance to external world skepticism

its

fully understands Kant’s attempt to refute

On
assume

the other hand, as

that

my

reason

skepticism about

my

is

I

argued

one could argue

functioning properly as

I

that

my

it

is

acceptable to

devise an anti-skeptical argument, for

unanswerable by argument and thus could be

said to represent a different level of skepticism altogether.
If this

assumption about

not apparent until

it.

earlier,

ability to reason is

is

cognitive capacity— the assumption that

I

is so,

am

then another

not capable of

generating original empirical content-doesn’t seem so unreasonable, since
that

assumption

is

only a negative claim about

If we accept this

capacities, rather than a positive one.

assumption and thus accept

that the idea of succession

am

my

is

a

Humean

NOECP,

simple idea, then

and add

at least

we

to that the claim

get the result that

I

passive with respect to the inception of some of my ideas and thus possess not only an

outer imagination but also a genuine 'outer sense'. This would be sufficient to refute a
radical solipsism based

on dream or hidden

from passivity with regard
addition, this result

to

faculty skepticism.

some sense-experiences

would seem

to follow

However,

to the existence

it

is

a big step

of outer objects. In

from Hume's empiricism about other simple

ideas without Kant’s help.

Kant's argument gives the result that

contact with change.

our

own

One way

(outer) sense-data

we have

to explain this

comes

in the

a direct, non-inferential perceptual

would be

to claim that our consciousness

form of a specious present;
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in other

of

words, that

our awareness of our

own

sense-experiences comes in the form of a sequence of

awarenesses which have duration and thus have temporally extended
sensory contents.

As we have

seen, however,

it is

very difficult to understand

immediately aware of sense-data that are not present.
to see, as

Kant and Reid pointed

out,

how we

On

how we

the other hand,

it

can be

is

also difficult

could be aware of a temporally unextended

piece of data.
In any event, if we construe the conclusion of the argument as implying a
direct

consciousness of sense-data, the skeptic can always question the origin of that data. If we
accept the possibility that the direct perception of endurance argued for by the Refutation

could

mean just

the direct perception of enduring sense-data presentations, then the

Refutation loses what distinguished
Recall that the

inferential.

accepts

latter

it

from the

argument accepted

that our

knowledge of the external world

This allows the skeptic to question the true source of my ideas, even

NOECP

and the claim that

I

myself (or the

the souce of my ideas of empirical qualities.

this

edition 'argument from empiricism'.

first

argument by showing

that

faculties

I

know

I

is

if

he

possess) cannot be

The Refutation was intended

some immediate experience of enduring

to

improve on

objects

is

necessary. But if we allow the experience of mere sense-data presentations to serve the

purpose of generating the idea of alteration, then

have immediate contact with external

we

also discard the notion that

objects. Skeptical hypotheses like the evil

hypothesis remain untouched by such a conclusion, and so this argument would
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we must
demon
fall

well

short of repairing "the scandal to philosophy
and to

human

reason" that Kant set out to

fix.

An
objects

is

alternative

and stronger conclusion regarding

direct contact with external

hinted at by Kant in his preface note regard the
Refutation, but

explained.

It is

it

is

not

unsatisfying to leave the answer, as he sometimes
seems to want to do, as

an unexplainable brute fact about us: a mysterious immediate
contact with objects

simply must have as a condition of empirical self-consciousness
and which

human reason

unexplainable by

form of our experience
Still, this

is

is

we

as

as the fact that the universe exists, or the fact that the

spatio-temporal.

argument

is

much more

interesting than a

mere application of idealism,

or a trivial application of a problematic verificationist principle. Also,
the conclusion

allegedly reached by the argument

knowledge

is

the right one for a response to skepticism: actual

of objects, rather than justified belief in them, or meaningful reference to

them. Contrary to Strawson's protestations, the
"a priori genetic psychology," in

way

which one argues

to get this result is indeed to attempt

in favor

of certain necessary

conditions of being able even to form certain sorts of belief-regardless of whether those
beliefs are either justified or meaningful.

Also,

now

that

we

understand the nature of Kant's argument in the Refutation,

can clear up Guyer's confusion about
Refutation

is

it.

we

Recall that Guyer concluded that the goal of the

to give a necessary condition

of the justification of STJs because he did not
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see "in what sense a principle

which

is

not a psychological factor in the production of a

form of belief can serve as a condition of the possibility of a form of
judgment except by
furnishing the basic framework for the justification of beliefs" 82 In
fact, the Refutation

is

an argument about a necessary condition of the formation of a kind of
belief-a belief
about succession

own

in one's

judgments about one's own

states.

states,

The

which

latter is

a condition of the possibility of

in turn is necessary for

judgments about the

external world.

"Clearly,"

Guyer

says, "Kant does not treat claims to the

knowledge of the

existence of external objects as a psychological condition in the refutation of idealism." 83

This

is right,

genuine

(if

but

we have

seen in this essay that there

not necessarily veridical) outer experience

certain kinds of judgments;

and

if

it

is

that

is

a coherent line of argument that

a necessary condition of making

outer experience could be

making such judgments, then one could then
knowledge

is

at least

make

shown

to be a condition

a general claim to have

something external to oneself exists. Kant's argument as

a failure, but

it

comes

tantalizingly close to a goal that

missed by a wide margin.

82

Guyer, Kant, p.304; see Chapter Two, above.

83

Guyer, Kant p.304.
,
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of

many of his

I

have construed

imitators have
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